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C L A Y T O N  P .  G I L L E T T E  &  D A V I D  A .  S K E E L ,  J R .  
 
Governance Reform and the Judicial Role in 
Municipal Bankruptcy 
abstract.  Recent proceedings involving large municipalities such as Detroit, Stockton, and 
Vallejo illustrate both the utility and limitations of using the Bankruptcy Code to adjust 
municipal debt. In this Article, we contend that, to resolve fully the distress of a substantial city, 
municipal bankruptcy needs to provide more than simple debt reduction. Debt adjustment alone 
does nothing to remedy the fragmented decision making and incentives for expanding municipal 
budgets that are ingrained in municipal governance structures and that often underlie municipal 
distress. Unless bankruptcy also addresses governance dysfunction, the city faces a return to 
financial distress. Indeed, this Article demonstrates that governance restructuring has long been 
an essential element of corporate bankruptcy and that, given the monopoly position of local 
governments as providers of local public goods, it is even more important in the municipal  
bankruptcy context. 
Some might argue that reducing a city’s debt is the best that bankruptcy courts can offer, 
due to concerns that a more comprehensive approach would, among other things, interfere with 
state sovereignty and exceed the statutory authority that the Bankruptcy Code grants to courts. 
In our view, these concerns do not withstand scrutiny. Based on a careful analysis of the origins 
of the current municipal bankruptcy provisions, as well as an assessment of recent Supreme 
Court jurisprudence, we argue that governance reform is permitted even under existing law, and 
point out that minor adjustments to municipal bankruptcy law would make this conclusion even 
clearer. To be sure, the states themselves, rather than a bankruptcy court, ideally should be the 
ones to effect municipal governance reform. But political factors and the imperatives of the 
immediate fiscal crisis make state intervention unlikely, thus underscoring the need for a more 
comprehensive approach to municipal bankruptcy. 
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introduction 
As an increasing number of municipalities take advantage of the ability to 
adjust their debts under Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code, the utility and 
efficiency of that scheme has become more apparent.1 Fears that Chapter 9 
would be incapable of handling the fiscal distress of large cities have dissipated 
as bankruptcy courts have deftly managed the bankruptcies of Vallejo, San 
Bernardino, and Stockton, California; Jefferson County, Alabama; and Detroit, 
Michigan.2 These episodes have revealed that bankruptcy courts can balance 
the interests of the various stakeholders—creditors, pensioners, the state, and 
residents—involved when municipalities face fiscal distress.  
Less clear is whether the dexterity that bankruptcy courts display in 
adjusting municipal debts has lasting effects on municipal fiscal health. Courts 
tend to focus almost exclusively on the debt overhang problem—that is, on 
reducing the municipality’s debt burden to a level that permits a city to devote 
scarce resources to providing services rather than solely to paying creditors. To 
the extent that municipal distress results from a debt burden that stifles 
investment and diverts municipal budgets to legacy costs rather than future 
productivity, the ability to pare down a municipality’s debt may be sufficient.  
But municipal distress—especially the distress of a substantial city—rarely 
is simply a matter of too much debt. Failed budget policies do not arise 
autonomously, disaggregated from the political environment in which they are 
devised. Rather, with the exception of cases in which municipalities face some 
exogenous shock, such as a crippling tort suit or natural disaster, or in which 
local governments suffer from broad economic disruptions beyond their 
control, local fiscal crises usually are caused by a governance structure that 
tolerates financial decisions in which the benefits and costs of public 
expenditures are misaligned. The disparity may be temporal. Local political 
officials concerned about electoral success or opportunities for higher office 
may favor programs that promise short-term benefits paid for through long-
term costs. Alternatively, the mismatch may be spatial. Programs that produce 
highly concentrated benefits in some districts within the locality may be 
 
1. For a thoughtful analysis of the details of the recent wave of municipal receiverships and 
bankruptcies, see Michelle Wilde Anderson, The New Minimal Cities, 123 YALE L.J. 1118, 
1130-51 (2014).  
2. For doubts about whether Chapter 9 would be adequate for the needs of large cities, see 
ROBIN JEWELER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33924, MUNICIPAL REORGANIZATION: CHAPTER 
9 OF THE U.S. BANKRUPTCY CODE 1-2 (2007) (noting that the vast majority of Chapter 9 
reorganizations are by small districts); Omer Kimhi, Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code: A 
Solution in Search of a Problem, 27 YALE J. ON REG. 351, 360-61 (2010) (describing Chapter 9 
as “used by tiny municipalities under peculiar circumstances”). 
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financed by imposing costs on neighboring districts, with the result that the 
commons of the municipal budget faces overuse.3 Or, officials may adopt 
policies that confer inefficient benefits on small, concentrated groups and 
discourage electoral redress by spreading the costs among the diffuse 
electorate.4  
The institutions of local governance that permit these misalignments tend 
to be entrenched in city charters or bureaucratic regimes, and left 
unchallenged, they survive even after bankruptcy proceedings adjust the debts 
to which they have given rise. According to the conventional wisdom, Chapter 
9 has little to say about these issues other than to preclude the bankruptcy 
court from usurping the political or governmental powers of the municipal 
debtor.5 If the conventional wisdom is correct, Chapter 9 cannot meaningfully 
reduce the risk of recidivism for a financially distressed municipality. The debt 
adjustment provided by Chapter 9 offers temporary relief before the next crisis, 
not a thoroughgoing remedy aimed at the root causes of municipal distress.  
This Article challenges the traditional account. We contend that municipal 
bankruptcy can and should address governance failures where they contribute 
to financial failures. We argue that this conclusion follows from an 
appreciation of the similarities between municipal corporations and the for-
profit corporations that are reorganized in Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. 
Where governance failures contribute to corporate financial distress, no one 
would treat governance reform as irrelevant to the reorganization of a 
corporation. Carefully crafted governance rules were a central feature of the 
Chrysler bankruptcy,6 and governance rules figure prominently in most other 
substantial Chapter 11 cases as well. From a purely functional perspective, 
governance reform is even more essential to an effective Chapter 9 municipal 
bankruptcy than it is in Chapter 11, since at least some stakeholders in 
insolvent municipalities are more dependent on those entities than are 
stakeholders in insolvent firms. 
Municipal bankruptcy does not just facilitate governance reform: in many 
cases, the logic of the municipal bankruptcy process requires governance 
 
3. For a discussion of the metaphor of the commons as it applies to municipal budgets, see 
infra notes 153-156 and accompanying text. 
4. See CLAYTON P. GILLETTE, LOCAL REDISTRIBUTION AND LOCAL DEMOCRACY: INTEREST 
GROUPS AND THE COURTS 75-80 (2011). 
5. See 11 U.S.C. § 904 (2012); Kimhi, supra note 2, at 357. 
6. As described infra Section I.B, the governance reforms were especially elaborate in the 
Chrysler bankruptcy. The parties allocated specified numbers of seats on Chrysler’s board of 
directors to each of its major postbankruptcy shareholders: Chrysler retirees, Fiat, Canada, 
and the United States. 
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reform. The public—and inherently political—nature of municipal debtors has 
traditionally been seen to preclude the use of Chapter 9 for anything other than 
reducing a municipality’s debt.7 Our position is that the political nature of 
municipal fiscal distress has precisely the opposite implication. The financial 
distress of a substantial municipality nearly always signals that its politics are 
dysfunctional. The same entrenched political environment that exacerbates 
fiscal instability may also frustrate efforts to initiate reforms necessary to escape 
a cycle of financial irresponsibility. That entrenchment can be overcome only 
by the inducement or imposition of structural reforms from outside the 
municipality.  
Ideally, the outside catalyst would be the state, which retains substantial 
authority over its political subdivisions. But political entrenchment may also 
constrain the state from inducing or imposing structural reforms that are 
needed for fiscal stability. Where that is the case, and where the state accedes to 
a municipality’s use of the federal bankruptcy courts, we conclude that the 
bankruptcy judge should and does have leeway to induce necessary reforms. 
Yet discussions of Chapter 9 consistently ignore the possibility of governance 
reform, even where it is essential to revive a financially failed municipality. 
Although conventional wisdom suggests that governance reform in bankruptcy 
infringes on state sovereignty, which perhaps explains its neglect, we contend 
that governance restructuring in Chapter 9 passes constitutional muster.  
Two decades ago, Michael McConnell and Randal Picker made the most 
comprehensive argument to date for moving beyond the debt-adjustment 
model of municipal bankruptcy.8 They contended that municipal bankruptcy 
should permit reorganization of municipal structures in ways that were 
analogous to the reorganization of firms in Chapter 11. For McConnell and 
Picker, the expanded powers of the court would include authority to mandate 
“politically unpopular reforms,”9 such as authority to collect taxes to pay 
preexisting debt; to order reductions in expenditures; to sell municipal assets; 
and perhaps even to reorganize the boundaries of or to dissolve the debtor 
municipality based on applicable state-law principles.10 McConnell and Picker 
 
7. See, e.g., Kimhi, supra note 2, at 353-54, 395 (arguing that Chapter 9 cannot solve political 
and socioeconomic problems and advocating that Chapter 9 be given the narrow role of 
solving creditor-holdout problems). 
8. Michael W. McConnell & Randal C. Picker, When Cities Go Broke: A Conceptual Introduction 
to Municipal Bankruptcy, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 425, 472-81 (1993). 
9. Id. at 475. 
10. Id. at 475-77, 481-86. Michelle Anderson has also explored dissolution as a possible response 
to municipal distress—especially the distress of small municipalities. See, e.g., Michelle 
Wilde Anderson, Dissolving Cities, 121 YALE L.J. 1364, 1432-33 (2012); Michelle Wilde 
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advocated that these reforms take place in state bankruptcy proceedings rather 
than in federal bankruptcy court. 11  Implicit in McConnell and Picker’s 
recommendations is an optimistic story of a benign state willing and able to 
enact reforms that facilitate municipal fiscal discipline. 
We share McConnell and Picker’s intuition that relief for fiscally distressed 
municipalities necessarily entails more than debt reduction. We focus, 
however, on the design of municipal decision-making institutions rather than 
boundaries or tax decisions, and look to the federal bankruptcy court as the 
catalyst for reform. Where the state intervenes to redress structural difficulties 
that cause fiscal distress, there may be little need for bankruptcy court 
intervention. But where the state fails to do so because of its own political 
constraints, rather than as a consequence of a deliberate decision, we find fewer 
reasons to preclude bankruptcy courts from filling the gap. While state political 
inertia has always been a concern, its salience has increased considerably in the 
two decades since McConnell and Picker wrote their classic article. In short, we 
view bankruptcy court intervention into municipal governance as an option, 
not a requirement. It is warranted by the same entrenchment problem that has 
led commentators to advocate for more intensive judicial intervention in other 
public arenas, such as voting rights or prison reform, where political incentives 
inhibit changes that one might otherwise prefer be made through the political 
process.12 Indeed, we anticipate that the very presence of the option will make 
its exercise less necessary, as states otherwise politically constrained from 
enacting necessary reforms for distressed municipalities may prefer to do so 
themselves, rather than leave the task to bankruptcy courts.  
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I explores the similarities between the 
roles of municipalities and private corporations as providers of services, but 
emphasizes that the monopoly position of the former justifies a greater concern 
for protecting municipalities’ ongoing viability, rather than simply maximizing 
the recoveries of creditors. This distinction, which seems to be reflected in the 
 
Anderson, Who Needs Local Government Anyway? Dissolution in Pennsylvania’s Distressed 
Cities, 24 WIDENER L.J. 149, 166-72 (2015). 
11. McConnell & Picker, supra note 8, at 479. 
12. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics as Markets: Partisan Lockups of the 
Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643, 699-707 (1998); Michael J. Klarman, Majoritarian 
Judicial Review: The Entrenchment Problem, 85 GEO. L.J. 491, 509-26 (1997); Richard H. 
Pildes, The Supreme Court, 2003 Term—Foreword: The Constitutionalization of Democratic 
Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 28, 153-54 (2004); Susan Sturm, Resolving the Remedial Dilemma: 
Strategies of Judicial Intervention in Prisons, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 805, 846-60 (1990); cf. Ariz. 
State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2672 (2015) (reading 
the Elections Clause of the Federal Constitution “as a safeguard against manipulation of 
electoral rules by politicians and factions in the States to entrench themselves or place their 
interests over those of the electorate”). 
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greater emphasis on a fresh start in municipal bankruptcy than in Chapter 11, 
underscores the need to address a municipal debtor’s underlying problems, 
rather than solely reduce the amount of its debt. Even if governance reform 
was unheard of in Chapter 11, there would be a powerful case for attending to 
governance concerns in Chapter 9. In fact, governance reform is not rare in 
Chapter 11; it is ubiquitous.  
Part II raises the question of why, if governance reform is so common in 
Chapter 11, such reform does not currently occur in Chapter 9 cases. An 
obvious answer might be that state sovereignty precludes governance reform. 
However, based on a careful analysis of the history of municipal bankruptcy, 
starting with the first municipal-bankruptcy law in 1934, we offer an 
alternative explanation: historical path dependence is at least as important as 
constitutional concerns. At key junctures, lawmakers seriously considered 
explicitly incorporating governance reform into Chapter 9, but the proposals 
were overtaken by events such as the need for immediate resolution of New 
York City’s fiscal crisis in the 1970s.  
Part III develops our affirmative case that governance reform is essential to 
the effective restructuring of a substantial municipality. This Part argues not 
only that governance reform is permissible, but that bankruptcy courts should 
refuse—on feasibility grounds—to confirm a restructuring plan that fails to 
reform municipal governance structures responsible for the distress that 
generated the Chapter 9 proceeding.13 Part IV considers potential objections to 
our vision for Chapter 9, including the limited scope of municipal bankruptcy 
proceedings and constitutional concerns such as the Supreme Court’s 
commandeering cases. In our view, none of these objections preclude 
governance reform in Chapter 9.  
Part V takes up an equally substantial objection: that the state, not a 
bankruptcy court, should be the entity implementing governance reform. 
Although we fully endorse state intervention and agree that state reform is the 
optimal solution for a municipality’s governance dysfunction, we argue that 
doctrinal constraints limit states’ effectiveness to some extent and that political 
constraints are an even more serious obstacle to state reform. These 
impediments confirm the need for thoroughgoing reform in municipal 
bankruptcy.  
 
13. “[F]easib[ility]” is one of the key requirements for confirming a Chapter 9 plan. 11 U.S.C. 
§ 943(b)(7) (2012); see infra notes 216-229 and accompanying text.  
 
governance reform and the judicial role in municipal bankruptcy 
1157 
 
i .  municipal reorganization and corporate 
reorganization 
In this Part, we lay the initial groundwork for our claims about the proper 
scope of municipal bankruptcy by considering the similarities and differences 
between municipalities and private corporations. If we conceptualize 
municipalities and private corporations as alternative vehicles for providing 
goods and services and consider the role of bankruptcy from this perspective, 
the need to include governance reform as part of the toolkit for addressing the 
financial distress of a substantial municipality becomes clear. Governance 
reform is not a new concept in bankruptcy; rather, it is already central to many 
Chapter 11 cases. 
A. The Need for Municipal Governance Reform 
A key objective of Chapter 11 reorganization is to restore the fiscal stability 
of a potentially viable firm so that it can efficiently provide valuable goods and 
services. Much of the corporate-bankruptcy literature focuses entirely on the 
benefits to creditors of this restored productivity. If creditors would be better 
off maintaining the firm as a going concern, according to this reasoning, then 
reorganization is appropriate. But if dissolving the firm maximizes the payout 
to creditors, then selling the assets and distributing the proceeds to creditors 
should be followed—even if reorganization might seem to serve the interests of 
current employees, equity holders, or other third parties. 14  Conventional 
literature views corporate bankruptcy solely as a mechanism for the efficient 
collection and payment of debts; rehabilitation of the firm for its own sake at 
best risks inefficiencies and at worst is “nonsense.”15 The creditor collection—
or creditors’ bargain, as it is usually known—conception of bankruptcy is 
contested,16 but we take it as a given here, in order to highlight a key difference 
between private corporations and municipalities.  
Even if compelling in the corporate context, the creditors’ bargain 
conception is an awkward fit for municipalities. Like private corporations, 
 
14. The leading theory is Douglas Baird and Thomas Jackson’s “creditors’ bargain” model of 
bankruptcy, which conceptualizes bankruptcy as “a collective system of creditor collection.” 
See THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 14 (1986); Douglas 
G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Corporate Reorganizations and the Treatment of Diverse 
Ownership Interests: A Comment on Adequate Protection of Secured Creditors in Bankruptcy, 51 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 97, 100-01 (1984). 
15. See Douglas G. Baird, A World Without Bankruptcy, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 173, 182 
(1987).  
16. See, e.g., Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 777 (1987). 
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municipalities provide goods and services for which there is substantial 
demand. And financial failure ensues when a municipality is unable to provide 
those goods and services at a price (the taxes imposed by the municipality) that 
residents are willing to pay. At that point, much like the firm that is unable to 
generate sufficient revenues to pay its debts, the municipality suffers 
insolvency as residents (the municipal equivalent of both customers and equity 
holders) with sufficient means emigrate to other jurisdictions, and those 
residents who remain are unable to make the higher tax payments necessary to 
service existing indebtedness. 17  As in the case of the insolvent firm, 
restructuring can be justified if it will enable creditors to recover more than 
they would receive if the municipality tried to pay all of its obligations in full.  
Municipal corporations, however, possess other characteristics that make 
the case for a more extensive restructuring—restructuring that includes 
governance reform as well as debt adjustment—stronger than under the 
parsimonious view of corporate reorganization. The conception of corporate 
bankruptcy as a pure collection device is premised on the assumption that the 
troubled firm is one of numerous firms that are competing in an active 
marketplace. The failure of one firm in an active market does not substantially 
disadvantage customers, since they can purchase similar goods from 
competitors; nor does a firm’s failure reduce overall employment if employees 
can migrate to other jobs where they can be more productive. 18  These 
assumptions may reflect a somewhat romantic vision of consumer and labor 
mobility, but for ordinary corporations, they often are close enough to reality 
to justify the conclusion that rehabilitating a failed firm for its own sake is 
unlikely to maximize social welfare under ordinary circumstances.  
Those same assumptions, however, are less plausible in the municipal 
context. The goods and services that municipalities provide tend to be public 
goods—goods that are nonrival or nonexcludable—or goods subject to a 
natural monopoly.19 A private provider is unlikely to produce these goods, 
 
17. See Andrew Haughwout et al., Local Revenue Hills: Evidence from Four U.S. Cities, 86 REV. 
ECON. & STAT. 570, 583 (2004). 
18. Baird, supra note 15, at 183-84. 
19. Goods are nonrival when they can be consumed simultaneously by more than one person. 
Standard examples include mosquito spraying and policing. Goods are nonexcludable when 
the costs of excluding those who have not contributed to production are too high to justify 
charging users. Standard examples include uncongested roads or street paving. Goods are 
subject to natural monopoly when they require high entry costs and have continually 
decreasing average costs—“the greater the level of output, the lower the cost per unit”—as 
with electricity generation or water systems. See, e.g., HARVEY S. ROSEN & TED GAYER, 
PUBLIC FINANCE 54-56, 358 (9th ed. 2010). We do not claim that municipalities provide pure 
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notwithstanding substantial demand for them, due to uncertainty about the 
ability to recover the costs of production.20 If goods with these characteristics 
are to be efficiently provided, governmental participation—either by direct 
provision or by contracting for them to be provided by third parties—is 
necessary, or at least appropriate.21  
Local governments, rather than more centralized political entities, properly 
play this role when the goods at issue have a limited geographic scope (such as 
policing, firefighting, or street lighting) or take the form of club goods that are 
preferred by a limited group of residents who also are willing to pay for them 
(such as municipal golf courses or public playgrounds for children).22  By 
offering distinct bundles of goods and services, local governments allow 
prospective residents to sort themselves according to their preferences for 
public goods, just as market transactions permit consumers to sort themselves 
by preferences in the characteristics of private goods. For example, those who 
prefer proximity to their workplace may live in the central city, while those 
who prefer low-density living may migrate to the suburbs, just as those who 
like whole-wheat bread can sort themselves from those who prefer sourdough 
by making appropriate market purchases.23  
 
public goods, only that they provide goods with sufficient characteristics of publicness that 
they are unlikely to be provided by the private market at an efficient level.  
20. See LYNN A. BAKER, CLAYTON P. GILLETTE & DAVID SCHLEICHER, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW: 
CASES AND MATERIALS 39-50 (5th ed. 2015). 
21. There is a long tradition of private provision of goods with the characteristics of publicness. 
For well-known examples, see Ronald H. Coase, The Lighthouse in Economics, 17 J.L. & 
ECON. 357 (1974). 
22. See, e.g., TODD SANDLER, COLLECTIVE ACTION: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 73 (1992) 
(relating “club goods” to “local public goods”). 
23. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders’ Design, 54 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1484, 1493-94 (1987) (book review). Of course, neither of these markets is perfect. 
Some goods may be available either in market transactions or through government services. 
Think of trash collection, which is sometimes provided privately and sometimes publicly. 
Alternatively, sometimes neither market provides needed services so that individuals cannot 
obtain their preferences either publicly or privately, notwithstanding both capacity and 
willingness to pay the cost of production. Finally, some markets fail because individuals, 
although willing to pay the cost of production, have insufficient assets. In these cases, 
redistribution of wealth will be necessary to cure inequalities of opportunity, and 
government (though not necessarily local government) will appropriately play that role as 
well as the allocative role related to the provision of public goods. But the existence of 
overlap and incompleteness of provision is a feature of both markets and collective decision 
making, rather than one that distinguishes firms from municipalities. In this regard, as with 
the provision of goods and services generally, the similarities in the roles of firms and 
municipalities prevail over the differences. See JOHN CULLIS & PHILIP JONES, PUBLIC FINANCE 
AND PUBLIC CHOICE 46-68 (2d ed. 1998). 
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When municipalities petition for relief under Chapter 9, they do so 
primarily because fiscal distress precludes the delivery of the very services that 
municipalities were created to provide and of which they are monopoly 
providers. Recognizing the distinctive nature of municipalities, several 
bankruptcy courts recently have focused on service delivery, not debt service 
alone, as a measure of whether a municipal debtor is “insolvent”24 and thus 
eligible for municipal bankruptcy.25 Similarly, a municipality that desires to 
exit Chapter 9 must submit to the court a plan that is “feasible,” which courts 
increasingly have interpreted to mean that “the debtor can accomplish what the 
plan proposes and provide governmental services.” 26  It is presumably to 
address the service function of municipalities that the entire structure of 
Chapter 9 is commonly described as providing a municipality with a fresh start 
as in the case of an individual bankruptcy, rather than a mechanism purely for 
the collection of assets to maximize the payout for creditors as in the case of 
corporate bankruptcy.27 The increasing emphasis on service delivery suggests 
that bankruptcy courts recognize that failing to restore local public goods 
induces flight by those who pay taxes in excess of the benefits they receive from 
the locality, followed by the imposition of even higher taxes and fees on the 
remaining residents in order to pay fixed municipal costs, and followed by 
additional exodus.28  
 
24. 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(3) (2012). 
25. See In re City of Detroit, 504 B.R. 97, 169 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2013); In re City of Stockton, 
493 B.R. 772, 789 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2013). 
26. In re Mount Carbon Metro. Dist., 242 B.R. 18, 35 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1999). The court in the 
City of Detroit bankruptcy adopted a standard of “feasibility” that considered whether the 
city “will be able to sustainably provide basic municipal services to the citizens of Detroit 
and to meet the obligations contemplated in the Plan without the significant probability of a 
default.” In re City of Detroit, 504 B.R. at 222. 
27. See Omer Kimhi, Reviving Cities: Legal Remedies to Municipal Financial Crises, 88 B.U. L. 
REV. 633, 654 (2008) (“The underlying assumption [of municipal bankruptcy] is that 
mitigating the city’s financial hardship provides the locality with a fresh start and enables its 
rehabilitation, to the benefit of both residents and creditors.”); McConnell & Picker, supra 
note 8, at 470 (“[M]unicipal bankruptcy is based on the idea of the fresh start rather than 
the efficient reconfiguration of assets. The theory of Chapter 9 is that the burden of debt 
service, if sufficiently high, will affect the taxpayers of a city as it would a debt-ridden 
individual: it will sap initiative and depress money-generating activity.”).  
28. Courts have described this cycle of depopulation and service inefficiency as the “death 
spiral” of distressed municipalities. E.g., In re Sullivan Cty. Reg’l Refuse Disposal Dist., 165 
B.R. 60, 66 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1994) (discussing how a disposal district’s tipping fees led to a 
“‘death spiral’ . . . whereby increased fees result[ed] in lower total dollar collections by 
driving away customers because of the higher fees”); In re Pub. Serv. Co. of N.H., 114 B.R. 
820, 831 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1990) (discussing how electricity rates set “too high” can trigger a 
“death spiral” of diminishing returns due to an exodus of customers).  
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From this perspective, Chapter 9’s restrictive scope of restructuring seems 
anomalous. The fact that local governments provide public goods otherwise 
undersupplied due to market failures means that market solutions cannot 
remedy government failures. As a result, if the locality fails to provide desired 
services, immobile residents will likely be unable to obtain them. Relatively 
wealthy firms and individuals may be able to privatize inadequate public 
services; firms and some individuals may substitute private security, private 
education, private garbage collection, or private parks (such as country clubs) 
for municipal services.29  But even these residents will be exposed to the 
consequences of service-delivery insolvency when they venture beyond their 
homes and places of business. For example, during Bridgeport’s insolvency 
proceedings, the Chief of Police and the Director of Public Works testified that 
budget cuts to their departments would destroy Bridgeport’s ability to 
investigate property crime, collect residential garbage, or plow snow-filled 
streets, creating a health and public-service emergency.30 As public services 
deteriorate, those with the means to flee insolvent localities frequently do so.31 
But many residents who suffer the effects of service-delivery insolvency will be 
unable to migrate to an alternative jurisdiction, and the residents who remain 
are likely to be those least able to replace the services with even imperfect 
substitutes from private providers.  
Given the logic of municipal decline, one might assume that municipal 
bankruptcy would give a municipal debtor at least as many tools, including 
governance restructuring, as are available to reorganize private corporations. 
Alas, that supposition is not borne out by municipal bankruptcy as currently 
conceived. Chapter 9 borrows numerous provisions from Chapter 11,32 and a 
Chapter 9 case proceeds very much like a traditional Chapter 11 case. In 
Chapter 9, as in Chapter 11, the debtor negotiates with the creditors’ 
 
29. See, e.g., Richard Briffault, A Government for Our Time? Business Improvement Districts and 
Urban Governance, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 365, 368-69 (1999); Clayton P. Gillette, Opting Out of 
Public Provision, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 1185, 1185-86 (1996).  
30. In re City of Bridgeport, 129 B.R. 332, 335 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1991). 
31. See Jan K. Brueckner, A Test for Allocative Efficiency in the Local Public Sector, 19 J. PUB. ECON. 
311, 312 (1982) (discussing findings that residents migrate in and out of municipalities in 
response to changes in levels of public spending); Clayton P. Gillette, Dictatorships for 
Democracy: Takeovers of Financially Failed Cities, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1373, 1402-03 (2014) 
(discussing trends in localities suffering population losses during fiscal crises). 
32. Section 901(a) sets forth a long list of provisions from other chapters of the Bankruptcy 
Code and incorporates them into Chapter 9. The list includes sixteen provisions (or parts of 
provisions) from Chapter 11. 11 U.S.C. § 901 (2012). Chapter 9 itself consists of twenty 
provisions, including § 901. See id. §§ 901-904, 921-930, 941-946.  
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committee33 and other constituencies over the terms of a restructuring plan;34 
the debtor submits the plan to its creditors for a vote;35 and, if each class votes 
in favor and the plan satisfies a list of other confirmation requirements, the 
bankruptcy court confirms the plan.36 Despite these similarities, Chapter 9 has 
a much narrower scope than Chapter 11. The latter permits governance 
restructuring where mismanagement is viewed as a cause of the firm’s failure.37 
Not so in Chapter 9, at least according to the conventional wisdom treating 
debt reduction as the sole purpose of municipal bankruptcy. Chapter 9’s 
system of debt adjustment addresses the immediate fiscal crisis but, as 
currently applied, does not address the governance structure that may have 
generated oppressive debt in the first instance. That is the case even though 
addressing underlying governance issues is more important for troubled 
municipalities than for private corporations. 
B. Governance Reform in Chapter 11 
The discussion thus far suggests that, even if governance reform were 
absent from Chapter 11, it would be an essential feature of municipal 
bankruptcy, given the distinctive nature of the goods and services that 
municipalities produce. But governance reform is not absent from Chapter 11 at 
all. It is ubiquitous. Corporate debtors regularly take advantage of the 
reorganization process to reshape their governance as well as to restructure 
their debt. The attention given to governance issues in Chapter 11 underscores 
the incongruity of omitting governance reform from municipal bankruptcy.  
In recent years, lenders increasingly have forced certain kinds of 
governance change, such as the hiring of a chief restructuring officer even 
 
33. In both Chapter 9 and Chapter 11, the U.S. trustee establishes a committee of creditors 
holding unsecured debt to represent the debtor’s general creditors at the outset of the case. 
Id. § 901(a) (incorporating id. § 1102). The U.S. trustee can also appoint other committees, 
such as a committee of public employees or tort victims, but is not required to do so. Id.  
34. In both chapters, the debtor also pursues a variety of other objectives, such as avoiding 
preferences and fraudulent conveyances, and deciding which executory contracts to assume. 
See id. (incorporating id. § 365 (executory contracts), id. § 547 (preferences), and id. § 548 
(fraudulent conveyances)). 
35. See id. (incorporating id. § 1126(c), stating that a class of creditors approves the plan if a 
majority in number and two-thirds in amount vote in favor of the plan). 
36. See id. (incorporating parts of id. § 1129, the Chapter 11 confirmation provision); id. § 943 
(detailing additional Chapter 9 confirmation requirements). 
37. See infra Section I.B. 
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before a troubled company files for bankruptcy.38 But more pervasive reform 
usually takes place only in Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings. Lenders may 
prefer that governance be addressed in bankruptcy rather than through 
contract alone because they fear the risk of potential liability if they are later 
deemed to have overreached.39 Moreover, substantial governance restructuring 
may be nearly impossible to achieve outside of bankruptcy. Reorganization of 
the debtor’s board or alteration of shareholder-voting rules usually requires 
approval of both the board of directors and the firm’s shareholders.40 If either 
constituency will be disadvantaged by the changes, as quite often will be the 
case, they are well positioned to thwart reform outside of bankruptcy.  
Even companies whose governance is relatively effective when they file for 
bankruptcy may need to make significant governance adjustments as part of 
their restructuring process. Chapter 11 shifts control from the debtor’s 
shareholders to its creditors, and usually transfers ownership rights to creditors 
as well.41 These transitions create the potential for significant conflict that is 
best managed through carefully crafted governance rules.42 In the Chrysler 
bankruptcy, for instance, Fiat, Chrysler retirees, and the U.S. and Canadian 
governments received large ownership interests as a result of the 
restructuring. 43  To protect each of these constituencies, Chrysler’s new 
 
38. Cf. Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, The End of Bankruptcy, 55 STAN. L. REV. 751, 
755 (2002) (arguing that, because today’s investors allocate control rights through 
sophisticated contracts that already anticipate financial distress, “a law of corporation 
reorganizations is largely unnecessary”). 
39. The prospects of lender liability for overreaching or of equitable subordination of the 
lenders’ claims in bankruptcy are particular concerns. See, e.g., Daniel E. Bogart, Games 
Lawyers Play: Waivers of the Automatic Stay in Bankruptcy and the Single Asset Loan Workout, 
43 UCLA L. REV. 1117, 1224-25 (1996). 
40. If the reforms require amendment of the corporation’s certificate of incorporation, the board 
of directors and the shareholders both must approve the change. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. 
tit. 8, § 242 (2014) (discussing the amendment of the certificate of incorporation). 
41. See, e.g., David A. Skeel, Jr., Corporate Anatomy Lessons, 113 YALE L.J. 1519, 1555-57 (2004) 
(book review). 
42. Chapter 11 facilitates governance reform by explicitly authorizing the debtor to amend its 
charter as part of the debtor’s reorganization plan. 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(5)(I) (2012). The 
charter—also known as the certificate of incorporation or articles of incorporation, 
depending on the state—is a corporation’s foundational governance document. The charter 
sets forth the classes of stock that a corporation is authorized to issue and, along with the 
bylaws (which are much easier to alter), contains the firm’s governance rules. 
43. For a description of the interests and the transaction generally (which technically took the 
form of a § 363 bankruptcy sale, rather than a traditional reorganization), see In re Chrysler 
LLC, 576 F.3d 108 (2d Cir. 2009), vacated as moot per curiam, 592 F.3d 370 (2d Cir. 2010). 
Initially, the retirees held fifty-five percent of the membership interests, Fiat twenty percent, 
the United States eight percent, and Canada two percent. Id. at 112. 
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organizational documents specified that Fiat would designate three of 
Chrysler’s nine directors, the retirees would designate one, the Canadian 
government one, and the U.S. government three. 44  Although Chrysler’s 
reforms were especially elaborate, governance reforms that allocate board seats 
to specified constituencies, create voting trusts, or make other adjustments are 
a standard feature of substantial Chapter 11 cases.45 
Courts do not necessarily intervene in Chapter 11 proceedings by proposing 
specific structural changes. More often, bankruptcy judges confirm plans that 
contain restructuring provisions provided by others since bankruptcy judges 
are responsible for approving or rejecting reorganization plans but are not 
permitted to propose a plan.46 The negative implication of that process is that a 
court could refuse to confirm a Chapter 11 plan that did not contain structural 
reform. But creditors can insert themselves directly into the debtor’s 
governance in Chapter 11 and have a strong incentive to do so. Because some 
creditors’ claims are likely to be converted into equity in the reorganized 
debtor, creditors often receive a governance role to protect their interest and to 
reduce the risk of renewed financial distress.47 
In the municipal environment, by contrast, creditors who suffer reduced 
entitlements in bankruptcy proceedings are not granted any decision-making 
role in postbankruptcy municipal governance. Even if creditors in a Chapter 9 
 
44. See Chrysler Group LLC, General Form for Registration of Securities (Form 10) 144-45 
(Feb. 25, 2011), http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1513153/000119312511047098 
/d1012g.htm [http://perma.cc/RQH8-69N9]. The United States also figured prominently 
in the selection of one additional director. The three directors initially designated by the 
U.S. government designated a fourth director in consultation with the U.S. Treasury. Id. at 
145. 
45. When the Lear Corporation reorganized in 2009, for instance, it allocated one board seat to 
the current chief executive, five to its lenders, and three to its bondholders. See, e.g., Ryan 
Beene, Lear Corp.’s Board of Directors Could Be Replaced After Chapter 11 Filing, Company Says, 
CRAIN’S DETROIT BUS. (July 6, 2009), http://www.crainsdetroit.com/article/20090706 
/FREE/907069979/lear-corp-s-board-of-directors-could-be-replaced-after-chapter [http:// 
perma.cc/4LMZ-Z52A]; see also Joel T. Hardman & Mark E. MacDonald, Voting Trusts May 
Overcome Distrust of Owners, Management, TURNAROUND MGMT. ASS’N (May 1, 2004), 
http://s6.webitects.com/Publications/Articles.aspx?objectID=3170 [http://perma.cc/GW4P 
-ZSED]. 
46. See 11 U.S.C. § 1121(a), (c) (authorizing the debtor and parties in interest—but not the 
bankruptcy court—to file a plan); id. § 1129(a) (listing the conditions under which courts 
confirm reorganization plans). 
47. For discussion of some of the ways in which courts and the Chapter 11 process as a whole 
shift authority to creditors, see generally David Arthur Skeel, Jr., The Nature and Effect of 
Corporate Voting in Chapter 11 Reorganization Cases, 78 VA. L. REV. 461 (1992), which 
discusses sales of assets, shareholder requests to hold an annual meeting in bankruptcy, the 
leverage the Chapter 11 process gives to unsecured creditors, and other issues. 
 
governance reform and the judicial role in municipal bankruptcy 
1165 
 
proceeding receive modified obligations, such as bonds payable in ten years to 
displace existing bonds due immediately, no plan of adjustment has ever 
granted the creditors a seat on the city council while the restructured debt was 
outstanding.48 
But the fact that creditors do not participate directly in postbankruptcy 
municipal governance does not make restructuring inappropriate or 
unnecessary. It means only that governance reform may need to occur by other 
means. Creditors’ inability to dislodge the current governance structure 
increases the need for third-party intervention to ensure that Chapter 9 fully 
addresses the underlying causes of municipal financial distress. 
i i .  why hasn’t  governance been a focus in chapter 9?  
In the last Part, we considered how corporate-bankruptcy proceedings 
commonly include governance reform as a means of increasing the likelihood 
that the firm will operate successfully once it exits Chapter 11. To our 
knowledge, there are no analogous cases of governance reform in Chapter 9. 
The primary reason for the discrepancy lies in § 904 of the Bankruptcy Code.49 
That provision precludes the court from interfering with any of the political or 
governmental powers of the debtor. But the prohibition does not apply if “the 
debtor consents or the plan so provides,”50 suggesting a broader scope for 
restructuring with debtor approval.51 One might think that in at least some 
cases, local officials would benefit from restructuring and thus would consent 
to its use in Chapter 9. Section 903, however, implies an additional limitation 
on restructuring. That provision confirms the state’s power to control a 
municipality in the exercise of political or governmental powers and thus could 
be construed to disable a court from engaging in activities that affect local 
institutional design.52  
 
48. This option was never considered, for instance, in Detroit’s bankruptcy. See generally In re 
City of Detroit, 524 B.R. 147 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2014) (describing and confirming Detroit’s 
debt-adjustment plan). 
49. 11 U.S.C. § 904. 
50. Id. 
51. For a skeptical account of the role of consent in the Detroit bankruptcy, see Melissa B. 
Jacoby, Federalism Form and Function in the Detroit Bankruptcy, 33 YALE J. ON REG. 
(forthcoming 2016). 
52. 11 U.S.C. § 903. The fact that a state remains able to control the powers of its municipalities, 
however, does not necessarily preclude bankruptcy-court restructuring. It may mean only 
that any such court intervention is subject to defeasance by the state.  
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Together, these provisions suggest congressional concern with 
constitutional limitations on federal diminution of state sovereignty in Chapter 
9 proceedings. Any such concerns might seem to preclude the exercise of 
independent restructuring authority by a federal bankruptcy court.53 Some 
courts have stated explicitly that § 903 and § 904 are necessary to ensure the 
constitutionality of Chapter 9.54 While these provisions may support the idea 
that Congress designed Chapter 9 to avoid interference with state sovereignty, 
in Section IV.C we explain why municipal restructuring does not run afoul of 
constitutional principles.  
Before engaging in that debate, however, we revisit the history of 
municipal bankruptcy reform and show that constitutional concerns are not 
nearly as complete an explanation for the absence of governance reform in 
Chapter 9 as one might think. The municipal bankruptcies that gave rise to 
Chapter 9 and its predecessors were due either to circumstances that 
governance reform would not have addressed or to fiscal crises that superseded 
any aspirations for governance reform. 
During the debates on the earliest municipal bankruptcy laws, lawmakers 
were preoccupied with municipalities’ inability to restructure debts rendered 
unaffordable by the Depression, and sought to enact legislation that would 
reduce the immediate problem. They were not, by contrast, attempting to 
provide a comprehensive solution. When municipal bankruptcy returned to 
legislative attention four decades later, witnesses offered proposals that would 
have incorporated governance reform directly and explicitly into municipal 
bankruptcy. These proposals fell by the wayside, not because of any perceived 
constitutional infirmity, but because Congress chose a different, 
nonbankruptcy solution to the most pressing crisis of the time—New York 
City’s financial distress. Thus, path dependence has played a more pivotal role 
in defining the scope of municipal bankruptcy law than investigation of 
constitutional principles. 
 
53. These concerns are independent of the requirement of § 109(c)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code 
to the extent that only municipalities that are “specifically authorized” by the state may file 
for debt adjustment. 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(1)-(2). Sections 903 and 904 could be read to 
prohibit, due to constitutional restrictions, municipal restructuring by a federal bankruptcy 
court even if a state consents to the municipal petition for debt adjustment. 
54. See, e.g., In re N.Y.C. Off-Track Betting Corp., 434 B.R. 131, 140 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010) 
(“[Section 904] codifies the Tenth Amendment’s general prohibition on a bankruptcy 
court’s power to interfere with a state entity.”); In re Vallejo, 403 B.R. 72, 75 (Bankr. E.D. 
Cal. 2009) (“Section 903 ensures the constitutionality of chapter 9, but does not provide an 
independent substantive limit on the application of chapter 9 provisions.”).  
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A. Municipal Bankruptcy in the 1930s 
The original municipal bankruptcy law was enacted in 1934 as part of the 
New Deal response to the wreckage of the Great Depression. In the early 1930s, 
thousands of municipalities defaulted as real-estate values collapsed and 
taxpayers were unable to pay assessed property taxes.55 Although municipalities 
theoretically could have restructured their obligations outside of bankruptcy, 
holdouts often stymied these efforts. “In every instance where a governmental 
unit finds itself in financial difficulty and is able to make some satisfactory 
agreement of adjustment with a majority of its creditors,” as Congressman 
Mark Wilcox, the author of and leading advocate for a municipal bankruptcy 
law,56 put it, “there is always a small minority who hold out and demand 
preferential treatment.”57 State efforts to compel adjustment of municipal debts 
would founder on the shoals of the Contracts Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution.58 But because the Contracts Clause does not bind the federal 
government,59 federal bankruptcy law provided a plausible solution to the 
problem of debt overhang. 
The original municipal bankruptcy law sought to solve the holdout 
problem by binding all bondholders, even the dissenters, if a majority voted to 
 
55. See, e.g., ADVISORY COMM’N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, CITY FINANCIAL 
EMERGENCIES: THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL DIMENSION 11-15 (1973). 
56. 77 CONG. REC. 5,475 (1933) (statement of Rep. Condon) (referring to Congressman Wilcox 
as “the author of this bill”). The bill became known as the Sumners-Wilcox Municipal 
Bankruptcy Bill. See George H. Dession, Municipal Debt Adjustment and the Supreme Court, 
46 YALE L.J. 199, 207 (1936); Sanders Shanks, Jr., The Municipal Bankruptcy Act (Sumners-
Wilcox Bill), 28 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1072, 1072 (1934). Representative Hatton W. Sumners of 
Texas was chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, which held hearings on the bill. See 
To Amend the Bankruptcy Act Municipal and Private Corporations: Hearing on H.R. 1670, H.R. 
3083, H.R. 4311, H.R. 5009 and H.R. 5267 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 73d Cong. 1 
(1933) [hereinafter 1933 House Hearing].  
57. 1933 House Hearing, supra note 56, at 22 (statement of Rep. J. Mark Wilcox). In the House 
debate on the bill, Congressman Wilcox contended that in his own city, a bondholder of 
two percent of the municipality’s indebtedness had been able to derail a plan of adjustment 
to which ninety percent of the creditors had agreed. The result of the failure of the plan of 
adjustment was the issuance of a writ of mandamus to levy a property tax amounting to 
$425 per $1,000 of valuation. See 77 CONG. REC. 5,469 (1933).  
58. See generally Ashton v. Cameron Cty. Water Improvement Dist. No. 1, 298 U.S. 513, 531 
(1936) (“The Constitution was careful to provide that ‘No State shall pass any law impairing 
the Obligation of Contracts.’ This she may not do under the form of a bankruptcy act or 
otherwise.”). The Contracts Clause provides, “No State shall . . . pass any Bill of Attainder, 
ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts . . . .” U.S. CONST. art. I, 
§ 10. 
59. See Cox Cable Commc’ns, Inc. v. United States, 992 F.2d 1178, 1182 (11th Cir. 1993).  
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restructure the bonds.60 The proponents of the law thought that a more 
comprehensive framework was unnecessary. They also were well aware that 
their proposal was constitutionally uncertain, since Congress had never 
previously enacted a bankruptcy law for public entities like municipalities.61 
And they needed to allay the concerns of bondholders, who worried that 
municipal debtors would opportunistically walk away from their debt. As a 
result, the original 1934 law called for the equivalent of what we now refer to as 
a prepackaged bankruptcy—a case in which the debtor has secured the 
approval of its key creditors before filing for bankruptcy and files a proposed 
reorganization plan at the same time or shortly thereafter.62 The 1934 law 
required the municipality to secure approval by creditors holding fifty-one 
percent of the municipality’s debt—except with drainage districts and the like, 
for which the requirement was thirty percent—before filing its petition, and to 
file a proposed plan of adjustment with the petition.63 As amended in 1937, 
after the Supreme Court struck down the original law, 64  the municipal 
bankruptcy provisions imposed the fifty-one percent creditor approval 
requirement in all cases.65  
Throughout the process, Congress simply assumed, rather than analyzed, 
the constitutional scope of federal judicial intervention into municipal affairs. 
For the most part, statements made during the legislative process in defense of 
the bill’s constitutionality were directed at complaints that any law authorizing 
 
60. The other alternative, advocated by the then-mayor of Detroit, Frank Murphy, and a few 
other witnesses, would have imposed a moratorium on repayment of the municipality’s 
debts. See, e.g., 1933 House Hearing, supra note 56, at 84 (statement of Frank Murphy, 
Mayor, Detroit). Murphy worried that a Detroit default would cause a “complete 
demoralization of the services of government and of the affairs of private businesses as well” 
and questioned whether the Sumners-Wilcox Bill was sufficient to avoid this fate. Id. at 85.  
61. The Attorney General’s office issued a report on the proposed bankruptcy law that provided 
fodder for both sides in the debate. See Memorandum from Homer S. Cummings, Att’y 
Gen., United States, to Hatton W. Sumners, Chair, House Judiciary Comm’n (Apr. 21, 
1933), in 1933 House Hearing, supra note 56, at 174. Although the report concluded that the 
legislation might be upheld, it raised significant concerns under the Tenth Amendment and 
Contracts Clause. See id. 
62. The 1937 Act required fifty-one percent approval in all cases, regardless of the type of 
municipality. Act of Aug. 16, 1937, Pub. L. No. 75-302, § 83(a), 50 Stat. 653, 655. The 1934 
Act required three-quarters acceptance for final approval; the 1937 Act lowered this to two-
thirds. Compare Act of May 24, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-251, § 80(d), 48 Stat. 798, 801, 
invalidated by Ashton, 298 U.S. 513, with § 83(d), 50 Stat. at 657. 
63. § 80(a), 48 Stat. at 798-99. 
64. Ashton, 298 U.S. at 513. As we explain infra Section II.B, the Supreme Court upheld the 
subsequent version of the law that contained only cosmetic changes from the version 
invalidated in Ashton. 
65. § 83(a), 50 Stat. at 655. 
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municipal bankruptcy necessarily infringed unconstitutionally on state 
sovereignty.66 Little evidence suggests that Congress was attempting to define 
the limits of federal bankruptcy authority. Congressman Wilcox expressed 
confidence that the bill as proposed protected the sovereignty of states and did 
not permit the federal government “to interfere in any degree with any of the 
governmental or political subdivisions of the local municipalities.”67 David M. 
Wood, a lawyer representing the creditors of fifty troubled municipalities, 
contended that the bill had been carefully crafted to avoid the constitutional 
questions that would arise if municipalities were subject to involuntary 
bankruptcy. 68  During the debate on the original Act, Wilcox similarly 
highlighted the voluntary nature of the filing and the plan of adjustment as the 
hallmark of constitutionality.69 Lawmakers did emphasize that judges would 
play a minimal role and that state authorization was necessary.70 But in doing 
so, they were responding to specific objections that, if Congress enacted the 
law, cities would rush into bankruptcy to repudiate debts.71 Proponents of the 
bill were suggesting that courts and states would serve as constraints on 
permissive debt avoidance. The lawmakers did not appear to be exploring the 
constitutional limits of federal bankruptcy jurisdiction.  
True, a memorandum submitted by the Department of Justice concluded 
that states may not abdicate or delegate essential powers of government, and 
that state authorization for municipalities to file petitions under a federal 
bankruptcy law that “does not permit interference with the municipalities’ 
governmental functions would not constitute such an abdication or 
delegation.”72  However, nothing in that memorandum explained what an 
unconstitutional “interference” would look like. The memorandum referred to 
 
66. The tenor and generality of the objections to the municipal bankruptcy law are nicely 
summed up in the minority views filed with the 1933 House report. “There have been many 
profound and exhaustive opinions by the Supreme Court and the inferior Federal courts on 
the nature and extent of the power of Congress under the bankruptcy clause of the 
Constitution,” the dissenters wrote, “but in none of them has it ever been so much as 
intimated that the scope of the power embraced municipal corporations and other 
governmental subdivisions of the States.” H.R. REP. NO. 73-207, at 4 (1933). 
67. 77 CONG. REC. 5,470 (1933). 
68. 1933 House Hearing, supra note 56, at 53 (statement of David M. Wood, Attorney). 
69. 77 CONG. REC. 5,470 (1933) (“No creditor can force a municipality into the court. It must 
come in voluntarily, freely, of its own accord, and then only for the purpose of submitting to 
the court a plan of adjustment acceptable to two thirds in amount of the outstanding 
liabilities.”). 
70. 77 CONG. REC. 5,477 (1933) .  
71. 77 CONG. REC. 5,471, 5,475, 5,477-79 (1933). 
72. Memorandum from Homer S. Cummings to Hatton W. Sumners, supra note 60, at 178.  
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Congress’s inability “to regulate, directly or indirectly, the fiscal policies of the 
States or their governmental agencies,”73 perhaps because that issue arose in 
the congressional debates. Wilcox noted that no one would want to surrender 
to any court the power of levying taxes, “even if it could constitutionally be 
done.”74 Wilcox later dropped this agnosticism about the constitutional limits 
of municipal bankruptcy, stating that an 1883 Supreme Court decision held 
that  
[n]o court has the right . . . to interfere with the discretion of municipal 
officials as to the amount of money which they shall pay to the police 
department, or the fire department, or the sanitary department, or as to 
the ratio among the three, or as to any other government function.75  
But even that statement appears to have been intended to provide 
assurances concerning the limits of the present bill, rather than a discourse on 
constitutional constraints. Indeed, it appears that Wilcox’s reference was to the 
1880 case of Meriwether v. Garrett.76 If so, his statement of the case substantially 
overstates the relevant holding: that case held little more than that courts may 
not directly impose taxes to pay a valid claim against a municipality, but 
instead must, by writ of mandamus, require the officials properly designated 
by the legislature to levy and collect any tax available.77 While the Court 
revealed an aversion to any “invasion by the judiciary of the Federal 
government of the legislative functions of the State government,”78 it is less 
clear that a federal court exercising authority under the Bankruptcy Clause to 
approve restructuring of a municipality’s governance would constitute such an 
incursion.  
 
73. Id. 
74. 1933 House Hearing, supra note 56, at 36 (statement of Rep. J. Mark Wilcox). 
75. Id. at 167.  
76. 102 U.S. 472 (1880). It is plausible that Wilcox was referring to Memphis Gas & Light Co. v. 
Shelby County, 109 U.S. 398 (1883). In that case, the Court concluded that courts could not 
imply a restriction on the state’s right of taxation. Id. at 400-01. But Meriwether offers a 
better, if imperfect, fit with the point that Wilcox was making. The opinion states that 
“[t]he levying of taxes is not a judicial act. It has no elements of one. It is a high act of 
sovereignty, to be performed only by the legislature upon considerations of policy, necessity, 
and the public welfare.” 102 U.S. at 515. Perhaps Wilcox was extrapolating from the absence 
of judicial power to impose a tax to the absence of a power to mandate a budget. But even in 
Meriwether, the Court upheld the right of the judiciary to proceed by writ of mandamus to 
order the collection of taxes by relevant municipal officials, and thus to order indirectly what 
they could not do directly. 102 U.S. at 518. 
77. 102 U.S. at 515-18. 
78. Id. at 517. 
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Wilcox insisted that the bankruptcy court could require the municipality to 
levy taxes to repay bondholders. Although a bankruptcy court would not be 
able to determine the priority of municipal expenditures as between, for 
example, paying police or fire fighters,79 he argued, “[S]o far as contracts or 
debts are concerned, the municipality having contracted a debt, or a promise to 
pay, that permits them to levy taxes . . . the court can itself enforce that 
contract by requiring the levying of whatever taxes are necessary to meet that 
debt.”80 Wilcox envisioned, in effect, that the bankruptcy court would exercise 
all of the powers that are theoretically available to a court pursuant to a 
mandamus action outside of bankruptcy.81 
Lawmakers were trying to solve a more limited problem, however, in a 
context where the scope of their powers under the Bankruptcy Clause of the 
Constitution was unclear. The statute they enacted sought to achieve a single 
objective—preventing holdouts from scuttling a restructuring that most 
creditors had approved.82 Governance reform was not on their agenda.  
Perhaps the reason for this was that the distress that affected municipalities 
during the Depression was thought to have been caused by the general 
economic conditions of the time, rather than by poor decision making or 
dysfunctional municipal governance. This view may have oversimplified the 
source of municipal distress. Politically opportune decisions to incur debt do 
seem to have been on the rise during the period immediately preceding the 
Depression. Total municipal debt (less sinking-fund assets) grew from just 
under $3.5 billion in 1912 to over $15 billion in 1932.83 Between 1922 and 1931, 
 
79. 1933 House Hearing, supra note 56, at 167 (statement of Rep. Wilcox). 
80. Id. at 168. 
81. Wilcox thus anticipated one of McConnell and Picker’s key proposals by sixty years. 
McConnell & Picker, supra note 8, at 475-76 (advocating that bankruptcy judges be given 
mandamus-like powers). 
82. See, e.g., 77 CONG. REC. 5,479 (1933) (statement of Rep. Sumners) (asserting that, in his 
commercial experience, most creditors want to allow adjustment: “Our greatest difficulties 
in working out a fair, workable plan were the Shylocks. That is exactly the difficulty of these 
situations with regard to which these cities and their creditors have to deal.”); 77 CONG. 
REC. 5,477 (1933) (statement of Rep. Oliver) (“[The bill] merely gives the power that is 
necessary as a function of the bankruptcy court, a power to say to a minority that does not 
consent, ‘You are now in a bankruptcy court and as the United States Government we are 
clothed with full power of bankruptcy and, therefore, your consent is not necessary. . . .’”); 
77 CONG. REC. 5,469 (1933) (statement of Rep. Wilcox) (“In other words, the sole purpose 
of this bill is to give the court jurisdiction to force the recalcitrant minority to come in and 
accept that which is for their own best interest, and which has been agreed to and accepted 
by two thirds, in amount, of the outstanding indebtedness.”). 
83. A.M. HILLHOUSE, MUNICIPAL BONDS: A CENTURY OF EXPERIENCE app. A, at 485 tbl.XXXII 
(1936). 
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the net municipal debts of seventeen states more than doubled.84 Only in frugal 
Minnesota and North Dakota did debt levels decline during this period.85 Yet 
the 1934 legislation was premised on the view that even for Detroit, the city 
whose financial plight was most serious, the Depression was the problem, not 
municipal governance.86  
Even those commentators who concluded that municipalities had taken on 
too much debt did not identify flawed governance as the explanation. For 
example, writing in 1936, Albert Miller Hillhouse, the Director of Research of 
the Municipal Finance Officers’ Association,87 criticized the fiscal overextension 
of many municipalities, but attributed it to an overly optimistic view that the 
real-estate boom of the prior decade would continue, rather than to the politics 
behind those miscalculations.88 Yet Hillhouse’s analysis suggests that political 
arrangements were an important causal element. He noted that “[b]oth civic-
minded and non-civic-minded pressure groups sponsor new or expanded 
services in prosperous times, many of which are very necessary. . . . The 
combined pressure of these groups constitutes a real driving force. No increase 
in government service is advisable, however, if the community cannot afford 
it.”89 Hillhouse therefore revealed a sentiment that today might be cast in more 
concrete public-choice terms concerning the relationship between “pressure 
groups” and the size of government. Focus on that relationship might have 
 
84. Id. at 486 tbl.XXXIII.  
85. Id.  
86. 1933 House Hearing, supra note 56, at 24 (statement of Rep. J. Mark Wilcox) (“In 41 States 
there are now counties, cities, or tax districts which are in default, and these defaults are not 
the result of deliberate action or dishonesty, but are occasioned by the fact that shrinkage in 
values, loss of business, and general depression in world affairs have produced a condition 
which has resulted in practical bankruptcy.”). The 1933 House Hearing focused on Detroit, 
although that city was seen as an example of large cities in distress rather than the sole 
objective of the proposed legislation for debt adjustment. See id. at 31, 52, 57, 81. Although 
some witnesses preferred a different municipal bankruptcy bill—a bill known as the McLeod 
Bill, which would have provided a moratorium on the municipality’s obligation to repay its 
debts—they, too, assumed that the problem was excess debt. See, e.g., id. at 78 (statement of 
Edward A. Zimmerman) (arguing that, if Detroit can postpone repayment, “the integrity of 
the municipality is preserved and its property values and its people (the turnips out of which 
the creditors desire to wring blood at this time) are at least preserved for future dealings by 
and with the creditors”). 
87. HILLHOUSE, supra note 83, at iii. 
88. For example, Hillhouse concluded that Detroit’s “phenomenal growth” was responsible for 
its increase in debt prior to the Depression. Id. at 247. But Hillhouse noted that the 
determination of the city’s future needs was predicated on careful, if inaccurate, studies and 
that “[n]o one foresaw that a turn in economic conditions would bring so drastic a slump in 
the city’s economic and industrial life.” Id. at 248. 
89. Id. at 249. 
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allowed more direct attention to solutions that could forestall municipal 
distress, even in times of widespread economic crisis. But there appears to have 
been little consideration of the possibility that the design of governmental 
decision making could reduce recidivism, much less that the bankruptcy 
process should be the means for accomplishing that objective.  
B. Ashton to Congress to Bekins  
In Ashton v. Cameron County Water Improvement District No. 1, 90  the 
Supreme Court invalidated the 1934 municipal bankruptcy law, based on an 
extraordinarily broad interpretation of the Tenth Amendment as precluding 
any federal authority over municipalities, and on the grounds that the Act 
violated the Contracts Clause.91 The opinion has largely been discredited.92 
The statute provided that only voluntary petitions by the distressed 
municipality were cognizable in bankruptcy.93 Moreover, the statute rejected 
any federal intent to limit or impair the power of states, including “the power 
to require the approval by any governmental agency of the State of the filing of 
any petition hereunder and of any plan of readjustment,” and denied the right 
to file a bankruptcy petition to any political subdivision over which the state 
had assumed supervision or control.94 These provisions led Justice Cardozo to 
conclude in his dissent in Ashton that the statute “has been framed with 
sedulous regard to the structure of the federal system.”95 Nevertheless, the 
Ashton majority opinion endorsed a view of federalism so strict that Congress 
could not enact a bankruptcy law that covered municipalities even with the 
consent of the state.96 That position was taken on the non sequitur that such 
consent would constitute a violation of state sovereignty and an unlawful 
enlargement of the powers of Congress, notwithstanding that states “may 
voluntarily consent to be sued; [and] may permit actions against [their] 
 
90. 298 U.S. 513 (1936). 
91. Id. at 531.  
92. See, e.g., In re City of Stockton, 478 B.R. 8, 17-18 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2012) (stating that, 
although particular statutory terms might violate constitutional principles, the Supreme 
Court subsequently “repudiated” Ashton’s structural objection to municipal bankruptcy); 
McConnell & Picker, supra note 8, at 452 (“Even granting the underlying constitutional 
premise of dual federalism (which is no longer given strict application), the Ashton decision 
seems unnecessary and misguided.”). 
93. Act of May 24, 1934, Pub. L. No. 251, 48 Stat. 798, invalidated by Ashton v. Cameron Cty. 
Water Improvement Dist. No. 1, 298 U.S. 513 (1936). 
94. § 80, 48 Stat. at 802-03.  
95. 298 U.S. at 538 (Cardozo, J., dissenting).  
96. Id. at 531 (majority opinion). 
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political subdivisions to enforce their obligations” without violating that same 
principle.97  To permit Congress to legislate bankruptcy proceedings for a 
political subdivision of the state would be tantamount, the Court concluded, to 
permitting Congress to tax states or their political subdivisions, an activity that 
all understood as violating constitutional principles of federalism.  
Congress responded by essentially reenacting the law that the Supreme 
Court had invalidated. The revised statute itself changed little, other than to 
exclude counties and to include a legislative history that acknowledged the 
“sweeping character” of the holding in Ashton and effectively rejected it.98 
Nevertheless, Congressman Wilcox went to lengths to indicate the narrow 
scope of the legislation, its limited impact on the states, and the voluntary 
nature of the municipal bankruptcies it authorized.99 Given the continued 
requirement that a majority of creditors agree to a composition in order to 
obtain relief, Wilcox indicated that the bill constituted “purely and simply a 
composition, acceptable to the petitioning district and the majority creditors, 
and that no governmental function is involved.”100 Wilcox stressed that “this is 
not a bill designed to superimpose the will of Congress onto the will of the 
municipality or the district.”101 Nor was it a bill “to dictate to a municipality or 
taxing unit how it should operate its business.”102 Wilcox emphasized the 
composition aspect because, as he read Ashton, the decision was predicated on a 
mistaken belief that Congress was “imposing its will on a municipality.”103 The 
new bill, in Wilcox’s view, 
made it plain enough that neither the Court nor the Congress nor 
anybody has any right or power to say to any municipality, after it goes 
 
97. Id. 
98. See Act of Aug. 16, 1937, Pub. L. No. 75-302, § 81, 50 Stat. 653, 654 (not including counties 
on its list of the types of municipalities permitted to file for bankruptcy). Wilcox was unable 
to contain his displeasure with the Supreme Court ruling in Ashton, calling it “the most ill-
advised, ill-considered, and utterly ridiculous opinion ever rendered by any court in the 
history of modern jurisprudence.” Hearing on H.R. 2505, H.R. 2506, H.R. 5403 and H.R. 
5969 Before the Subcomm. on Bankr. and Reorg. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 75th Cong. 24 
(1937) (statement of Rep. J. Mark Wilcox) [hereinafter 1937 House Hearing]. Wilcox went 
on to note that he had difficulty drafting a bill that conformed to the ruling in Ashton 
without making changes in the invalidated Act because “the original act is a perfect answer 
to every argument made by Mr. Justice McReynolds” in that case. Id. 
99. 1937 House Hearing, supra note 98, at 32 (statement of Rep. J. Mark Wilcox). 
100. Id. at 144 (statement of Rep. J. Mark Wilcox)..  
101. Id. (statement of Rep. J. Mark Wilcox). 
102. Id. at 145. (statement of Rep. J. Mark Wilcox). 
103. Id. at 146. (statement of Rep. J. Mark Wilcox). 
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into court, “We will order you to do thus and so”, [sic] or “We are 
going to change your method of payment, or your system of taxation,” 
or anything else.104 
Thus, Wilcox was concerned about meeting the Ashton opinion on its own 
terms, not arguing that it was wrong as a constitutional matter. 
Only two years after the Court decided Ashton, it upheld the “new” law in 
United States v. Bekins.105 State consent, which had been deemed insufficient in 
the 1934 law, formed the primary basis on which the Supreme Court upheld 
the revised version of the legislation. 106  Wilcox’s effort at clarification 
obviously was successful, as the Court concluded that the new law 
expressly avoids any restriction on the powers of the States or their 
arms of government in the exercise of their sovereign rights and duties. 
No interference with the fiscal or governmental affairs of a political 
subdivision is permitted. The taxing agency itself is the only 
instrumentality which can seek the benefits of the proposed legislation. 
No involuntary proceedings are allowable, and no control or 
jurisdiction over that property and those revenues of the petitioning 
agency necessary for essential governmental purposes is conferred by 
the bill.107 
Virtually all commentators have concluded that the differences in the  
two statutes were solely cosmetic, and that politics—the Supreme Court’s 
famous “switch-in-time”—rather than changes in legislative language explains 
the shift from Ashton to Bekins.108 The availability of a federal forum for debt 
 
104. Id. at 146-47. (statement of Rep. J. Mark Wilcox). 
105. 304 U.S. 27 (1938). 
106. Ironically, the state-consent requirement was arguably less expansive in the 1937 Act than in 
the 1934 Act (neither of which explicitly required state consent). But the Supreme Court 
concluded that the distinctions were immaterial. See id. at 49.  
107. Id. at 51. 
108. The “switch-in-time” term is often used to refer to the Supreme Court’s upholding of New 
Deal legislation after President Roosevelt proposed increasing the number of Justices. 
Indeed, during the hearings on the 1937 legislation, Representative Walter Chandler 
suggested to Representative Wilcox that “[w]e might accomplish the things that you have 
in mind by enlarging the size of the Court.” 1937 House Hearing, supra note 98, at 33 
(statement of Rep. Walter Chandler, Chairman, Subcomm. on Bankr. & Reorganization). 
For recent commentary attributing the Court’s shift in Bekins to the switch-in-time, see, for 
example, Daniel J. Goldberg, Municipal Bankruptcy: The Need for an Expanded Chapter IX, 10 
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 91, 94 (1976); Thomas Moers Mayer, State Sovereignty, State 
Bankruptcy, and a Reconsideration of Chapter 9, 85 AM. BANKR. L.J. 363, 369-71 (2011); and 
Michael W. McConnell, Extending Bankruptcy Law to States, in WHEN STATES GO BROKE: 
 
 
the yale law journal 125 : 1 150   20 16  
1176 
 
adjustment to overcome the Contracts Clause obstacle for states was 
represented as an example of federal-state cooperation rather than one of 
conflict. 109  But even Bekins said little about the constitutional scope of 
municipal bankruptcy. While the Court emphasized that the law did not 
“impinge on the sovereignty of the State” and allowed the state to maintain 
control of “its fiscal affairs,” the opinion also stressed that sovereignty includes 
the capacity to make contracts in which the states “give consents upon which 
the other contracting party may rely with respect to a particular use of 
governmental authority.”110 
Of course, even more has changed in the balance struck by principles of 
federalism since Bekins. While direct taxation of states remains outside the 
congressional purview, congressional regulation and taxation of state fiscal 
activities have been upheld. 111  Though the parameters of congressional 
authority to regulate state policies through the Commerce Clause remain 
murky,112 the more specific nature of the Bankruptcy Clause has systematically 
been held to grant Congress substantial authority over the scope of bankruptcy 
proceedings, even where the results of those proceedings affect states or their 
subdivisions.113 
C. New York City and the 1970s Amendments 
The next major period of municipal bankruptcy reform came four decades 
later.114 Whereas the distress that prompted the original municipal bankruptcy 
 
THE ORIGINS, CONTEXT, AND SOLUTIONS FOR THE AMERICAN STATES IN FISCAL CRISIS 230 
(Peter Conti-Brown & David Skeel eds., 2012). 
109. Bekins, 304 U.S. at 53-54. The theme of municipal bankruptcy as a form of federal-state 
cooperation was pervasive in the municipal bankruptcy literature in the 1930s. For a 
discussion of the theme, see generally Juliet M. Moringiello, Goals and Governance in 
Municipal Bankruptcy, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 403, 446-53 (2014).  
110. Bekins, 304 U.S. at 51-52. 
111. See, e.g., South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505 (1988) (upholding federal regulations 
limiting the tax exemption on municipal debt to instruments issued in a specified form); 
Willcuts v. Bunn, 282 U.S. 216 (1931) (allowing federal taxation of capital gains on 
municipal bonds). 
112. We discuss the Supreme Court’s commandeering and unconstitutional conditions 
jurisprudence infra Section IV.C. 
113. See, e.g., Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 379 (2006) (upholding the application 
of the Federal Bankruptcy Code in an action between a debtor and a state agency). 
114. In 1946, Congress added a provision designed to overrule the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Faitoute Iron & Steel Co. v. City of Asbury Park, 316 U.S. 502 (1942), which had held that a 
New Jersey law altering an insolvent municipality’s obligations to creditors did not conflict 
with Congress’s bankruptcy power. Congress’s new provision, which is now part of § 903, 
 
 
governance reform and the judicial role in municipal bankruptcy 
1177 
 
law was nationwide, the 1970s crisis centered on a single city: New York City. 
Inefficient and interest-group-dominated municipal governance was widely 
recognized as a root cause of New York City’s financial distress.115 New York 
City had long lived beyond its means, in large part to cement political support 
by traditional politically influential groups. Fiscal distress increased as the civil-
rights movement empowered new groups to demand a share of municipal 
resources that they had previously been denied and to which city officials 
acceded without reducing other expenditures. Total city spending rose forty-
seven percent in a two-year period in the mid-1960s, largely as a consequence 
of previously negotiated settlements with public labor unions.116 Spending on 
welfare doubled in the same period, and Medicaid spending quadrupled.117 
While spending stabilized in subsequent years and new revenue sources—
including additional state grants—brought some budgetary stability, by the 
end of the decade, recession made spending levels unsustainable. The city’s 
response, however, was not to attempt to undo obligations but to obfuscate 
their costs, which were “pasted over with new taxes, gimmicks, and wishful 
thinking.” 118  At bottom, New York City’s predicament stemmed from a 
governance structure that tolerated or encouraged generous expenditures to 
politically influential groups, fostered by a politically entrenched budgetary 
system. The New York City crisis of the 1970s raised the issue of governance 
reform much more directly than the 1930s deliberations had. 
Starting in 1974, state and local officials in New York actively intervened, 
ultimately establishing several different oversight boards and providing $2.3 
billion in rescue financing.119 New York Governor Hugh Carey, who had 
 
limits state restructuring laws. 11 U.S.C. § 903 (2012). The restriction figures prominently in 
Puerto Rico’s current debt crisis but is less salient to the issues that concern us in this 
Article. For an overview of the 1946 amendment and the Puerto Rico crisis, see, for example, 
Stephen J. Lubben, Puerto Rico and the Bankruptcy Clause, 88 AM. BANKR. L.J. 553, 568-78 
(2014).  
115. Donna E. Shalala & Carol Bellamy, A State Saves a City: The New York Case, 1976 DUKE L.J. 
1119, 1122-23. 
116. CHARLES R. MORRIS, THE COST OF GOOD INTENTIONS: NEW YORK CITY AND THE LIBERAL 
EXPERIMENT, 1960-1975, at 138 (1980). 
117. Id.  
118. Id. at 145.  
119. In late 1974, a group of financial leaders formed the Financial Community Liaison Group 
(FCLG) with the encouragement of Mayor Abe Beame. Intended to consolidate the advice of 
the financial community, the FCLG had no formal authority and a perceived lack of 
democratic accountability and proved ineffectual as a result. In early 1975, the state 
legislature established the Municipal Assistance Corporation (MAC). The MAC was given 
control over New York City’s sales tax and securities fees, as backing for its issuance of new 
bonds. This gave the MAC significant funding authority—and thus valuable carrots to 
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previously been a congressman for many years, made several trips to 
Washington to lobby for federal assistance for New York City.120 President 
Ford balked, insisting in remarks at the National Press Club on October 29, 
1975 that the real responsibility for New York City’s crisis lay with the city itself 
and grumbling that responsibility was being dumped on the federal 
government.121 Rather than a federal bailout, Ford concluded, New York City 
should consider filing for municipal bankruptcy.122 The New York Daily News 
summed up his remarks with the now famous headline: “FORD TO CITY: 
DROP DEAD.”123 
Several weeks before Ford’s remarks, the House Judiciary Committee held 
the first of a series of hearings on proposed amendments to the municipal 
bankruptcy provisions in the bankruptcy laws. Although a major bankruptcy 
reform effort that would culminate in overhaul of the entire bankruptcy statute 
in 1978 was well underway, the impetus for the October 1975 hearings was the 
New York City crisis. A recurring question was whether New York City could 
plausibly use the existing municipal bankruptcy laws to restructure its 
obligations. Every witness who raised the question agreed that it would be 
impossible for New York City to obtain the approval of fifty-one percent of its 
creditors in time for a bankruptcy filing, as required by the then-current 
municipal bankruptcy provisions.124  
 
entice reform—but relatively little direct oversight power. That came with a third 
intervention, the state’s enactment of the Financial Emergency Act, which created the 
Emergency Financial Control Board (EFCB). In addition to launching the EFCB, the 
legislation provided for $750 million in state rescue funding as part of a $2.3 billion rescue 
package, codified a recent New York City wage freeze, and established a special deputy 
comptroller for the city to report to State Comptroller Arthur Levitt. Under the terms of its 
enactment, the EFCB was authorized to devise and approve a three-year budget to return 
the city to solvency, to exercise veto power over city borrowing, to supervise the use of all 
city revenues, to file for bankruptcy and propose a reorganization plan, and to implement 
the wage freeze. Among the best accounts of the drama are ROBERT W. BAILEY, THE CRISIS 
REGIME: THE MAC, THE EFCB, AND THE POLITICAL IMPACT OF THE NEW YORK CITY 
FINANCIAL CRISIS 1-12 (1984); SEYMOUR P. LACHMAN & ROBERT POLNER, THE MAN WHO 
SAVED NEW YORK: HUGH CAREY AND THE GREAT FISCAL CRISIS OF 1975, at 75-166 (2011); and 
MARTIN SHEFTER, POLITICAL CRISIS/FISCAL CRISIS: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF NEW 
YORK CITY 127-37 (1985). 
120. LACHMAN & POLNER, supra note 119, at 150-55. 
121. Id. at 155-56. 
122. Id. at 155. 
123. Frank Van Riper, Ford to City: Drop Dead, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Oct. 30, 1975, at A1.  
124. Even a representative of municipal creditors, who would have favored retention of the fifty-
one percent approval requirement, acknowledged this: “It is I think fairly clear from a 
reading of the newspapers presently and a review of the New York City situation that it 
would be very difficult to obtain the approval of 51 percent of the creditors in sufficient time 
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Two developments in the hearings are particularly revealing of the 
relationship between bankruptcy and municipal governance. First, several 
weeks after the initial hearing, the Ford Administration proposed that 
Congress enact a new, separate Chapter XVI designed solely for major cities 
like New York.125 The new chapter, which was considered in a hearing two 
days after Ford’s National Press Club remarks, would have applied only to 
cities with at least one million residents.126 It also would have eliminated the 
fifty-one percent creditor-approval prerequisite for eligibility, while retaining 
the requirement that the city file a preliminary restructuring proposal with its 
bankruptcy petition. 127  Finally, the new chapter would have required the 
municipality to show explicitly how it would balance its revenues and costs 
going forward.128 
Then-Assistant Attorney General Antonin Scalia, who testified on behalf of 
the proposal, emphasized that the new chapter would ensure “more substantial 
use of Federal judicial authority in overseeing reestablishment of the fiscal 
integrity of the petitioning city.” 129  Scalia contended that active judicial 
intervention was essential for an effective financial restructuring of a 
substantial city and that enacting a separate chapter for big cities would 
minimize the risk of constitutional objections. Because the default of a large 
city “might seriously disrupt banking, financial and commercial activities 
nationwide,” Scalia reasoned, Congress could draw on the Commerce Clause 
as well as the Bankruptcy Clause for authority.130 
 
to enable the city to avail itself of the protections of the Bankruptcy Act.” Hearings on S. 235 
and S. 236 Part II Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Mach. of the S. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 688 (1975) (statement of Haven N.B. Pell, Attorney, Kutak Rock 
Cohen Campbell Garfinkle & Woodward) [hereinafter 1975 Senate Hearing (Part II)]. 
125. A transmittal letter from President Gerald Ford and the text of the proposed Chapter XVI 
are reprinted in Hearing on S. 235, S. 236, S. 582 and S. 2597 Before the Subcomm. on 
Improvements in Judicial Mach. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 186-192 (1975) 
[hereinafter 1975 Senate Hearing (Part III)]. 
126. S. 2597, 94th Cong. § 803(a) (1975). 
127. Id. § 804(b). Then-Assistant Attorney General Antonin Scalia defended the requirement that 
the municipality file a plan at the outset of the case as necessary to prevent filing by a city 
that was not serious about addressing its obligations. See, e.g., 1975 Senate Hearing (Part III), 
supra note 125, at 209 (statement of Antonin Scalia, Assistant Att’y Gen. of the United 
States) (noting that the creditors’ right to challenge the initial plan as inadequate would 
ensure that the municipality was genuinely committed to restructuring by “render[ing] the 
risk of a frivolous plan not worth the taking”).  
128. S. 2597 § 804(b). 
129. 1975 Senate Hearing (Part III), supra note 125, at 199 (statement of Antonin Scalia, Assistant 
Att’y Gen. of the United States). 
130. Id. at 207 (statement of Antonin Scalia, Assistant Att’y Gen. of the United States). 
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The second relevant feature of the hearings was a repeated emphasis on the 
need for municipal bankruptcy to facilitate governance reform. The most 
interesting proposal in this regard came from Judge Patchan, a bankruptcy 
judge in Cleveland. Patchan’s proposal had two parts. The first was greater 
flexibility for courts to shape the restructuring process. “With due regard for 
state sovereignty,” he said, “the federal courts should be granted a more active 
role within the design of the municipal bankruptcy chapter of the Act presently 
contemplated by Congress.”131  Patchan maintained that “where the debtor 
alone cannot design a workable plan or where functional restructuring is 
needed, the court should serve as a catalyst to bring necessary parties together 
to produce such a plan.”132 He advocated that the court be given continuing 
jurisdiction to ensure that the municipality carried out its restructuring plan.133 
Patchan’s second proposal sought to facilitate governance reform that a 
municipal debtor might not be able to carry out on its own. “I would suggest,” 
Patchan told the lawmakers, “that consideration be given to a means by which 
State officials, or local officials outside the debtors’ administration, can be 
brought into the formulation of a plan and given standing in court. In that way 
the city may gain necessary State house support for possible restructuring of 
local government functions.”134 Patchan proposed that the bankruptcy judge be 
authorized to form a committee of relevant officials and to give the committee 
the power to propose a restructuring plan.135  
Another witness, representing the then-new municipal bond insurance 
business, offered a less fully developed proposal for governance reform. 
 
131. Bankruptcy Act Revision: Hearing on H.R. 31 and H.R. 32 Before the Subcomm. on Civil & 
Constitutional Rights of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 647 (1975) (statement of 
Judge Joseph Patchan) [hereinafter 1975 House Hearings]. 
132. 1975 Senate Hearing (Part III), supra note 125, at 230 (statement of Judge Joseph Patchan). 
133. Id. at 230-31 (statement of Judge Joseph Patchan) (“Retention of jurisdiction until 
substantial compliance with plan should be mandatory. . . . Unless there is mandatory 
retention of jurisdiction there is little assurance that succeeding city administrations will 
honor a demanding plan.”). 
134. 1975 House Hearings, supra note 131, at 649 (statement of Judge Joseph Patchan). 
135. Id. at 650 (statement of Judge Joseph Patchan). Judge Patchan also anticipated a key point 
we will make infra Section II.D about the unique governance issues of large cities:  
We have, however, the equivalent of chapter XI [the bankruptcy provisions for 
small businesses] for a small city and small local governmental taxing units here, 
and needed is the capability to handle and help large cities, the equivalent perhaps 
of chapter X [the bankruptcy provisions for large corporations] for larger entities, 
which may need pervasive treatment. Neither the present law, nor the provisions 
of the proposed bills which are before you provide sufficiently for the larger cities; 
there are additional provisions required. 
 Id. at 649 (statement of Judge Joseph Patchan).  
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Referring explicitly to the New York City crisis, he argued that the 
“bankruptcy judge should have the benefit of the expertise of an advisory board 
similar to the ‘Big Mac’ board to assist him in evaluating the likelihood of 
success of a [restructuring] plan.”136 
Neither lawmakers nor the witnesses in the hearings seemed to doubt that 
Congress had the authority to include provisions like these in its municipal 
bankruptcy amendments. Then-Assistant Attorney General Scalia, who 
extolled the proposed Chapter XVI as assuring federal judicial oversight, as 
noted earlier, was confident that the new chapter would be constitutionally 
sound. 137  Harvard Law professor Vern Countryman, who dismissed the 
proposed Chapter XVI as pointless “shadow-boxing” between President Ford 
and New York officials, was especially insistent that any state sovereignty 
concerns were overstated.138 
But the focus quickly shifted away from New York and its governance 
issues. The New York City crisis was moving too fast to be resolved by a hastily 
drafted new bankruptcy chapter, and it was far from clear that the proposed 
Chapter XVI would have been adequate in any event. Persuaded that the 
enactment of a moratorium law by the state of New York reflected an 
acknowledgment by New York City that it was in default, President Ford 
announced his support for more than two billion dollars in federal loan 
guarantees for New York several weeks later.139 Congress enacted the necessary 
legislation shortly thereafter, and the President signed it on December 15, 
1975.140 
With New York’s immediate cash crunch averted, lawmakers scrapped the 
proposal for a new Chapter XVI and set aside the more ambitious governance-
oriented proposals. Congress did, however, enact the most extensive reforms to 
the existing municipal bankruptcy laws since the 1930s. The signature change 
 
136. 1975 Senate Hearing (Part II), supra note 124, at 690 (statement of Haven N.B. Pell, Attorney, 
Kutak Rock Cohen Campbell Garfinkle & Woodward); see also supra note 119 and 
accompanying text (describing the functions of the MAC board).  
137. Scalia based his confidence on the fact that the proposed chapter would be premised on both 
the Bankruptcy Clause and the Commerce Clause. 1975 Senate Hearings (Part III), supra note 
125, at 199 (statement of Antonin Scalia, Assistant Att’y Gen. of the United States). 
138. See id. at 234, 237 (statement of Vern Countryman, Professor, Harvard Law School) 
(complaining that the proposal “defer[s] too much to outmoded notions of state 
sovereignty”).  
139. See, e.g., LACHMAN & POLNER, supra note 119, at 164 (describing the Ford Administration’s 
conclusions “that the Moratorium Act was tantamount to a declaration of voluntary default” 
and that “the state and city were jointly facing up to their years of fiscal irresponsibility”). 
140. New York City Seasonal Financing Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-143, 89 Stat. 797 (codified as 
amended at 31 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1510 (2012)); see Shalala & Bellamy, supra note 115, at 1131. 
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was the removal of the requirement that a municipality secure the approval of 
fifty-one percent of its creditors to an initial restructuring proposal before 
filing.141 Congress made a number of other important changes as well, one of 
which explicitly authorized municipal debtors to assume or reject collective 
bargaining agreements and other executory contracts.142 
D. Selection Bias in Municipal Bankruptcy Filings 
In one sense, the historical evidence described in Section II.B and Section 
II.C only deepens the mystery we are trying to solve: if lawmakers understood 
the importance of governance reform, and assumed that municipal bankruptcy 
could be used for this purpose, why do we see so little of it in actual Chapter 9 
cases? Lingering concerns about constitutionality no doubt played some role, 
but we think the heart of the explanation lies elsewhere. 
The first thing to note is that significant obstacles remained, even after 
1976, for a municipality that wished to file for Chapter 9. Federal bankruptcy 
courts were available only to those municipalities whose states authorized a 
Chapter 9 petition, and even today, only half the states have granted the 
requisite permission.143 Although they no longer were required to secure fifty-
one percent approval before filing for bankruptcy, municipal debtors still had 
to demonstrate, among other things, that they were insolvent, which is 
uniquely defined for Chapter 9 purposes to mean failure to pay debts as they 
become due or inability to pay debts as they become due. 144  Since 
municipalities have access to tax revenues, the insolvency requirement can be 
very difficult to meet, even for a municipality in dire financial straits. For 
example, Bridgeport, Connecticut’s effort to adjust debts in bankruptcy during 
a period of extreme fiscal distress foundered on the court’s determination that 
 
141. See Bankruptcy Act, Pub. L. No. 94-260, 90 Stat. 315 (1976), repealed by Bankruptcy Reform 
Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549. 
142. See id. § 82(b)(1), 90 Stat. at 316 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 904 (2012)). 
143. See CHAPMAN & CUTLER LLP, MUNICIPALITIES IN DISTRESS? HOW STATES AND INVESTORS 
DEAL WITH LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCIAL EMERGENCIES app. B (2012) (identifying twelve 
states as unconditionally authorizing municipalities to file for Chapter 9, and fifteen more as 
permitting Chapter 9 under specified conditions). The state-consent requirement was 
changed from a “general” to a “specific” authorization in 1994. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 
1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 402, 108 Stat. 4106, 4141 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(2)). 
The change appears to have been the result of a desire to resolve a split among federal courts 
as to whether express statutory authorization by state law was necessary in order for a 
municipality to file for bankruptcy. See 140 CONG. REC. H10,771 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1994) 
(statement of Rep. Brooks). 
144. 11 U.S.C. § 101(32)(C). 
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the city was not insolvent because it was still capable of borrowing and had not 
yet run out of cash.145 The stigma of a bankruptcy filing also has a chilling 
effect, especially for large and complex municipalities. No mayor wants to be 
the one who has put his or her city in bankruptcy.  
Due to these obstacles, together with states’ ability to intervene in a variety 
of ways, there has long been a striking (and oft-noted) selection bias in actual 
municipal bankruptcy cases. Until recently, financially distressed sewer and 
water districts filed for Chapter 9, but substantial cities simply did not.146 Of 
the 650 or so municipalities that filed for bankruptcy between 1997 and 2009, 
the vast majority have been special districts, such as irrigation districts that 
failed to attract expected development or small towns crippled by a lawsuit or 
unexpected catastrophe. 147  Thus, financial infeasibility, rather than 
dysfunctional governance, motivated these bankruptcy petitions. Until the 
recent spate of municipal bankruptcies, the only large jurisdiction other than 
Bridgeport that had sought the protection of Chapter 9 was Orange County, 
California, which suffered from its treasurer’s losing bets on derivatives 
contracts.148 
Much more than constitutional concerns, this selection bias explains why 
governance has figured more prominently in legislative debates than in actual 
cases. To return to our Chapter 11 analogy, the parallel situation would arise in 
the corporate context if the only firms that filed for Chapter 11 were small 
restaurants and other closely held corporations, not large businesses like 
Chrysler or United Airlines. When a closely held corporation files for Chapter 
11, it ordinarily is either reorganized with its existing owners intact, or 
liquidated.149 Governance reform plays little or no role. It is only with more 
complex businesses that we see the carefully calibrated governance reforms 
described in Part I. 
The same logic applies in Chapter 9. Because the municipalities that filed 
for bankruptcy before 2008 tended to be special districts, it is hardly surprising 
that we do not find efforts to use Chapter 9 to effect governance reform. While 
 
145. In re City of Bridgeport, 129 B.R. 332, 337-38 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1991); see also ROBERT S. 
AMDURSKY ET AL., MUNICIPAL DEBT FINANCE LAW: THEORY AND PRACTICE 428 (2d ed. 2013). 
146. See Kimhi, supra note 2, at 359-60, 359 n.43. 
147. See CHAPMAN & CUTLER LLP, supra note 143, at 49; Kimhi, supra note 2, at 359 n.44. 
148. See In re County of Orange, 183 B.R. 594, 597-98 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1995); MARK 
BALDASSARE, WHEN GOVERNMENT FAILS: THE ORANGE COUNTY BANKRUPTCY 2 (1998). 
149. See generally Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Success of Chapter 11: A 
Challenge to the Critics, 107 MICH. L. REV. 603, 636-37 (2009) (presenting evidence that, 
although most small corporate debtors liquidate in Chapter 11, a significant percentage of 
small corporate debtors that can plausibly reorganize do reorganize).  
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filings by substantial municipalities still make up a small fraction of Chapter 9 
petitions,150 the frequency of filings by such entities has increased.151 Because 
the financial distress of many municipalities stems in large part from 
obligations such as pensions that cannot easily be restructured outside of 
bankruptcy, additional filings can reasonably be anticipated.152  
We draw two conclusions, one descriptive and one normative, from 
Chapter 9’s new prominence as a restructuring option for substantial cities. 
First, we predict that, as more cities make use of Chapter 9, there will be 
increased pressure to include substantial governance reform as part of the 
reorganization process. Second, we believe that governance reform should be—
indeed, must be—incorporated into Chapter 9. We take up the latter point in 
Part III.  
i i i .  an affirmative case for governance reform 
As discussed in Part II, problems with the city’s governance are nearly 
always a major factor when a substantial city falls into financial distress. In this 
Part, we take a closer look at some of the governance tendencies that can 
exacerbate a city’s financial difficulties and stymie efforts to reverse a 
downward spiral. Not only can Chapter 9 governance reform counteract these 
tendencies, but a restructuring plan that does not address the governance 
dysfunction may be destined to fail. Indeed, to put the point more strongly, if a 
city’s governance dysfunctions are severe, a bankruptcy judge should not 
confirm a restructuring plan that leaves the governance crisis unaddressed. 
A. Fragmented Governance as a Source of Distress 
The most common governance problem—our principal focus in the 
discussion that follows—is a fragmented local decision-making structure.153 
 
150. See CHAPMAN & CUTLER LLP, supra note 143, at 50 (noting that, of the 262 filings between 
1980 and early 2012, only five have involved municipalities of significance).  
151. For a partial list of recent filings by substantial municipalities, see supra notes 1-2 and 
accompanying text. 
152. Pension obligations frequently constitute contracts under state law, meaning that the 
Contracts Clause of the Federal Constitution restricts the capacity of the state to impose any 
change that would reduce fiscal distress. Thus, only federal bankruptcy intervention can 
effectively force an adjustment of the debts owed to pensioners. See, e.g., In re City of 
Detroit, 524 B.R. 147, 272 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2014); Amy B. Monahan, State Fiscal 
Constitutions and the Law and Politics of Public Pensions, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 117. 
153. See WALLACE S. SAYRE & HERBERT KAUFMAN, GOVERNING NEW YORK CITY: POLITICS IN THE 
METROPOLIS 710-12 (1960); Robert P. Inman & Michael A. Fitts, Political Institutions and 
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One of us has recently considered the fragmentation issue in a related 
context.154 We therefore only summarize the issue here. We begin by briefly 
describing four general patterns of municipal governance fragmentation, then 
consider how a bankruptcy court could counteract the fragmentation. 
In a fragmented budgetary system, fiscal policy is decentralized in a manner 
that allows decision makers to determine expenditures without simultaneously 
internalizing their costs.155 As a result, the municipal budget takes on the 
characteristics of a common pool from which various actors can obtain 
benefits, while sharing the costs with other participants. Because those who 
utilize the common resource fail to internalize the full costs of their activity, 
there is a tendency for overuse.156 In the municipal context, the misalignment 
between costs and benefits through fragmentation could arise from any of 
numerous sources.  
First, different branches of the municipal bureaucracy could have authority 
over spending and be inattentive to the manner in which their spending 
decisions affect the overall budget. The mayor, for instance, may wish to 
concentrate spending on a small number of projects each of which, as a 
consequence of scale, has a high expected value for the municipality. City-
council members may prefer to spend the same amount of money on numerous 
small projects, each of which has a positive, but relatively low expected value 
within a member’s district, and the aggregate of which does not equal the 
expected value of the smaller number of large projects favored by the mayor. 
Departments within the municipality may have interests in maximizing their 
share of the municipal budget rather than providing efficient service. If their 
costs are opaque to legislators, bureaus may obtain a level of funding in excess 
of that preferred by the median legislator or the median voter.157  
 
Fiscal Policy: Evidence from the U.S. Historical Record, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 79, 81-82 (1990); 
Omer Kimhi, A Tale of Four Cities—Models of State Intervention in Distressed Localities Fiscal 
Affairs, 80 U. CIN. L. REV. 881, 892-93, 914-17 (2012); Kimhi, supra note 2, at 378-79; 
Guntram B. Wolff, Fiscal Crises in U.S. Cities: Structural and Non-Structural Causes  
(ZEI, Working Paper No. B 28-2004, 2004), http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/bitstream 
/10419/39523/1/478945442.pdf [http://perma.cc/5KUY-TGU6]. 
154. See Gillette, supra note 31, at 1420-133. 
155. See Roberto Perotti & Yianos Kontopoulos, Fragmented Fiscal Policy, 86 J. PUB. ECON. 191, 
194 (2002). 
156. In the standard example, fishermen overfish an area because each fisherman obtains the 
benefit of his full catch while sharing the costs with other fishermen. The tragedy-of-the-
commons nomenclature is attributed to Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 
SCI. 1243 (1968). 
157. See William A. Niskanen, Bureaucrats and Politicians, 18 J.L. & ECON. 617, 630-35 (1975) 
(summarizing studies that suggest the monopoly power of governments and bureaus 
increases expenditures above what is preferred by the median legislator or median voter). 
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Second, different individuals within a governmental branch could have 
authority over spending and engage in negative-sum logrolling to support each 
other’s favored projects, notwithstanding that those projects do not return net 
local fiscal benefits. Trades among city-council members in order to favor 
projects for the districts from which they are elected may take this form. The 
desire of city-council members to appeal to constituents within their respective 
districts and the subsequent tendency for logrolling suggests that city 
expenditures per capita will increase with the number of districts. Barry 
Weingast, Kenneth Shepsle, and Christopher Johnsen formalized this effect 
with the law of 1/n, which assumes that a citywide tax is used to finance a 
project in a specific district.158 As the share of the project’s cost in the district 
decreases, the law of 1/n predicts that the number and cost of projects will 
increase. 159  Subsequent empirical work by Reza Baqir;160  Laura Langbein, 
Philip Crewson, and Charles Brasher;161 and John Charles Bradbury and E. 
Frank Stephenson162 supported the existence of a positive relationship between 
council size and expenditures. More recently, however, Lynn MacDonald has 
attempted to control for the possibility that the relationship between council 
size and spending is endogenous, and has concluded that the relationship is 
“not definitively positive.”163 Of course, even empirical work that does not 
support the law of 1/n does not necessarily indicate the absence of adverse 
effects from decentralized districts. Within a fixed budget, if expenditures are 
used for projects that do not have positive citywide effects, fiscal stability could 
suffer. New York City’s fiscal crisis, for example, was not simply a function of 
 
158. Barry R. Weingast, Kenneth A. Shepsle & Christopher Johnsen, The Political Economy of 
Benefits and Costs: A Neoclassical Approach to Distributive Politics, 89 J. POL. ECON. 642, 654 
(1981). 
159. Id. 
160. Reza Baqir, Districting and Government Overspending, 110 J. POL. ECON. 1318 (2002). 
161. Laura I. Langbein, Philip Crewson & Charles Niel Brasher, Rethinking Ward and At-Large 
Elections in Cities: Total Spending, the Number of Locations of Selected City Services, and Policy 
Types, 88 PUB. CHOICE 275, 285 (1996). The authors find, however, that the relationship 
between spending and district representation varies with different kinds of projects. Those 
projects that are appealing to all constituents throughout the city receive more expenditures 
regardless of the system for electing council members, while projects that may be 
undesirable but that are demanded by a concentrated group tend to receive more funding 
where districts exist. Id. at 289-90. The authors suggest that attention to different types of 
projects explains some conflicting findings about the relationship between city-council size 
and spending in other literature. Id. 
162. John Charles Bradbury & E. Frank Stephenson, Local Government Structure and Public 
Expenditures, 115 PUB. CHOICE 185 (2003). 
163. Lynn MacDonald, The Impact of Government Structure on Local Public Expenditures, 136 PUB. 
CHOICE 457, 470 (2008). 
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high expenditures, but also of the use of expenditures for groups that had 
substantial political power and did not necessarily represent the interests of the 
city at large.164 In addition, the empirical work also does not distinguish 
between healthy and distressed localities; it is plausible that the effects of the 
law of 1/n are more pronounced in distressed cities than in the average city 
within the studies. 
Third, bureaucrats with expenditure authority who do not coordinate may 
make budgetary decisions that either duplicate efforts or conflict with each 
other. If both the city council and the mayor’s office form subdivisions for 
tasks such as city planning or environmental review, the different 
constituencies of those offices could generate more redundancy and conflict 
than collaboration. The consequences for the fiscal condition of municipalities 
have been captured in accounts of cities such as New York and Chicago.165 
Fragmentation in budget making and expenditures in those cities tends to 
generate redistribution of wealth to groups that are able to influence the entity 
with expenditure authority, and the plethora of such authorities leads to 
increases in the size of government.166  
Even after its bankruptcy, Detroit’s governance appears to reflect the third 
type of fragmentation, burdening the city’s decision making with costly 
redundancies. Although the causes of Detroit’s decline over the second half of 
the twentieth century are multifaceted, fragmented governance and reduced 
budgetary flexibility may have diluted the city’s capacity to adjust to the decline 
of the auto industry, white flight, and other challenges. 167  For example, 
Detroit’s separate planning departments report separately to the mayor’s office 
and to the city council. This arrangement invites review of plans both by the 
mayor, who is responsible to the city as a whole, and by individual city-council 
members, who consider the interests of particular electoral districts. Similarly, 
while Detroit’s City Charter provides for an office of corporation counsel, the 
charter also authorizes the city to obtain the opinion or advice of an attorney in 
any matter pending before it, and to retain an attorney to represent the council 
in a matter where there exists a conflict of interest with another branch of 
 
164. See, e.g., SHEFTER, supra note 119, at 95-96 (documenting expenditures made to civil-service 
unions in order to ensure that public-employee strikes would not interfere with an electoral 
campaign). 
165. See id. at 127-37; see also ESTER R. FUCHS, MAYORS AND MONEY: FISCAL POLICY IN NEW YORK 
AND CHICAGO (1992) (discussing effects of mayoral authority on the ability of cities to 
withstand fiscal shocks); SAYRE & KAUFMAN, supra note 153 (discussing the role of political 
groups and agencies in influencing government activity). 
166. Cf. Baqir, supra note 160, at 1318-20. 
167. For an account of Detroit’s decline even prior to its recent fiscal crisis and bankruptcy, see 
THOMAS J. SUGRUE, THE ORIGINS OF THE URBAN CRISIS (1996). 
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government.168 Although the charter seems to envision that additional legal 
assistance will be obtained only in special circumstances, the city council 
created a permanent legal division that frequently conflicts with the Office of 
Corporation Counsel.169 
The process for selecting Detroit’s police chief reflects a fourth form of 
fragmentation in that it decentralizes appointive authority over city officials, 
with equally dire implications for Detroit’s financial health. The empirical 
literature on business mobility reveals that crime rates figure prominently in 
firms’ decisions to move or expand their business, though they lag behind cost 
factors in significance.170 This evidence suggests that low crime rates contribute 
to municipal fiscal health.171 Courts are well aware of the link between effective 
policing and municipal financial health. In both the Detroit and Stockton 
bankruptcy cases, for instance, the bankruptcy judge pointed to cutbacks of 
police services as evidence of municipal crisis.172 Thus, one might conclude that 
the selection of the person charged with choosing among plausible policing 
strategies (e.g., aggressive quality-of-life enforcement, community policing, or 
increasing police presence) could significantly affect a municipality’s fiscal 
stability. Perhaps for this reason, city charters in major cities tend to confer on 
the mayor the exclusive authority to appoint or to nominate the chief of 
police. 173  Detroit’s City Charter, by contrast, substantially constrains the 
 
168. DETROIT, MICH., CODE pt. 1 § 4-121 (2012); see id. § 7.5-312 (providing for a special counsel 
in the instance of a conflict of interest with the Inspector General).  
169. See Report on the Elimination of Redundancy in City Government 13 (2013) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with author). 
170. See Lisa L. Love & John L. Crompton, The Role of Quality of Life in Business (Re)Location 
Decisions, 44 J. BUS. RES. 211, 219 (1999). 
171. For evidence of particular policing strategies that have proven effective, see, for example, 
John E. Eck & Edward R. Maguire, Have Changes in Policing Reduced Violent Crime? An 
Assessment of the Evidence, in THE CRIME DROP IN AMERICA 207 (Alfred Blumstein & Joel 
Wallman eds., 2000); and Rafael Di Tella & Ernesto Schargrodsky, Do Police Reduce Crime? 
Estimates Using the Allocation of Police Forces After a Terrorist Attack, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 115 
(2004). 
172. See, e.g., In re City of Stockton, 493 B.R. 772, 789-90 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2013) (“The evidence 
demonstrates that the police department has been decimated. The crime rate has soared.”); 
In re City of Detroit, 504 B.R. 191, 213 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2013). See also Bankruptcy Act, 
Pub. L. No. 94-260, 90 Stat. 315 (1976), repealed by Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. 
No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549. 
173. See e.g., DENVER, COLO., CODE § 2.2.6(a) (2015) (with confirmation by city council); 
ATLANTA, GA., CODE pt. 1 § 3-305(a) (2015) (with confirmation by city council); 
INDIANAPOLIS, IND., CODE, § 181-501(e) (2015); BALT., MD., CITY CHARTER art. IV § 6(a) 
(2014) (with confirmation by city council); N.Y.C., N.Y., CHARTER, ch. 18 § 431(a) (2009); 
CLEVELAND, OHIO, CODE ch. 25 § 116 (2005); PITTSBURGH, PA., CODE, art. 2 § 209 (2009) 
(subject to approval by city council). 
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selection of that official. Detroit’s charter provides for a Board of Police 
Commissioners consisting of eleven members, seven of whom are elected from 
the City’s council districts.174 The Board’s responsibilities include establishing 
policies, rules, and regulations for the police department and approving the 
departmental budget. 175  Perhaps most importantly, the Board identifies 
candidates for the city’s chief of police, and the mayor may only select the chief 
from the list that the board submits.176  
Even in the abstract, this arrangement suggests that the mayor has limited 
control over the selection of policing strategies. In practice, the fragmentation 
is even more severe, because the Board has traditionally been heavily populated 
by commissioners who are themselves former police officers.177  While the 
experience that they bring to the office may sometimes ensure greater 
understanding of the competing policies, there is also some risk that 
commissioners whose background involves policing will identify with the 
preferences of police officers rather than with the policies that would best serve 
the municipality. 
It is unlikely that internal politics would generate reform of any of these 
structural inducements to fiscal excess. Bureaus that benefit from serving client 
groups can be expected to resist centralization of budgets that would limit their 
discretion or their funding. 178  City-council members will rarely abandon 
practices that allow them to provide services to constituents who maximize 
electoral chances or post-public service opportunities. Mayors are not inclined 
to welcome oversight of their decisions. For example, even when the New York 
City Charter was amended after the fiscal crisis of the 1970s to create the 
 
174. See DETROIT, MICH., CODE pt. 1 § 7-802 (2012). The City Charter actually provides that the 
Board consists of eleven members, “seven of whom shall be elected from each non at-large 
district.” Notwithstanding the linguistic challenge presented by the City Charter language, 
the understanding is that one member shall be elected from each of the seven council 
districts. See Board of Police Commissioners, CITY DET., http://www.detroitmi.gov/Boards 
/BoardOfPoliceCommissioners [http://perma.cc/2H3G-SDSS] (listing eleven current police 
commissioners). 
175. DETROIT, MICH., CODE pt. 1 § 7-803 (2012). 
176. Id. § 7-805. 
177. The 2014 Annual Report of the Detroit Board of Police Commissioners indicates that five of the 
seven district representatives on the Detroit Board of Police Commissioners 
(Commissioners Willie Bell, Lisa Carter, Richard Shelby, Reginald Crawford, and Ricardo 
Moore) are former police officers. There are also four commissioners appointed by the 
mayor, none of whom appears to be a former police officer. See DETROIT BD. OF POLICE 
COMM’RS, 2014 ANNUAL REPORT, http://corktownconnection.org/448-detroit-board-of 
-police-commissioners-2014-annual-report [http://perma.cc/7HMP-8SAA].  
178. See Niskanen, supra note 157, at 618-19. 
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Independent Budget Office (IBO), successive mayors sought to defund it179 
and provided funding only after losing court battles over withheld funding.180 
Entrenched political authority that favors fragmented decision making means 
that any reforms would have to emerge from some third party that has the 
authority to restructure governing institutions. 
Under the approach we advocate, a bankruptcy judge could play this role 
when the consequences of fragmentation have become sufficiently severe that a 
municipality files for bankruptcy. A bankruptcy judge who construed Chapter 
9 as including governance reform could induce revision of the city charter in a 
manner that defragmented municipal decision making by, for example, placing 
appointive power over the police department exclusively within the mayor’s 
jurisdiction.  
Alternatively, assume fiscal distress has been generated by negative-sum 
logrolling among city-council members, each of whom has secured funding  
for projects within his or her district at the expense of overall local welfare. At 
least three changes in institutional design could reduce the problem. First, the 
city council could be elected on an at-large basis rather than by district. Second, 
the number of city-council members could be reduced. Third, the mayor  
could be given a strong veto power that would permit her to deny funding to a 
project that appeared inconsistent with municipal welfare. Entrenchment could 
frustrate intramural efforts to enact any of these (or other meaningful) 
antilogrolling reforms. Again, a bankruptcy judge could spur redesign of 
municipal governance by encouraging one of these (or some other) reforms.181  
More radically, a court could encourage a more thorough alteration of  
the existing form of government. Cities in the United States typically take 
either a council-manager form of government or a mayor-council form of 
 
179. Lynne A. Weikart, Monitoring the Fiscal Health of America’s Cities, in HANDBOOK OF LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT FISCAL HEALTH 387, 396-97 (Helisse Levine et al. eds., 2013). 
180. See, e.g., N.Y. Pub. Interest Research Grp. v. Dinkins, 632 N.E.2d 1255, 1259 (N.Y. 1994); 
N.Y. Pub. Interest Research Grp. v. Giuliani, 644 N.Y.S.2d 38, 39 (App. Div. 1996). 
181. The choice among these alternatives would need to take into account factors such as the 
potential effect on minority representation. If replacing council districts with an at-large 
approach would reduce the likelihood of minority candidates being elected, for example, one 
of the other alternatives might be preferable. At least that is the case if one values the 
possibility that minority groups may have distinct interests that should be represented in the 
deliberative process of legislatures, even if representation takes the form of vote trading. See 
Lynn A. Baker, Direct Democracy and Discrimination: A Public Choice Perspective, 67 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 707, 727-28 (1991); Pamela S. Karlan, Maps and Misreadings: The Role of 
Geographic Compactness in Racial Vote Dilution Litigation, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 173, 
181-82 (1989); Binny Miller, Who Shall Rule and Govern? Local Legislative Delegations, Racial 
Politics, and the Voting Rights Act, 102 YALE L.J. 105, 192 (1992). 
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government.182 The former involves an elected council that hires a professional 
city manager. The city may have a mayor, but the council retains authority over 
policy and budget.183 In the mayor-council form of government, both the 
mayor and council are elected. The mayor serves as chief executive and may 
have substantial administrative, budgetary, and appointive authority, as well as 
veto power over legislative enactments.184  
The literature concerning the comparative fiscal performance of these 
forms of government is equivocal. It is not clear whether different 
methodologies, the different time periods in the studies, or some other variable 
explains these differences. There is theoretical support for each of the 
findings.185 Stephen Coate and Brian Knight find that mayor-council forms of 
government have approximately nine percent lower per capita spending, and 
that spending falls following switches from council manager to mayor council 
and rises following switches in the other direction. 186  Lynn MacDonald 
concluded from a twenty-year study of political structure and fiscal-policy 
outcomes that council-manager cities had lower spending in the 1980s, but the 
effect disappeared in later years.187 Earlier studies ran the gamut from showing 
higher spending under mayor-council forms of government, 188  to lower 
spending under that structure,189 to the absence of any effect.190  
Mayors who are elected citywide and have veto power may resist 
expenditures that only benefit a specific district. Managers may better control 
spending because they are not subject to political pressures from interest 
groups. But managers may spend as much as or more than mayors because 
managers are accountable to council members who may be subject to pressures 
 
182. BAKER ET AL., supra note 20, at 55. 
183. Id.; see also Stephen Coate & Brian Knight, Government Form and Public Spending: Theory and 
Evidence from U.S. Municipalities, 3 AM. ECON. J. 82, 82 (2011). 
184. BAKER ET AL., supra note 20, at 55. 
185. For discussion of the various theories that underlie various findings, see Coate & Knight, 
supra note 183, at 83-84. 
186. Id. at 83. 
187. MacDonald, supra note 163, at 468. 
188. See, e.g., Bernard H. Booms, City Governmental Form and Public Expenditure Levels, 19 NAT’L 
TAX J. 187, 192 (1966). 
189. See, e.g., Edgar L. Sherbenou, Class, Participation, and the Council-Manager Plan, 21 PUB. 
ADMIN. REV. 131, 134 (1961). 
190. See, e.g., Kevin T. Deno & Stephen L. Mehay, Municipal Management Structure and Fiscal 
Performance: Do City Managers Make a Difference?, 53 S. ECON. J. 627, 639 (1987); Kathy 
Hayes and Semoon Chang, The Relative Efficiency of City Manager and Mayor-Council Forms 
of Government, 57 S. ECON. J. 167, 176 (1990). 
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from those same groups.191 The variations in these studies, however, should 
not preclude judicial consideration of a switch in government in a particular 
bankruptcy case. The studies consider cities generally, and it remains plausible 
that more systematic differences between forms of government exist for cities 
that are fiscally distressed. Given the theoretical explanations for why one form 
of government may be more fiscally stable than another, a court that concluded 
that the variables that generate high expenditures were present in a distressed 
city with one form of government could reasonably contemplate inducing a 
switch to the alternative. For example, a court that concluded that a manager 
exercised little discretion over implementation of council policies, and that 
those policies reflected disproportionate expenditures to groups that provided 
electoral support to legislators, might exert pressure for adoption of a strong 
mayor-council structure that permitted centralized budgeting and executive 
vetoes.192 
In other contexts, a bankruptcy court might be convinced that the locality 
has too few, rather than too many, mechanisms for constraining fiscal 
profligacy. A bankruptcy judge could condition plan confirmation on the 
appointment of a financial control board that provided expertise in reviewing 
(and perhaps approving) city budgets and that increased the transparency of 
the budgetary process. Puerto Rico’s recent proposal for restructuring the debt 
of the commonwealth and some of its public corporations included creation of 
a control board that would oversee the budgetary process and be authorized to 
levy sanctions for noncompliance with approved budgets.193 As we have noted, 
New York City revised its City Charter to create the IBO.194 That nonpartisan 
agency issues a forecast of revenue and spending for the coming year, performs 
a comprehensive review of the mayor’s preliminary budget, and creates an 
analysis of the executive budget that focuses on changes from the preliminary 
budget. The IBO also issues detailed fiscal briefs on critical issues facing the 
city, prepares technical background papers, and outlines annual budget options 
for increasing revenue and saving costs.195 The objectivity of the Office is 
 
191. See Deno & Mehay, supra note 190, at 628. 
192. Cf. Richard C. Feiock & James Clingermayer, Municipal Representation, Executive Power, and 
Economic Development Policy Activity, 15 POL’Y STUD. J. 211, 214-15 (1986) (noting that cities 
with strong mayors, characterized by veto power and weak councils, have greater capacity to 
initiate economic-development policies). 
193. See Puerto Rico Fiscal and Economic Growth Plan, WORKING GROUP FOR FISCAL & ECON. 
RECOVERY P.R. 53-54 (2015), http://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/2388398/puerto 
-ricos-debt-plan.pdf [http://perma.cc/G4SL-3SQ6].  
194. See supra text accompanying notes 179-180. 
195. For descriptions of the work of the IBO, see N.Y.C. INDEP. BUDGET OFF., http://www.ibo 
.nyc.ny.us [http://perma.cc/NV2A-2BRQ].  
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enhanced by a complicated process for appointment of a director that inhibits 
capture by any particular group within the city. 196  In addition, the 
independence and professionalism of the IBO are secured by a requirement 
that it receive funding in proportion to the budget office of the mayor.197 While 
the success of the New York City IBO may be a function of its capacity to draw 
from a substantial talent pool of individuals with expertise in public finance, a 
bankruptcy judge plausibly could conclude that another municipality had 
sufficient access to human capital to make a similar body an effective agent for 
analyzing and publicizing budgetary issues as a municipality seeks to escape 
fiscal distress postbankruptcy. 
To the extent that municipal distress is attributable to a temporal 
misalignment of costs and benefits of municipal expenditures, a bankruptcy 
court could demand structural reforms of institutions that exacerbate the 
externalization of costs to future residents. For example, several commentators 
have suggested that municipal difficulties arise from the use of defined benefit 
pension plans, rather than defined contribution plans, for municipal 
employees. 198  If elected officials can obtain electoral support by offering 
substantial pension benefits to public-sector unions, while deferring the related 
costs to a later time, they may resist reform.199  A bankruptcy court that 
concluded that these incentives substantially contributed to the fiscal distress of 
an insolvent municipality might condition confirmation on the adoption of a 
local ordinance to require that future contracts with public sector unions 
permit only defined contribution plans. The State of Michigan imposed a 
similar requirement on the City of Detroit when it agreed to provide state 
funding in return for the creation of a state advisory board prior to the City’s 
filing for bankruptcy.200 One term of that agreement was that any future 
collective-bargaining agreement would provide that newly hired employees of 
the city would have “a defined contribution retirement health care benefit.”201 
 
196. N.Y.C., N.Y., CITY CHARTER § 259(a) (2004). 
197. Id. § 259(b). 
198. See, e.g., T. Leigh Anenson et al., Reforming Public Pensions, 33 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 51 
(2014); Christine Sgarlata Chung, Zombieland/The Detroit Bankruptcy: Why Debts Associated 
with Pensions, Benefits, and Municipal Securities Never Die . . . and How They Are Killing Cities 
Like Detroit, 41 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 771, 784, 846 (2014); Natalya Shnitser, Funding Discipline 
for U.S. Public Pension Plans: An Empirical Analysis of Institutional Design, 100 IOWA L. REV. 
663, 668 (2015). 
199. See Monahan, supra note 152, at 128-29.  
200. See Financial Stability Agreement, CITY DET. & MICH. DEP’T TREASURY 4-5 (2012), http:// 
www.michigan.gov/documents/treasury/Detroit_Fiscal_Stability_Agreement_382287_7.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/3ZYN-A8UV].  
201. Id. Annex D.  
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Although the bankruptcy court has less authority over a city’s relationship 
with the surrounding communities, a judge also could spur regional reform in 
some contexts, such as sewer and water services that encompass the city and 
nearby counties.202 A regional water arrangement was one of the few structural 
governance reforms that was in fact achieved in the Detroit bankruptcy case.203 
Finally, one could also imagine a bankruptcy court encouraging more 
creative reform. For example, some municipalities have permitted groups 
within the locality to form business improvement districts (BIDs) or 
neighborhood improvement districts that allow firms or neighbors to fund a 
higher level of public services than the municipality provides generally and to 
impose assessments on recalcitrant members if a majority or supermajority 
approves.204  These districts are controversial,205  but there is at least some 
evidence that they reduce crime206 and, at least for well-funded BIDs, increase 
commercial property values.207 They plausibly discourage exit, because they 
ensure that members can use fees for services from which they benefit directly 
in the same way that they would if they emigrated to less redistributive 
suburbs. A bankruptcy court might conclude that such efforts are worth 
undertaking in an effort to revitalize a city and, where that is the case, could 
expect the municipality to enact the legislation necessary to establish the 
districts. 
 
202. Gerald Frug is the best known proponent of regionalization. See, e.g., Gerald E. Frug, Beyond 
Regional Government, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1763 (2002). 
203. See, e.g., Nathan Bomey & Matt Helms, Detroit, Suburbs OK Regional Water Deal; $50 
Million Yearly to Upgrade System, DET. FREE PRESS (Sept. 9, 2014), http://archive 
.freep.com/article/20140909/NEWS01/309090084/Detroit-bankruptcy-water-deal [http:// 
perma.cc/CZ6G-TBMC]. 
204. BIDs exist in forty-eight states; major cities that have adopted BIDs include Chicago, 
Houston, Los Angeles, New York City, and Philadelphia. See JERRY MITCHELL, BUSINESS 
IMPROVEMENT DISTRICTS AND THE SHAPE OF AMERICAN CITIES 3 (2009); Leah Brooks, 
Unveiling Hidden Districts: Assessing the Adoption Patterns of Business Improvement Districts in 
California, 60 NAT’L TAX J. 5, 6 (2007). 
205. See Briffault, supra note 29, at 371; Gillette, supra note 29, at 1190. 
206. See Leah Brooks, Volunteering To Be Taxed: Business Improvement Districts and the Extra-
Governmental Provision of Public Safety, 92 J. PUB. ECON. 388 (2008); John MacDonald et al., 
The Effect of Business Improvement Districts on the Incidence of Violent Crimes, 16 INJ. 
PREVENTION 327 (2010); Amy Ellen Schwartz et al., What Do Business Improvement Districts 
Do for Property Owners?, 99TH ANN. CONF. ON TAX’N 431 (2006).  
207. Ingrid Gould Ellen et al., The Impact of Business Improvement Districts on Property Values: 
Evidence from New York City, 2007 BROOKINGS-WHARTON PAPERS ON URB. AFF. 1, 29.  
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B. Bankruptcy as a Governance Corrective 
In this Section, we propose that the current Bankruptcy Code, and in 
particular, the requirement that a plan of adjustment be “feasible,”208 provides 
the doctrinal basis for a bankruptcy court serving as a catalyst for governance 
reform. Before explaining that issue more fully, we note that bankruptcy filings 
may alter political dynamics that frustrate reform, even without judicial 
prodding for specific organizational structures.  
First, although a city’s leadership may be reluctant to endorse reform under 
ordinary conditions, given the political costs of challenging beneficiaries of the 
existing system, fiscal distress that is severe enough to require a bankruptcy 
filing is likely to diminish the leverage of proponents of the status quo; and a 
mayor who files for bankruptcy may feel that there is little more to lose, given 
the political costs she will already have incurred by declaring the need for 
bankruptcy. If the state has special provisions for distressed cities and local 
officials have been replaced by an emergency manager, as in Detroit,209 the 
willingness to pursue structural reform may be even greater. Bankruptcy may 
thus create political opportunities that did not previously exist. Indeed, one 
benefit of permitting structural reform in bankruptcy may be that the existence 
of the option makes its exercise unnecessary since the locality may prefer to 
restructure on its own rather than risk external imposition.210  
Second, and relatedly, bankruptcy can centralize decision-making authority 
and diffuse opposition. Outside of bankruptcy, a proposal to change 
governance arrangements would need to be vetted with the city’s voters and 
with the officials that would be affected, even if neither had formal veto power 
over reform. From their perspective, reform may have significant downsides 
and little immediate upside. In bankruptcy, the reforms can be included as part 
 
208. 11 U.S.C. § 943(b)(7) (2012). 
209. MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 141.1547(1)(b), 141.1549(2) (2014); see also Kevyn D. Orr, Emergency 
Manager City of Detroit, Order No. 1: Restoration of Salary and Benefits of Mayor and City 
Council (Mar. 25, 2013), http://www.detroitmi.gov/Portals/0/docs/EM/Order1.pdf [http:// 
perma.cc/7BZA-ME8A]. 
210. Recent evidence of this possibility may be apparent in the current efforts of Puerto Rico to 
restructure its debt. As we noted above, supra text accompanying note 193, the plan 
advanced by a working group created by the Governor of the Commonwealth recommended 
a control board that would be authorized to approve or disapprove a five-year fiscal and 
economic growth program, assess budgetary compliance with the plan, and impose “severe” 
sanctions for failure to comply. The board would also be authorized to “[i]mplement[] 
structural reforms that restore economic growth and competitiveness.” WORKING GROUP 
FOR FISCAL & ECON. RECOVERY P.R., supra note 193, at 54. While the scope of that authority 
is not made clear, it could certainly include the possibility of governmental restructuring. See 
id. at 54-56.  
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of a single package that also includes a substantial reduction of the city’s debt 
load. For voters especially, reform may be more palatable as part of the 
combined proposal. Overall, incorporation of governance into municipal 
bankruptcy would considerably strengthen the hand of city leaders who wish 
to effect reform (and weaken the hand of leaders who are themselves an 
impediment to reform), since city leaders could rightly say that they have no 
choice but to include governance reform in their restructuring proposal.211 
Suppose, however, that the municipal decisionmakers are reluctant to 
pursue reform, even after the municipality has filed for bankruptcy. How can 
the bankruptcy court intervene? Chapter 9 makes clear that the debtor  
alone has authority to file a plan of adjustment.212 Thus, under current law,  
the bankruptcy court would not be entitled to dictate the terms of structural 
reform. Nevertheless, the bankruptcy court is permitted to confirm the  
plan only if it satisfies certain criteria, and courts can use those criteria to 
induce—or effectively compel—debtors to propose desirable reforms.213 Some 
legislative history suggests that plan-confirmation standards would incorporate 
the principles of cases in which courts considered whether the debtor was 
 
211. An analogy might be drawn to the reactions of city officials who have been subjected to  
the state imposition of financial control boards. In at least some situations, local officials 
have conceded that control boards provided political cover for taking unpopular actions.  
See, e.g., DAVID R. BERMAN, LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND THE STATES 116–17 (2003) (describing 
use of a Pennsylvania control board to provide political cover for local officials to  
make unpopular decisions); Mike DeBonis, D.C. Still Haunted by Federal Takeover, WASH. 
POST (Jan. 31, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2011/01/30 
/AR2011013004444.html [http://perma.cc/75EW-CREY] (recounting former District of 
Columbia Mayor Marion Barry’s conclusion that the financial control board “was able to do 
some things that needed to be done that, politically, [Barry] would not do, would not do, 
would not do,” including among other things firing about two thousand human-service 
workers). One might be concerned that the ability to circumvent normal political processes 
for political restructuring could induce city officials to enter Chapter 9 too readily. The 
eligibility requirements for Chapter 9, however, serve as a substantial safeguard against its 
abuse. In particular, § 109(c)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code requires a municipality to prove 
insolvency as a prerequisite to entering Chapter 9. 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(3). 
212. Id. § 941. The statutory provisions of § 1121, which authorizes other parties to propose plans 
under some circumstances in Chapter 11, are not incorporated into Chapter 9. See id. 
§ 901(a) (omitting § 1121 in the sections incorporated into Chapter 9 from elsewhere in the 
Bankruptcy Code). 
213. See, e.g., Fano v. Newport Heights Irrigation Dist., 114 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1940). In Fano, the 
appellate court rejected a plan of adjustment that did not impose tax-rate increases on 
district residents, given the absence of a showing that the district had inadequate taxing 
power. The court concluded that the failure to impose such increases and placement of the 
entire burden of adjustment on bondholders meant that the plan did not satisfy the 
requirements that the plan be “equitable,” “fair,” or in the “best interest of the creditors.” Id. 
at 565-66. 
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making full use of its taxing powers.214  While isolated statements in the 
legislative history of what is now Chapter 9 are not by themselves strong 
evidence that courts can mandate municipal tax increases,215 both the logic and 
language of Chapter 9 suggest that a bankruptcy judge can reject a plan that 
fails to address obvious governance dysfunction.  
McConnell and Picker concluded that the requirement that a plan be “in 
the ‘best interests of the creditors’” provides the most obvious basis for judicial 
leverage but were skeptical that the clause was intended to give the court broad 
discretion to second-guess the city’s financial arrangements. 216  We focus 
instead on the requirement that a proposed restructuring plan cannot be 
approved unless it is “feasible.”217 If fragmented governance has contributed to 
fiscal irresponsibility in the first instance, then a bankruptcy judge cannot 
properly conclude that the debtor’s restructuring plan is feasible if it leaves in 
place a political structure that threatens to return the municipality to 
insolvency. Even if the municipality adjusts its balance sheet dramatically, 
dysfunctional governance will encourage a prompt return to fiscal profligacy. 
Indeed, this very risk became an issue in the Detroit bankruptcy proceedings. 
The bankruptcy judge appointed an independent expert to assess the feasibility 
of Detroit’s restructuring proposal. The expert defined feasibility in terms of 
the following question: 
 
214. See 124 CONG. REC. 34,003 (1978) (statement of Sen. DeConcini) (invoking Fano); 124 
CONG. REC. 32,403 (1978) (statement of Rep. Edwards) (same). 
215. See Kevin A. Kordana, Tax Increases in Municipal Bankruptcies, 83 VA. L. REV. 1035, 1060-63 
(1997). 
216. McConnell & Picker, supra note 8, at 474-75. The meaning of the phrase is somewhat 
ambiguous in municipal bankruptcies. It is taken from the private sphere, where it has been 
interpreted to mean that creditors will not receive less from the plan than they would 
through liquidation. Id. at 465. But given that municipalities cannot be liquidated by 
creditors, the meaning of the phrase remains amorphous. Courts have given it narrow 
scope, concluding that it means only that a proposed plan provide a better alternative for 
creditors than what they already have. Since creditors can neither propose a plan nor 
liquidate municipal assets, they “already have” very little. Hence, a proposed plan of almost 
any sort is likely to make them better off. See, e.g., In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. 147, 212-13 
(Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2014); In re Mount Carbon Metro. Dist., 242 B.R. 18, 34 (Bankr. D. 
Colo. 1999).  
217. 11 U.S.C. § 943(b)(7). In the Detroit bankruptcy, the court interpreted feasibility to require 
that the debtor “will be able to sustainably provide basic municipal services to the citizens . . 
. and to meet the obligations contemplated in the Plan without the significant probability of 
a default.” In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. at 222; see also In re Mount Carbon Metro. Dist., 242 
B.R. at 35 (defining feasibility as “whether it is probable that the debtor can both pay pre-
petition debt and provide future public services at the level necessary to its viability as a 
municipality”). 
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Is it likely that the City of Detroit, after the confirmation of the Plan of 
Adjustment, will be able to sustainably provide basic municipal services 
to the citizens of Detroit and to meet the obligations contemplated in 
the Plan without the significant probability of a default?218 
Although the feasibility expert concluded that Detroit’s plan met this standard, 
she raised concerns about Detroit’s failures to incorporate governance reform 
into the restructuring. “This bankruptcy has been largely focused on 
deleveraging the City,” she noted, “often to the exclusion of fixing the  
City’s broken operations.”219 As a result, she concluded, “[T]he operational 
restructuring that often occurs with commercial reorganizations will be left 
largely to Mayor Duggan and his managers for the post confirmation 
period.” 220  Implicit in that statement was a view that, absent additional 
governance reform, there remained serious questions about the feasibility of 
Detroit’s restructuring. A perceived lack of authority to address those issues, 
rather than their irrelevance, perhaps explains why the independent expert and 
ultimately the bankruptcy judge deferred to local officials to redress some of 
the core causes of Detroit’s distress.  
At first glance, there may seem to be a temporal mismatch between the 
feasibility requirement and concerns about the consequences of poor 
governance. “Feasibility,” on this understanding, would be concerned only 
with short-term financial viability; while the effects of poor governance are 
likely to fester over multiple years of deficits, mismanagement, and 
inappropriate expenditures before crisis reemerges. 221  Thus, governance 
reforms that are intended to forestall long-term distress might seem to be a 
poor fit for a test that focuses on the near future. Indeed, even the parties 
themselves may not seem to have incentives to respond to judicial 
 
218. Expert Report of Martha E.M. Kopacz Regarding the Feasibility of the City of Detroit Plan 
of Adjustment at 13, In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. 147 (No. 13-53846) (emphasis omitted). 
219. Id. at 23. 
220. Id. at 26. 
221. The much-debated phenomenon of repeat Chapter 11 filings—so-called Chapter 22s—in the 
1990s might seem to confirm this perspective. But the repeat filings were quite 
controversial. Compare LYNN M. LOPUCKI, COURTING FAILURE (2005) (condemning the 
repeat filings, and attributing them in part to bankruptcy judges’ lax interpretation of the 
feasibility requirement), with Kenneth Ayotte & David A. Skeel, Jr., An Efficiency-Based 
Explanation for Current Corporate Reorganization Practice, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 425 (2006) 
(reviewing LOPUCKI, supra) (offering an efficiency-based rationale for the pattern). Repeat 
filings appear to have become much less common since the 1990s. See Douglas G. Baird, 
Chapter 11’s Expanding Universe, 87 TEMP. L. REV. 975 (2015). Moreover, many of the 
corporate debtors that filed a second Chapter 11 case were liquidated, which is not a realistic 
option for a substantial municipal debtor.  
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recommendations of long-term governance restructuring because they receive 
no benefit from the effort.222 
But feasibility for a municipality inherently requires attention to long-term 
financial solvency. The need to consider the long term is most obvious where 
restructuring existing obligations entails deferring payments rather than 
simply eliminating them. New York State’s efforts to restructure New York 
City debt, for example, included an exchange of short-term notes for bonds 
with a maturity of up to twenty years.223 Detroit issued $1.28 billion of new 
bonds, with maturities ranging from eight to thirty years, as part of its plan  
of adjustment.224 Confirmation of a plan that restructures existing debt or 
requires the issuance of new long-term debt implies that the debtor will be able 
to make debt service payments when due. A plan cannot be considered 
genuinely feasible if it extends maturities but does nothing to increase the 
probability that payments will be forthcoming at the new maturity date. 
Creditors who accept extended maturities will expect the municipality to take 
measures to avoid the need for additional adjustment during the period when 
their bonds are outstanding. The same is true of other stakeholders, such as 
pensioners, whose obligations may have been adjusted in bankruptcy, but who 
remain entitled to postbankruptcy payments into the long-term future for 
services already rendered.225 Given their long-term stake, creditors who are the 
beneficiaries of restructured obligations have good reason to respond to judicial 
suggestions or even to offer recommendations for restructuring without 
judicial prompting once it becomes apparent that there is legal authority for 
incorporating such measures into a plan.  
 
222. For a discussion of the concern that public officials consider short-term, electoral effects of 
policies rather than long-term effects that may better serve constituents, see Claire S.H. 
Lim, Preferences and Incentives of Appointed and Elected Public Officials: Evidence from State 
Trial Court Judges, 103 AM. ECON. REV. 1360 (2013); William D. Nordhaus, The Political 
Business Cycle, 42 REV. ECON. STUD. 169, 182 (1975); and Edward A. Zelinsky, Tax Incentives 
for Economic Development: Personal (and Pessimistic) Reflections, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1145, 
1149 (2008). 
223. See Flushing Nat’l Bank v. Mun. Assistance Corp., 379 N.Y.S.2d 978, 982 (Sup. Ct. 1976), 
aff’d, 382 N.Y.S.2d 764 (App. Div. 1976), rev’d on other grounds, 358 N.E.2d 848 (N.Y. 1976). 
224. See Caitlin Devitt, Leaving Bankruptcy, Detroit Takes on $1.28B of New Debt, BOND  
BUYER (Dec. 11, 2014), http://www.bondbuyer.com/news/regionalnews/leaving-bankruptcy 
-detroit-takes-on-1b-of-new-debt-1068692-1.html [http://perma.cc/VN92-88D6]. 
225. Under Detroit’s debt-adjustment plan, Detroit pension beneficiaries’ pensions were 
restructured, but some of the (modest) reductions will be restored if the pension plans hit 
specified funding targets in the future. See Supplemental Opinion Regarding Plan 
Confirmation, Approving Settlements, and Approving Exit Financing at 37, In re City of 
Detroit, 524 B.R. 147 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2014) (No. 13-53846). 
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Once we recognize that municipal bankruptcy is not solely intended to 
restructure debt but to permit revival of municipal services,226 the case for a 
long-term view of feasibility becomes even stronger. As the court in the Detroit 
bankruptcy noted, “feasibility” in the municipal context includes not simply 
avoiding default but also the ability “to sustainably provide basic municipal 
services to the citizens of Detroit . . . .”227 Just as degradation of services from 
poor governance is likely to occur slowly, emergence from service-delivery 
insolvency also takes time. Reestablishing a tax base after a long period of 
depopulation, rebuilding dilapidated infrastructure, and scaling up a municipal 
workforce that may have been decimated during a period of fiscal distress 
require long-term arrangements.228 As in the case of extended-debt obligations, 
if feasibility involves obligations that can only be satisfied in the long term, it is 
appropriate to include within the remedial scheme measures that themselves 
will return benefits on a similarly extended time horizon. 
While we recognize that our proposal varies significantly from the common 
understanding of the pure debt adjustment function of Chapter 9 and could 
conflict with a broad interpretation of § 904’s prohibition of nonconsensual 
judicial interference with any of the debtor’s political or governmental powers, 
our proposal is less radical than it initially appears. First, as we have noted, it is 
commonly recognized that bankruptcy courts have the capacity to do indirectly 
what they cannot do directly by refusing to confirm plans that do not include 
details such as tax increases that the municipality might otherwise reject.229 
Second, as discussed more fully in Part IV, the structural interventions that 
we propose reflect a difficult but manageable balance between state and federal 
law.230 Chapter 9 itself imposes a limitation on the ability of federal bankruptcy 
law to trump state law. Section 943(b)(4) allows confirmation of a plan only if, 
among other things, “the debtor is not prohibited by law from taking any 
action necessary to carry out the plan.”231 Thus, without amendment of that 
 
226. See supra text accompanying notes 26-29. 
227. In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. at 222. 
228. During Bridgeport, Connecticut’s bankruptcy proceedings, the City’s Chief of Police 
testified that there were 341 police officers of the 430 necessary to provide adequate service. 
See In re City of Bridgeport, 129 B.R. 332, 335 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1991). The court in the 
Stockton, California bankruptcy concluded that there was service-delivery insolvency based 
on testimony that the city’s workforce had decreased by twenty-five percent from 2008 to 
2011 and that the police department had about 1.10 officers per one thousand residents, 
compared to a national standard of 2.7 per one thousand residents. See In re City of 
Stockton, 493 B.R. 772, 780-81 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2013).  
229. See, e.g., Kordana, supra note 215, at 1042-43; McConnell & Picker, supra note 8, at 474.  
230. See infra Sections IV.A, IV.B, IV.C. 
231. 11 U.S.C. § 943(b)(4) (2012). 
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provision, a court could not, for example, require a municipality to adopt an at-
large election system for the local legislature if state statutes require such 
elections to occur by districts.  
But assume that the locality’s decision to use district elections were 
embodied in the city charter rather than in a state statute. Would § 943(b)(4) 
also prevent judicial modification of that document as a condition of plan 
confirmation? Here, a municipal debtor appears to have more flexibility, 
especially if the restructuring plan requires that governance reforms will only 
be implemented if the city charter is amended through the ordinary charter 
amendment process.232 Of course, that course of action, which may include a 
voter referendum,233 provides opportunities for those who benefit from the 
status quo to oppose reforms. But they may have difficulty doing so without 
revealing their self-interested positions and without at least providing 
opportunities for proponents of reform to explain why proposed amendments 
were included in the Chapter 9 plan.  
Third, structural requirements imposed by the bankruptcy court need not 
be permanent. That is because municipal governance structures, at least for 
home-rule municipalities, tend to be imposed through the same city charters 
that may have to be amended in order to implement proposed reforms. While 
charters essentially form the constitution for the municipality, they are 
typically subject to amendment far more readily than are constitutions of more 
centralized governments. Thus, what is accomplished through the bankruptcy 
process can be undone if opponents of reform are able to gather sufficient 
support for the pre-bankruptcy regime. To be sure, as we have just noted, state 
law frequently requires substantial effort, including voter approval, in order to 
amend a city charter.234 Some charters also contain temporal limitations on 
amendment or revision.235 The result is that structural reforms imposed by the 
 
232. As discussed more fully infra note 252, in the Stockton case, the court suggested in dicta  
that ordinary amendment processes would need to be followed. Opinion Regarding 
Confirmation and Status of CalPERS at 35-36, In re City of Stockton, No. 12-32118-C-9 
(Bankr. E.D. Cal. Feb. 4, 2015), amended by 526 B.R. 35 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 2015).  
233. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 3(a); MO. CONST. art. 6, § 32(a); OHIO CONST. art. XVIII, § 9; 
TEX. CONST. art. 11, § 5(a); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31-2-210 (West 2002); FLA. STAT. ANN. 
§ 166.031(2) (West 2000); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 117.21(1) (2015); N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE 
LAW §§ 36(5)(d), 37(13) (McKinney 1994); 53 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 13110 (West 
1998).  
234. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 3(a) (voter approval required); MO. CONST. art. 6, § 32(a) 
(voter approval required); OHIO CONST. art. XVIII, § 9; R.I. CONST. art. 13, § 8 (voter 
approval required); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31-2-210 (West 2002) (voter approval 
required); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 166.031(2) (West 2000) (voter approval required); 53 STAT. 
AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 13110 (West 1998) (voter approval required). 
235. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS. § 117.18 (2015); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 8-4-7 (LexisNexis 2012).  
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bankruptcy court could not be undone without difficulty but would also be 
subject to their own reform should they prove to be less desirable than 
anticipated. They would however be subject to amendment and revision just as 
any other matter addressed within the city charter.236 
iv .  objections to governance reform in chapter 9  
We have outlined what we think is a compelling case that governance 
reform needs to be added to the Chapter 9 menu, and indeed, that a substantial 
municipality often will not be able to propose a feasible reorganization plan in 
the absence of governance reform. In this Part, we address potential objections 
to such a major shift from the conventional understanding of municipal 
bankruptcy. We focus first in this Part on the structure of Chapter 9 itself. 
Several key provisions in Chapter 9 seem to limit its scope to financial 
restructuring. We take up each of these provisions, concluding that they reflect 
the conventional wisdom but do not preclude governance reform. We also 
address a weighty constitutional objection to our proposal: the argument that 
governance reform would violate the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, 
even if Chapter 9 purported to allow it. The final two Sections consider two 
important practical objections: (1) the question whether bankruptcy judges are 
competent to induce or oversee governance reform; and (2) the possibility that 
the prospect of governance reform will discourage Chapter 9 filings.  
A. Bankruptcy Courts Cannot Interfere with Municipal Powers  
When the original municipal bankruptcy laws were challenged in  
the 1930s, much of the discussion centered on claims of impermissible 
interference with the prerogatives of the states as protected by the Tenth 
Amendment.237 (The other principal concern, the constitutional prohibition 
against impairment of contracts, is implicated by a city’s restructuring of its 
debt but not by the governance reforms we advocate here.) Three different 
 
236. It also would be possible to include a sunset provision providing, for instance, that the 
governance reforms would be reversed after five or ten years unless the citizens of the city 
explicitly voted to retain the reforms. 
237. In Bekins, the case that upheld the 1937 municipal bankruptcy law, the Court quoted the 
assurance in the House Report that the law “expressly avoids any restriction on the powers 
of the States or their arms of government in the exercise of their sovereign rights and duties. 
No interference with the fiscal or governmental affairs of a political subdivision is 
permitted.” United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27, 51 (1938) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 75-517 
(1937)).  
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provisions of Chapter 9 are designed to assuage these concerns.238 The first 
prohibits a municipality from filing for bankruptcy unless its state explicitly 
authorizes it or municipalities like it to do so.239 The second prohibits the use 
of Chapter 9 to limit or impair a state’s control over its municipalities.240 And 
the third prohibits the bankruptcy court from interfering with a municipality’s 
political or governmental powers, property or revenues, or use of income 
producing property “unless the debtor consents or the plan so provides.”241 
Our proposal implicates only the third of these protections. 
On first glance, the restriction on bankruptcy court authority over the 
municipality’s political or governmental powers seems to preclude precisely the 
kinds of reforms we have advocated. But there are several responses to that 
criticism. First, as Steven Walt and Richard Hynes have demonstrated, the 
constraint that § 904 imposes is less absolute than it initially appears.242 For 
example, notwithstanding § 904, the court is still entitled “to appoint a trustee 
to exercise . . . avoidance powers if the municipality refuses to do so”243 and to 
determine whether the debtor is permitted to secure “post-petition financing 
with collateral,”244 each of which interferes with the debtor’s property and 
powers. Although those exceptions exist pursuant to explicitly delineated 
authority in the Bankruptcy Code, they at least dilute any claim that the 
constitutional principles embodied in § 904 mandate a strict separation of 
bankruptcy powers and state sovereignty. 
 
238. Still other provisions address these concerns indirectly. Chapter 9 does not create an “estate” 
overseen by the bankruptcy court, for instance, and the court authorization is not required 
when the city sells assets. 11 U.S.C. § 901(a) (2012) (not incorporating § 363 (sales) or § 541 
(estate)). 
239. 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(2) (2012). 
240. 11 U.S.C. § 903 (2012) (“This chapter does not limit or impair the power of the State to 
control by legislation or otherwise, a municipality of or in such State . . . .”). Section 903 
does qualify this noninterference principle in a very important way, prohibiting state 
restructuring (“composition”) laws and the enforcement of judgments entered under such 
laws. For discussion of this qualification, see supra note 114.  
241. 11 U.S.C. § 904 (2012). Chapter 9 also permits only voluntary filings, which precludes a 
municipality from being thrown into bankruptcy by its creditors. 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(4) 
(2012). 
242. Richard M. Hynes & Steven D. Walt, Pensions and Property Rights in Municipal Bankruptcy, 
33 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 609, 624-27 (2014) (arguing for a “moderate understanding of 
section 904” that allows a court to interfere with a municipality’s use of assets or “undo 
political decisions” in some situations). 
243. Id. at 624 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 926(a) (2012)). For a description of a trustee’s avoiding powers, 
see 11 U.S.C. §§ 544-548 (2012), incorporated into Chapter 9 by 11 U.S.C. § 901(a) (2012). 
244. Hynes & Walt, supra note 242, at 625 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 364(c) (2012)). Section 364(c) is 
incorporated into Chapter 9 by 11 U.S.C. § 901(a) (2012).  
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Second, and much more importantly, the noninterference provision 
includes a large escape hatch that could make major governance reforms 
possible in many cases. If the “debtor consents” to the interference or if “the 
plan so provides,” the prohibition does not apply.245 The first term—debtor 
consent—seems to contemplate consent by the debtor at any point in the 
bankruptcy case. For example, shortly after Detroit filed for bankruptcy, the 
bankruptcy court appointed a fee examiner to oversee Detroit’s bankruptcy 
lawyers’ fees. Detroit consented to this oversight that might otherwise have 
been deemed to interfere with Detroit’s political or governmental powers.246 
Because only the debtor itself can propose a restructuring plan,247 the debtor’s 
consent also is a prerequisite to the use of the plan to effect changes that might 
otherwise be viewed as interference with political or municipal powers.  
The escape hatch thus gives the bankruptcy court the power to implement 
governance reforms so long as the debtor agrees to the changes. 
In the bankruptcy context, debtor consent has multiple features. We  
first address the question of who among various elected officials has the 
authority to speak on behalf of the debtor. We then turn to the possibility that 
broader popular consent would be required to enact particular reforms. The 
issue of which elected officials speak for the debtor may seem superfluous. If 
elected officials have resisted efforts to restructure their government prior to 
bankruptcy, it is unlikely that they would consent to a procedure that allowed 
the bankruptcy court to motivate the same results that those officials have 
eschewed. Nevertheless, there may be circumstances in which the resistance of 
local officials matters less. Where, prior to bankruptcy, governance of the 
municipality has been turned over to a state-appointed financial control board, 
entrenchment will serve as less of a constraint. For instance, under Michigan 
law, Detroit’s emergency manager had sweeping, unilateral authority that 
 
245. 11 U.S.C. § 904 (2012).  
246. See, e.g., Steven Church, Detroit Fee Examiner Gets Paid To Second-Guess Bills,  
BLOOMBERG NEWS (Oct. 21, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-10-21 
/detroit-fee-examiner-gets-paid-to-second-guess-bills [http://perma.cc/3EKX-EVYS]. As 
Melissa Jacoby has analyzed in careful detail, the consent exception enabled the Detroit 
bankruptcy judge to exercise extensive control over the Detroit restructuring process. 
Jacoby, supra note 51. We share Jacoby’s discomfort with some of the actions taken by the 
bankruptcy judge and his chief mediator in the Detroit case—especially the secretive 
maneuvering by the mediator—and question some of the rulings made in the case. See, e.g., 
David Skeel, The Meaning of Detroit, 22 NAT’L AFF. 3, 21-22 (2015). But in our view, a 
bankruptcy judge’s unwillingness to confirm a restructuring plan that fails to address 
obvious governance dysfunction does not undermine the legitimacy of the debtor’s decision 
to propose a plan that includes governance reform. 
247. 11 U.S.C. § 941 (2012) explicitly states that “[t]he debtor shall file a plan.”  
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displaced both the mayor and city council.248 As a result, neither fractured 
authority nor entrenchment was a concern in Detroit’s bankruptcy. Similarly, 
under New York law, an emergency control board that has been appointed to 
oversee a municipality can file a petition under Chapter 9.249 
One could also imagine that a mayor who both had unequivocal authority 
to give the requisite consent under § 904 and believed that bankruptcy courts 
would use that provision to strengthen mayoral authority would consent to 
judicial intervention. But if a municipal debtor has both a mayor and a city 
council, the question of which one can provide the necessary “consent” for 
purposes of § 904 may depend on state law that dictates the division of local 
powers between local executives and legislatures. To answer the related 
question of whether the proper city officials had filed a bankruptcy petition in 
the case involving Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, for example, the court relied on 
state law and the local city charter to conclude that only the mayor had 
authority to file the petition.250 Consent is less likely to be forthcoming where 
the proposed “interference” affects the incumbents themselves in ways that 
they perceive as threatening their authority. 
As we have suggested above, where structural reforms affect city charter 
provisions, the issue of consent becomes more complicated, not necessarily 
because of entrenchment but because consent under state law could be 
interpreted to require the same charter commission and electoral process that is 
necessary to amend or revise a charter outside of bankruptcy. Indeed, even if 
the official who speaks for the municipality in bankruptcy agreed to include 
charter reform in the plan, it is not clear that such consent would bind the 
municipality, since that official would have had no authority to restructure the 
municipality’s governance structure outside of bankruptcy.  
One plausible technical solution to the obstacle of popular consent may 
exist in current law. Among the provisions of Chapter 11 incorporated into 
Chapter 9 is § 1123(a)(5).251 That provision authorizes the debtor to make 
charter amendments in its reorganization plan, subject only to bankruptcy’s 
plan confirmation process. One could, therefore, interpret the reference to 
“charter” to apply to municipal as well as corporate organic documents and 
allow bankruptcy law to circumvent state law restrictions on charter revision. 
We recognize, however, that this interpretation is aggressive (and perhaps 
normatively objectionable). Chapter 9 also contains a democracy-preserving 
 
248. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 141.1549(2) (West 2012). 
249. See N.Y. LOCAL FIN. LAW § 85.80 (McKinney 2009). 
250. In re City of Harrisburg, 465 B.R. 744, 764-65 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2011). 
251. See 11 U.S.C. § 901(a) (2012) (incorporating § 1123(a)(5)). 
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provision that allows a plan to be confirmed only if “regulatory or electoral 
approval necessary under applicable nonbankruptcy law in order to carry out 
any provision of the plan has been obtained, or such a provision is expressly 
conditioned on such approval . . . .”252 Presumably that provision requires that 
any restructuring proposal in a reorganization plan must be approved through 
a local referendum when the same proposal would have required a referendum 
outside the bankruptcy context. Alternatively, the potential for impasse may 
suggest the need for more explicit avenues for reform. These could include 
express amendment of Chapter 9 to trump city charter amendment provisions, 
or, perhaps more palatably, to require submission of governance reform 
proposals to the normal charter revision process. 
Perhaps the more important constraint on § 904 is the capacity of the 
bankruptcy judge to withhold confirmation of a plan that fails to incorporate 
certain measures that the court deems necessary for fiscal success. As we have 
already noted, the authority to withhold confirmation permits a bankruptcy 
court to do indirectly what § 904 prohibits being done directly.253 A court 
required to consider the feasibility of a plan and the best interests of creditors 
prior to confirmation254 could conclude that continuing the existing municipal 
governance structure substantially increased the probability of recidivism or 
impeded the delivery of services. The court could therefore deny confirmation 
of a plan that failed to restructure. This veto power increases the likelihood that 
each of the relevant decision makers will consent to needed reforms. 
B. Only the “Adjustment of Debts” Is Permitted in Chapter 9 
The second statute-based objection to governance reform is semantic but 
equally serious. Unlike Chapter 11, which explicitly contemplates governance 
reform, one might contend that Chapter 9 only provides for financial 
restructuring. Whereas Chapter 11’s title is “Reorganization,” Chapter 9 is 
called “Adjustment of Debts of a Municipality.” Similarly, Chapter 11 says 
 
252. 11 U.S.C. § 943(b)(6) (2012). The question is whether this requirement would apply to 
charter changes included in the plan itself, or only to steps taken subsequently. A recent 
decision in the Stockton bankruptcy suggests, in dicta, that § 943(b)(6) applies both to the 
initial plan and to post-confirmation efforts to carry out the plan. See In re City of Stockton, 
No. 12-32118-C-9, 526 B.R. 35, 54 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. Feb. 4, 2015) (distinguishing “basic 
requirements of government and political polity,” which must be honored, from “financial 
and employment relations,” which are governed by bankruptcy). 
253. See supra text accompanying notes 245-247. 
254. 11 U.S.C. § 943(b)(7) (2012) (providing for court confirmation if “the plan is in the best 
interests of creditors and is feasible”). 
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simply that the debtor may file a “plan,”255 whereas Chapter 9 states that “[t]he 
debtor shall file a plan for the adjustment of the debtor’s debts.”256 This 
language seems to envision that a Chapter 9 debtor will restructure only its 
balance sheet, not its governance. 
Although balance sheet restructuring has traditionally been Chapter 9’s 
focus, which is reflected in the references to “adjustment of debts,” these  
labels do not preclude governance reform. The first thing to note is that  
the “adjustment of debts” language is a legacy of the concerns that shaped  
the original municipal bankruptcy laws. As discussed earlier,257 the drafters’ 
principal concern in the 1930s was enabling stressed municipalities to 
restructure their bond debt, at a time when it was unclear whether Congress’s 
bankruptcy powers extended at all to public entities such as a municipality. It is 
therefore unsurprising that the principal provision of the earliest act referred to 
“municipal-debt readjustments.”258 Lawmakers were reluctant to use the word 
“bankruptcy” or words such as “reorganization” that connoted bankruptcy, and 
they wanted the new law to seem as narrow as possible. With only minor 
modifications,259 this label has been retained, even as the key concerns in 
municipal bankruptcy have evolved. 
The historical origins of the term do not justify a conclusion that Chapter 9 
permits governance reform, of course. But they provide a context for thinking 
about several other considerations that do seem to make that case. First, as we 
have been emphasizing throughout this Article, effective, long-term fiscal 
rehabilitation of the municipality, for the benefit of both residents and 
creditors, may not be possible unless it includes governance reform as well as 
adjustment of current debts. Debt adjustment and governance reform may go 
hand-in-hand. The adjustment of a municipality’s debts may in this sense 
imply governance reform as well. 
The second consideration is the noninterference provision we considered  
in the prior Section.260  As we have seen, even if construed broadly, the 
provision does not forbid a bankruptcy court from “interfering” with a 
 
255. 11 U.S.C. § 1121(a) (2012). 
256. 11 U.S.C. § 941 (2012). The headings were within the congressionally-enacted statute and 
were not simply added during the codification process. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 
Pub. L. No. 95–598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978). 
257. See supra Section II.A. 
258. Act of May 24, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-251, § 80, 48 Stat. 798, 798-803. 
259. One of the minor modifications was dropping the “re” from municipal debt “readjustment.” 
For example, the current title of Chapter 9 is “Adjustment of Debts of a Municipality.” See 11 
U.S.C. § 901 (2012). 
260. 11 U.S.C. § 904 (2012). 
 
the yale law journal 125 : 1 150   20 16  
1208 
 
municipal debtor’s political or governmental powers under all circumstances.261 
It only precludes interference to which the debtor has not consented and that is 
not contained in the restructuring plan. This suggests that, notwithstanding 
the ostensibly restrictive language in the title, the technical language of Chapter 
9 does not foreclose efforts to address the debtor’s municipal political or 
governmental structure through the plan for adjustment. Even if § 904 is read 
to limit the conditions under which courts may “interfere,” the fact that some 
such conditions exist belies the notion that the language of “debt adjustment” 
alone restricts the court or the plan to fiscal issues, narrowly defined. 
C. Commandeering and Unconstitutional Conditions 
The Chapter 9 provisions that have occupied our attention in the last two 
Sections were designed to ensure that Chapter 9 does not interfere with state 
sovereignty under the Tenth Amendment and related constitutional 
protections. But perhaps the provisions do not go far enough. Even if 
permitted by Chapter 9, governance reform could be challenged as 
commandeering or as imposing unconstitutional conditions on state and local 
decisionmakers, under a line of Supreme Court cases that have taken on 
heightened significance after the first major Affordable Care Act case, National 
Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius (NFIB). 262  The concern that 
governance reform would violate the Constitution, even if Chapter 9 permits 
it, is the most serious obstacle to our proposed rethinking of municipal 
bankruptcy.  
Eighty years ago, state sovereignty questions cast a cloud over all of 
Chapter 9. Elements of that claim remain. Objectors to Detroit’s eligibility for 
municipal bankruptcy, for example, contended that Chapter 9 violated the 
requirement of the Bankruptcy Clause that bankruptcy laws be “uniform.”263 
Even if Chapter 9 itself is no longer in jeopardy, the prospect that it might be 
used to reform municipal governance introduces a new complication.  
 
261. See supra Section IV.A. 
262. 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (holding that Congress may not “penalize States that choose not to 
participate in that new program by taking away their existing Medicaid funding”).  
263. In re City of Detroit, 504 B.R. 97, 136 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2013). More recently, Judge 
Thomas Bennett, the bankruptcy judge who oversaw the Chapter 9 case of Jefferson 
County, Alabama, has pointed out that the municipal bankruptcy framework upheld by the 
Supreme Court in Bekins was much narrower and less intrusive than current the Chapter 9 
framework and speculated that the consent by a municipal debtor that files for Chapter 9 
bankruptcy may not be sufficient to satisfy state sovereignty concerns with some of the 
provisions of Chapter 9. Thomas B. Bennett, Consent: Its Scope, Blips, Blemishes, and a 
Bekins Extrapolation Too Far, 37 CAMPBELL L. REV. 3, 9 (2015).  
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In New York v. United States,264 Justice O’Connor identified two general 
principles that run through this line of cases. First, Congress can attach 
conditions when it directs funds to the states under its Spending Clause 
powers, so long as the conditions are sufficiently related to the purposes of the 
funding.265 Second, Congress also can give states the option either to regulate 
in accordance with federal standards or to face preemption.266 In each case, 
federal influence on state decision making is permissible if “the residents of the 
State retain the ultimate decision as to whether or not the State will comply.”267 
Prior to NFIB, the Court routinely upheld federal legislation that imposed 
conditions on state decisionmakers when it involved federal spending, since 
“Congress has no obligation to use its Spending Clause power to disburse 
funds to the States,”268 while casting a colder eye on federal intervention in 
other contexts.269 In NFIB, Chief Justice Roberts made clear that the anti-
commandeering principle imposes limits—in practice, not just in theory—even 
on Congress’s power to attach strings to its funding programs: “The legitimacy 
of Congress’s exercise of the spending power . . . rests on whether the State 
voluntarily and knowingly accepts the terms of the ‘contract.’”270 The Court 
concluded that the healthcare law’s extension of Medicaid benefits to new 
recipients, which gave states the option either to carry out the extension or to 
forfeit all of their federal funding under the existing Medicaid program, did not 
meet this standard. “In this case,” the Chief Justice wrote, “the financial 
 
264. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).  
265. Id. at 167 (citing South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206-08 (1987)). New York v. United 
States involved both Spending Clause and non-Spending Clause challenges. Id. at 154. The 
Court upheld under the Spending Clause a provision of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste 
Policy Amendments Act of 1985 that gave escrowed funds to states that complied with the 
statute’s radioactive waste requirements. But the Court found that the “take title” provision 
of the law, which offered states a choice of either accepting ownership of waste or regulating 
according to the instructions of Congress, unconstitutionally commandeered the legislative 
processes of the States by compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory 
program. Id. at 175-77. 
266. Id. 
267. Id. at 168. 
268. Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 686 (1999). 
269. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992). In Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 
(1997), a pure commandeering case, the Court struck down the gun control statute known 
as the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, which instructed the chief law enforcement 
officer of each local jurisdiction to conduct background checks on prospective handgun 
purchasers. 
270. Nat’l Fed’n Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2602 (2012). 
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‘inducement’ Congress has chosen is much more than ‘relatively mild 
encouragement’—it is a gun to the head.”271 
If we are reading the implications of NFIB correctly,272 the same general 
principles apply in Spending Clause and other commandeering cases, although 
the Court presumably will continue to apply them more forcefully outside of 
the Spending Clause context. Since Congress enacted Chapter 9 under the 
Bankruptcy Clause, not the Spending Clause, governance reform could be 
subject to particularly skeptical review. Yet in many respects, Chapter 9 
functions quite similarly to federal spending, and congressional conduct 
pursuant to the Spending Clause therefore provides the best analogy to 
Congress’s authority under the Bankruptcy Clause. Although Congress does 
not disburse funds from the federal treasury under Chapter 9, discharge from 
debt gives municipalities financial resources they could not obtain outside of 
bankruptcy. The discharge therefore provides municipalities with the 
functional equivalent of a direct grant that the federal government is not 
obligated to provide to distressed municipalities.273 Assume, for example, that 
Congress offered a financially distressed municipality a grant sufficient to pay 
its outstanding debts, but the grant was contingent on the municipality’s 
adoption of a form of government that was understood to reduce the risk of 
fiscal profligacy. If the Supreme Court precedents suggest that such a 
conditional grant would fall outside the realm of commandeering, then 
adjustments in bankruptcy that had the same effect should be treated no 
differently.274  
In both the spending and the general commandeering contexts, the Court 
seems most concerned that states have a genuine option whether or not to 
accept the incursion on their lawmaking authority. The Court’s principal 
objection to the Medicaid extension was the severe penalty it exacted on states 
 
271. Id. at 2604. 
272. Always an “if” with the unconstitutional conditions cases. For a top scholar’s refreshingly 
candid perplexity with the cases, see Frederick Schauer, Too Hard: Unconstitutional 
Conditions and the Chimera of Constitutional Consistency, 72 DENV. U. L. REV. 989 (1995). 
273. In Florida Prepaid, the Court characterized interstate compact cases, such as Petty v. 
Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Commission, 359 U.S. 275 (1959), as analogous to the Spending 
Clause, since states cannot form interstate compacts unless Congress expressly agrees. 527 
U.S. at 686. Municipal bankruptcy is quite similar.  
274. As discussed below, the analogy is not perfect. One important difference is that Congress is 
not required to make payments when it provides a discharge, and thus does not fully 
internalize the cost. In this sense, Chapter 9 is more like a decision on interstate compacts. 
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that declined to embrace the extension.275 Included in the Court’s distinction 
between coercion and legitimate consent is a concern (much criticized by 
commentators but oft-repeated by the Court) that the absence of genuine 
consent also could undermine political accountability by making it difficult to 
determine whether state or federal decision makers are responsible. 276 
“[W]here the Federal Government directs the States to regulate, it may be state 
officials who will bear the brunt of public disapproval, while the federal 
officials who devised the regulatory program may remain insulated from the 
electoral ramifications of their decision.”277 
With Chapter 9 governance reform, state and local officials have far more 
authority–a more legitimate choice–than with the federal initiatives the Court 
has struck down as commandeering. Most obviously, a municipality cannot 
even file for Chapter 9 unless authorized to do so by state law.278 Once a state 
does authorize its municipalities to file, only a municipality itself can invoke 
Chapter 9; creditors are prohibited from throwing a city into Chapter 9 
involuntarily. 279  States’ actual behavior underscores the absence of any 
federally-imposed obligation that states feel to confer the requisite authority. 
Only half of the states have enacted the requisite authorization, and of those, 
more than half have imposed conditions on a municipality’s right to file for 
 
275. See Nat’l Fed’n Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2604 (“A State that opts out of the Affordable Care 
Act’s expansion in health care coverage thus stands to lose not merely ‘a relatively small 
percentage’ of its existing Medicaid funding, but all of it.”). 
276. Mitchell Berman points out, for instance, that “a federal offer that gives states ‘no choice’ 
but to accept [and thus seems to implicate the Court’s concerns about compulsion] 
threatens accountability less than does an offer that puts substantial pressure on the states 
but leaves them some choice in the matter.” Mitchell N. Berman, Conditional Spending and 
the Conditional Offer Puzzle, in THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT DECISION: PHILOSOPHICAL AND 
LEGAL IMPLICATIONS 257, 261 (Fritz Allhoff & Mark Hall eds., 2014). 
277. Nat’l Fed’n Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2602 (quoting New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 
169 (1992)); see also Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Anti-Leveraging Principle and the Spending 
Clause after NFIB 101 GEO. L.J. 861, 880-81 (2013); Andrew B. Coan, Commandeering, 
Coercion, and the Deep Structure of American Federalism, 95 B.U. L. REV. 1, 13-15 (2015); Nicole 
Huberfeld, Elizabeth Weeks Leonard & Kevin Outterson, Plunging into Endless Difficulties: 
Medicaid and Coercion in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 93 B.U. 
L. REV. 1, 34 (2013) (“Cooperative federalism programs have been criticized for obscuring 
political accountability; the federal government enacts the programs but leaves states 
bearing the brunt of any political opposition to program operations and costs.”). 
278. 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(2) (2012) (permitting municipalities to alternatively be authorized by “a 
governmental officer or organization empowered by State law”). 
279. See 11 U.S.C. § 901 (2012) (listing the Bankruptcy Code provisions that apply in Chapter 9 
and omitting 11 U.S.C. § 303, the provision authorizing involuntary bankruptcy). 
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Chapter 9.280 Only after its state has authorized municipal bankruptcy, and 
after a city voluntarily files for bankruptcy, would the city face a more 
constrained choice: either reform its governance or run the risk that the 
bankruptcy judge will decline to approve the city’s debt adjustment plan. Even 
this choice is more meaningful than the state’s options under the Medicaid 
extension in NFIB, since a municipality that declined to implement governance 
reform would not be forced to give up federal benefits it had previously 
enjoyed. 
Under nearly any ordinary understanding of coercion and consent, the 
governance reform proposals we have advocated neither coerce nor compel 
state and local decision makers.281 Even if one accepted the proposition that 
federal taxation for federal programs could impose the same constraints on 
states as direct commandeering by crowding out the states’ capacity to raise 
their own taxes for their own purposes,282  conditions imposed on a debt 
 
280. See, e.g., CHAPMAN AND CUTLER LLP, supra note 143, at 51 (noting that twelve states provide 
unconditional authorization, twelve other states authorize filing conditioned on additional 
state action, and three other states grant “limited authorization”). 
281. Under the definition of coercion Mitchell Berman advocates in his recent critiques of the 
Supreme Court’s case law, Chapter 9 governance reform is a closer call than it is under the 
Court’s treatment of the term. Berman defines coercion as improper pressure on a state’s 
exercise of its rights, and frames one dimension of the inquiry in terms of whether Congress 
would wish to supply a benefit even without the inducement it has attached. See Berman, 
supra note 276, at 268. In an important new article, Einer Elhauge develops a somewhat 
similar theoretical framework, distinguishing between contrived threats and uncontrived 
warnings. Contrived Threats v. Uncontrived Warnings: A General Solution to the Puzzles of 
Contractual Duress, Unconstitutional Conditions, and Blackmail, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 21) (on file with authors). In the Chapter 9 context, this 
could be construed as asking whether Congress would provide a Chapter 9 discharge even if 
municipalities did not reform their governance. The answer could be “yes,” although 
Congress also might be reluctant to offer the discharge to a substantial city whose failure to 
reform its governance undermines the prospects for a successful recovery. See Mitchell N. 
Berman, Coercion, Compulsion, and the Medicaid Expansion: A Study in the Doctrine of 
Unconstitutional Conditions, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1283, 1343-44 (2013) (“Even if Congress would 
have some affirmative reason to provide an offered benefit notwithstanding the state’s 
noncompliance with a condition, non-provision of the benefit does not amount to a 
proscribed penalty if the reasons that militate against providing the benefit, and that 
Congress treats as overriding, do not depend upon making the state’s exercise of its rights 
more costly.”). 
282. The dissenters in National Federation of Independent Businesses relied on the relationship 
between federal and state taxation as part of their argument for invalidating the Affordable 
Care Act. Nat’l Fed’n Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2662 n.13 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Similar 
arguments previously appeared in the academic literature. See, e.g., Matthew D. Adler & 
Seth F. Kreimer, The New Etiquette of Federalism: New York, Printz, and Yeskey, 1998 SUP. 
CT. REV. 71, 107; Lynn A. Baker, Conditional Federal Spending After Lopez, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 
1911, 1935-47 (1995); Lynn A. Baker & Mitchell N. Berman, Getting off the Dole: Why the 
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adjustment plan in bankruptcy do not entail any federal taxation. Governance 
reform, at least where related to the risk of profligacy, also is directly related to 
Chapter 9’s financial objectives and thus does not raise germaneness 
concerns.283 Finally, by their very nature, conditions created by a federal judge 
on a case-by-case basis to fit the circumstances of an individual municipality in 
a Chapter 9 proceeding (itself an infrequent phenomenon) impose a much 
lower threat to federalism principles than congressional action that 
simultaneously applies to all states and their political subdivisions. To the 
extent that the value of federalism lies in experimentation and variety in the 
provision of goods, services, or government institutions,284 or in the capacity of 
those with different preferences to sort themselves into hospitable 
jurisdictions,285 little is lost should federal action induce a single municipality 
to alter its governance structure. 
Nevertheless, and notwithstanding our analogy to the Spending Clause, 
there are dissimilarities between federal grants and federally approved debt 
adjustment, and these dissimilarities point in different directions with respect 
to the legitimacy of federal intervention in restructuring local governments. As 
commentators have argued, spending from a federal treasury subject to a 
budget constraint assumes a zero-sum quality that requires legislators to 
internalize the costs of their decisions because they must pay for even 
conditional spending by either sacrificing other budget items or raising 
taxes. 286  In theory, spending from a fixed budget also induces potential 
recipients to monitor overall spending to ensure that they obtain a fair share of 
expenditures. Either argument indicates that there are political limits to the 
federal government’s capacity to pursue its own policies at the expense of the 
states. Federal bankruptcy control over municipalities, however, does not have 
the same zero-sum quality. Thus, there is greater risk of federal overstepping of 
 
Court Should Abandon Its Spending Doctrine, and How a Too-Clever Congress Could Provoke It 
To Do So, 78 IND. L.J. 459 (2003); Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of 
Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 430-31 (1998). For doubts that federal 
taxation has a negative effect on state revenue raising, see Brian Galle, Does Federal Spending 
“Coerce” States? Evidence from State Budgets, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 989 (2014).  
283. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 282, at 1966-74; Elhauge, supra note 281, at 49-50 (discussing 
germaneness and characterizing non-germane conditions as likely to be impermissible 
threats). 
284. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“It is 
one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its 
citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments 
without risk to the rest of the country.”). 
285. See McConnell, supra note 23, 1501-07. 
286. See, e.g., Brian Galle, Getting Spending: How to Replace Clear Statement Rules with Clear 
Thinking About Conditional Grants of Federal Funds, 37 CONN. L. REV. 155, 185-91 (2004). 
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boundaries. On the other hand, the availability to states of alternatives to 
federal bankruptcy dilutes the claim that the federal government is 
commandeering an operation in which states could not otherwise engage on 
their own terms. States remain free to deal with municipal insolvency by 
negotiating with creditors for consensual adjustments or providing assistance, 
perhaps accompanied by financial control boards or other arrangements that 
address the problem of moral hazard that might otherwise imperil bailouts. 
These mechanisms may be less efficient and more costly than federal 
bankruptcy law. But the experiences of municipalities that resolved substantial 
financial distress without bankruptcy—such as New York City, Philadelphia, 
and Cleveland—demonstrate that viable, if less desirable, alternatives to federal 
involvement exist.287 
We acknowledge, however, that two additional considerations could make 
our case a closer call. The first is political accountability. Suppose a bankruptcy 
judge threatened to deny confirmation unless a city reformed its governance, 
but did not provide any specific guidance. If the city proposed, for example, to 
privatize its sanitation department by contracting with private providers as part 
of its debt adjustment plan, city voters might not know for sure whether to 
treat city officials or the federal bankruptcy judge as responsible for the new 
governance framework. Interestingly, these accountability concerns counsel in 
favor of giving bankruptcy judges authority to mandate governance reform 
directly, rather than relying on their indirect power under current law to veto a 
plan that lacks governance reform as infeasible.288  Either way, so long as 
bankruptcy judges are explicit about their expectations for governance reform, 
the lines of accountability seem sufficiently clear to assuage concerns about 
blurred responsibility. Moreover, Chapter 9 governance reform is subject to an 
important check that is entirely absent under true commandeering: as noted 
earlier, if municipal voters do not like the governance reform, they could 
remove it after the bankruptcy case. Any reforms would be fully reversible, 
subject only to the constraints that state law or the city charter put on 
governance change. We anticipate that such reversals would be infrequent, 
both because of the stickiness of the new status quo and because, if the 
governance reform does translate into fiscal responsibility, residents will prefer 
 
287. See Actions Taken by Five Cities to Restore Their Financial Health: Hearing Before the Subcomm. 
on D.C. of the H. Comm. on Gov’t Reform & Oversight, 104th Cong. (1995) (recounting efforts 
taken by states and localities to deal with fiscal distress in Chicago, Cleveland, New York 
City, Philadelphia, and Yonkers). 
288. “[I]n such a case,” as Justice O’Connor put it in New York v. United States, “it is the Federal 
Government that makes the decision in full view of the public, and it will be public officials 
that suffer the consequences if the decision turns out to be detrimental or unpopular.” 505 
U.S. 144, 168 (1992). 
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it to the prior government structure. But the possibility of reversal does retain 
some autonomy for the municipality, which is lacking in the commandeering 
decisions. 
Despite these protections, one might still worry that the rights bankruptcy 
interferes with are so important that even meaningful state and local consent to 
the reforms are not sufficient. “Where Congress exceeds its authority relative 
to the States,” Justice O’Connor explained in New York v. United States, “the 
departure from the constitutional plan cannot be ratified by the ‘consent’ of 
state officials.”289 Indeed, Ashton was predicated in part on the proposition that 
“[n]either consent nor submission by the States can enlarge the powers of 
Congress.”290 The right of the state to determine the governance structure of 
its cities could be seen, in a sense, as inalienable.291  
In our view, this final objection is the most serious concern with our 
governance proposal. The first thing to note in response is that courts have 
traditionally been less deferential to local governments than state governments. 
The Supreme Court has long construed the Eleventh Amendment as 
prohibiting lawsuits against states and state officials, for instance, but not 
against local officials.292 In other areas as well, the Court has adopted a less 
deferential approach to local government. Municipalities are “persons” for 
purposes of civil rights liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983;293 states are not.294 
Further, states enjoy broader antitrust immunity than their political 
subdivisions.295 It is also important to point out once again that deep financial 
distress is emblematic of the failure of a city’s democratic processes. 
Displacement of those processes in an effort to restore the financial stability 
 
289. Id. at 182. The Court has made similar statements in other cases. See, e.g., Bond v. United 
States, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2364 (2011). 
290. Ashton v. Cameron Cty. Water Improvement Dist. No.1, 298 U.S. 513, 531 (1936). 
291. We borrow this characterization from a classic article by Seth Kreimer. See Seth F. Kreimer, 
Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive State, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 
1293, 1378 (1984). Although she critiques the inalienability concept, Kathleen Sullivan 
incorporates somewhat similar concerns into her theory of unconstitutional conditions. See 
Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413, 1489-1504 (1989) 
(advocating an emphasis on preserving private ordering, ensuring evenhandedness, and 
preventing constitutional caste). 
292. See, e.g., Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Serv, 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.54 (1978); Mt. Healthy City Sch. 
Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280-81 (1977). 
293. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 658. 
294. See Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). 
295. Compare Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 40 (1985) (holding a municipality 
enjoys antitrust immunity only if the state has clearly authorized a restraint), with Parker v. 
Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943) (holding the Sherman Act does not apply to states).  
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that a well-functioning democracy would pursue arguably is far less 
problematic than it might be with a city that is already providing the local 
public goods that localities are created to deliver.296 
D. Will Bankruptcy Judges Make Matters Worse? 
Even if governance reform is legally permissible under both Chapter 9 and 
the Constitution, some might raise prudential objections, arguing that 
bankruptcy court intervention could do more harm than good. The first reason 
for skepticism concerns an empirical difficulty. Even if it is appropriate to use 
Chapter 9 for structural reform where governance issues are a cause of 
bankruptcy, are bankruptcy judges competent to distinguish cases in which 
fiscal distress emerges from internal dysfunction rather than exogenous 
circumstances? It is, for example, plausible that Detroit’s decline was caused as 
much by the exit of the auto industry, an increase in energy prices that drove 
industry to the Sun Belt, and high labor costs as by municipal policies.297 One 
might question whether courts can disaggregate the various causes of fiscal 
distress or distinguish symptom from cause. Given that judicial intervention 
would interfere with democratic governance, restructuring would be 
appropriate only when political failure was clearly a major contributor to fiscal 
failure.  
Despite their limitations, bankruptcy judges will often be able to determine 
whether fiscal instability is due to some exogenous event or to political 
dysfunction. The bankruptcy filing in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, for example, 
was precipitated by an investment in a failed incinerator project that did not 
 
296. Arguably cutting the other way is the novelty of our proposal to use Chapter 9 to achieve 
governance reform. See Kreimer, supra note 291, at 1359 (identifying the historical status quo 
as one of three baselines courts should take into account in assessing whether conditions are 
permissible). But cities with substantial governance problems have not filed for bankruptcy 
in the past, so the governance issues that concern us also are quite new. 
297. Population changes suggest that the decline of Detroit was not fully attributable to exit 
induced by external forces. The population of Detroit declined from 951,270 in 2000 to 
680,250 in 2014. See State & County QuickFacts: Detroit (City), Michigan, U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU (Dec. 2015), http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/26/2622000.html [http:// 
perma.cc/7FGX-P73Y] (estimating population in 2014); American Fact Finder, U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU (2000), http://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview 
.html [http://perma.cc/4JS5-TW89] (providing population in 2000). But the population of 
Oakland County, which borders Detroit, increased from 1,194,156 to 1,237,868 during the 
same period. State & County QuickFacts: Oakland County, Michigan, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU 
(Sept. 2015), http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/26/26125.html [http://perma.cc/QW46 
-SF6Q]. Exit from Detroit did not necessarily mean exit from the metropolitan area.  
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necessarily reflect broad-based fiscal impropriety.298 But even municipalities 
that suffer exogenous shocks have opportunities to recover or to adjust to new 
circumstances. Failure to do so may be a consequence of entrenched decision-
making structures rather than of the initial event.  
Some evidence of political dysfunction may be inferred where bankruptcy 
has been preceded by a period of decline in tax revenues and population 
without offsetting reductions in expenditures and with heavy reliance on 
borrowing. Some evidence suggests that high debt levels and high spending 
levels are correlated with political relationships rather than with structural 
factors outside the control of city officials.299 Therefore, increasing debt-to-
revenue ratios or increasing deficits over a period of years may demonstrate a 
lack of political will to confront long-term distress in order to serve short-term 
interests. Increases in workforce or expenditures to groups that have an 
advantage in organizing may also be indicia that politics rather than resident 
demand has been driving unsustainable budgetary decisions.300 For example, 
at the height of its fiscal crisis in 1976, New York City’s municipal public 
employment levels and labor costs per capita were significantly above those of 
virtually all other major municipalities (with the exception of the District of 
Columbia), perhaps indicating the strength of interest groups rather than 
service demand.301 Detroit’s decline was characterized by inefficiencies in the 
delivery of municipal services—such as reduced collection rates of property 
taxes, redundancy in municipal functions, mismanagement of grant funding, 
 
298. See Sabrina Tavernise, Governor Moves To Take Fiscal Control of Pennsylvania’s Capital,  
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 20, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/21/us/governor-corbett-of-
pennsylvania-moves-to-take-control-of-harrisburg.html [http://perma.cc/D3MD-JGHK]. 
The bankruptcy of Jefferson County, Alabama may be a closer case. That petition was also 
precipitated by a singular event—debt issued to finance construction and repair of a county 
sewer system as required by a consent decree entered into to abate pollution. But both the 
disrepair that necessitated the new construction and the financing necessary to remediate it 
were characterized by political dysfunction, including graft and fraud by county 
commissioners. For a brief history, see In re Jefferson County, 474 B.R. 228, 237-40 (Bankr. 
N.D. Ala. 2012). 
299. See Guntram B. Wolff, Fiscal Crises in U.S. Cities: Structural and Non-Structural Causes 11 
(Ctr. for European Integration Studies, Univ. of Bonn, Working Paper No. B 28-2004, 
2004), http://repec.org/res2004/Wolff.pdf [http://perma.cc/58SV-2QCU] (purporting to 
demonstrate that extreme fiscal outcomes are the result of nonstructural factors such as 
mismanagement, union-power in public administrations, and weak mayors). 
300. See Robert P. Inman, How to Have a Fiscal Crisis: Lessons from Philadelphia, 85 AM. ECON. 
REV. 378, 383 (1995) (attributing fiscal decline in Philadelphia to two factors: an increasingly 
poor population and rising public-employee compensation).  
301. See SHEFTER, supra note 119, at 118-19. Shefter also finds that “[a]gain with the exception of 
Washington, municipal labor costs relative to the local economy loomed from 1.4 to 6.9 
times greater in New York than in any of the nation’s other major cities.” Id. at 119.  
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and public employee work rules based on seniority—rather than simply 
insufficient revenues.302 Therefore, it appears that, notwithstanding frequent 
ambiguity about the causal relationship between governance and fiscal distress, 
even a court wary of interfering with municipal structures would be able to 
identify situations in which the link is sufficiently clear to justify remedial 
efforts.  
Causation difficulties, however, do not exhaust the potential objections to 
allocating the responsibility to bankruptcy courts. A second difficulty involves 
the unintended consequences of any proposed governance reform. In this 
version of the “grass is greener” fallacy, the court may compare an existing, 
failed governance structure with an untried but romantic one. It is plausible 
that courts desirous of doing something to address a distressed city’s political 
dysfunction could advocate structural reform that is ill-suited to the situation. 
We have, for example, indicated that the empirical literature on the 
relationship between government structure and fiscal performance is not 
monolithic.303 Thus, it is plausible that a recommended reorganization will not 
have the anticipated effects.  
The variety of governance structures in both private and public realms 
suggests that no costless version of governance exists. Instead, different 
structures generate different costs and benefits. As we have noted, centralized 
governance promotes unified decision making in a manner that considers the 
interests of all constituents and thus avoids the adverse effects of 
fragmentation.304 But centralization simultaneously creates a risk of political 
monopoly and disenfranchisement of those with minority views, and those 
features can also lead to problematic financial effects. Centralized local 
governments, for example, can direct public expenditures to a political base 
even though the overall effect is to dilute the financial stability of the locality as 
a whole. 305  There is a risk that the institutions selected to address the 
governance failures to which a bankruptcy judge attributes fiscal distress will 
simply generate new difficulties that are different from, but not necessarily less 
serious than, those that the court purports to remedy.  
Even institutional structures that increase financial stability may generate 
offsetting costs in terms of democratic governance or misallocation of resources 
 
302. See Proposal for Creditors, CITY OF DETROIT 61-78 (2013), http://archive.freep.com/assets 
/freep/pdf/C4206913614.pdf [http://perma.cc/9XMH-GD5R]. 
303. See supra notes 161-165, 186-191 and accompanying text. 
304. See supra Section III.A. 
305. See Edward L. Glaeser & Andrei Shleifer, The Curley Effect: The Economics of Shaping the 
Electorate, 21 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 1 (2005) (recounting episodes of redistribution to favored 
groups).  
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to a new, but no more deserving, class of favored beneficiaries. A strong mayor 
may have the capacity to eliminate expensive projects that the majority of 
residents find too costly, but may also eliminate projects that the majority 
supports. 306  Some structural reforms could frustrate positive change by 
handing power to a group disinclined to implement it, such as if at-large 
council members turned out to favor the status quo more than those elected 
from districts.  
While we acknowledge the risk, it is also important to recognize that 
similar uncertainties underlie restructuring of firms under Chapter 11. 307 
Moreover, a court that induces consideration of structural reforms can hear 
arguments and evidence about existing political dysfunction and the propriety 
of reorganization in a particular case, shedding light on issues that Chapter 9 
cases currently ignore, even in spite of their relevance to fiscal stability. Where 
a locality suffers political conditions sufficiently dysfunctional to precipitate 
debt adjustment in bankruptcy and sufficiently entrenched to resist internal 
reform, it may be desirable to accept the risk of unintended consequences over 
the certainty of structurally induced fiscal distress. 
E. Will Governance Reform Discourage Bankruptcy Filings? 
A final concern is that the prospect of governance reform might have a 
chilling effect on municipal bankruptcy filings. Municipalities may be more 
reluctant to file for Chapter 9 relief because those who are currently charged 
with making that decision will be disinclined to initiate a process that could 
dilute their authority. Relatedly, states, which have full discretion to prevent 
their municipalities from filing for Chapter 9 relief, could be reluctant to grant 
the requisite specific authority308 necessary to allow even a willing municipality 
to enter Chapter 9 because the state prefers to maintain control over the 
 
306. Indeed, some commentators use that possibility to explain the continued existence of both 
mayor-council and council-manager forms of local government. See Coate & Knight, supra 
note 183, at 83. 
307. There is, for example, a substantial debate in the literature concerning the fiscal effects of 
staggered terms for boards of directors. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, The 
Costs of Entrenched Boards, 78 J. FIN. ECON. 409, 410, 430 (2005) (finding staggered boards 
established in corporate charter reduce firm value more than those established in bylaws); 
Morgan J. Rose, Heterogeneous Impacts of Staggered Boards by Ownership Concentration, 15 J. 
CORP. FIN. 113, 115, 127 (2009); Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., Staggered Boards and the Wealth of 
Shareholders: Evidence from Two Natural Experiments 23 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 17127, 2011), http://nber.org/papers/w17127 [http://perma.cc/SXL7 
-ZHZN]. 
308. See 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(2) (2012). 
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governance of its political subdivisions. In either case, the effect would be to 
deny a fiscally distressed municipality the benefits from debt adjustment only 
available in Chapter 9. Perhaps it would be preferable to permit the limited 
relief available under the current regime and hope that recidivism will not 
occur rather than to risk municipal or state avoidance of an imperfect, but 
useful, debt adjustment process. 
Although these concerns are real, we doubt that the risk of governance 
restructuring within bankruptcy would alter the calculus of either municipal or 
state officials concerning the decision to enter or permit a Chapter 9 filing. 
From the perspective of municipal officials, the possibility of diminished power 
looms large. But the officials of a municipality that is on the cusp of bankruptcy 
face a highly uncertain future; if debt adjustment is necessary to avoid further 
deterioration of the local economy and subsequent deterioration of officials’ 
political future, then even self-interested officials may consider Chapter 9 to be 
the best alternative, notwithstanding the possibility of restructuring. As we 
noted above with respect to the possibility of obtaining consent under § 904, to 
the extent that the local executive would be the beneficiary of centralized 
decision making that we have associated with fiscal stability, a mayor is likely 
to prefer restructuring that would permit consolidation of budgetary decisions 
under his or her auspices to the status quo.309 City council members, who are 
more likely to lose patronage and power under any movement toward a strong 
mayor system, might be more likely to oppose a Chapter 9 filing that risks 
restructuring.310 In at least some cases, any objections of the city council will be 
irrelevant because other parties have the relevant authority when the 
municipality faces sufficient distress to warrant a Chapter 9 petition. New 
York, Michigan, and Rhode Island, for example, may place fiscally distressed 
localities under the supervision of a financial control board or emergency 
manager.311 Once appointed, those authorities may recommend to state officials 
that the local government be authorized to file a Chapter 9 petition, as 
Detroit’s emergency manager did,312 or may directly file such a petition.313 
 
309. See supra text accompanying note 250. 
310. A brief review of authorizing statutes suggests that the legislative body of the municipality 
typically must vote to permit a bankruptcy filing. Pennsylvania is thus an exception in this 
regard, since it has enacted a special framework for distressed cities of the first class that 
ultimately vests the filing decision with the governor. 53 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. 
§ 12720.211(b) (West 1998). 
311. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 141.1549 (West 2013); N.Y. LOCAL FIN. LAW § 85.80 (McKinney 
2009); 45 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 45-9-7 (2009). 
312. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 141.1558(1) (West 2013). 
313. N.Y. LOCAL FIN. LAW § 85.80 (McKinney 2009). 
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Moreover, if governance restructuring were otherwise considered an 
appropriate role for a federal bankruptcy court, the potential tendency of city 
councils to avoid filings in order to retain authority could be overcome by an 
amendment to the Bankruptcy Code that placed filing authority in the hands of 
the local executive.  
To be sure, a state may consider such intervention to be an intrusion on its 
own prerogative to determine the governance structure of its political 
subdivisions and forbid its municipalities from filing for Chapter 9. But the 
political economy of municipal fiscal distress is more complicated. The 
experiences of Detroit and New York City reveal that state officials may be 
reluctant to interfere with municipal political processes because local officials 
and constituencies may blame state officials for the diminution of local 
autonomy.314 State officials, therefore, may prefer that any such diminution be 
imposed by a third party. The ability of state officials to “blame” a federal 
bankruptcy judge for redesigning institutions that enhance local (and state) 
fiscal stability may be sufficiently attractive to make Chapter 9 more appealing 
rather than less.315 
Moreover, the threat that municipal restructuring poses to the state’s 
plenary authority over its political subdivisions is perhaps more limited than 
initially appears to be the case. As we discuss below, the state retains the 
capacity to impose governance structures that render bankruptcy court 
intrusion unnecessary.316 Even within bankruptcy, the state is likely to play a 
significant role in formulating the plan that the debtor municipality submits 
for confirmation. In addition to its other authority over a municipality, the 
state will typically be the source of substantial capital infusions that will be 
necessary to make any plan feasible.317 Of course, the state’s plenary authority 
over its localities survives bankruptcy so that the state presumably could also 
 
314. See, e.g., JONATHAN SOFFER, ED KOCH AND THE REBUILDING OF NEW YORK CITY 120 (2010) 
(reporting that Koch’s reaction to the imposition of a financial control board was “if I were 
the Mayor, I would never have gone along with it: I don’t think I could have accepted a state 
of affairs that made me one-seventh of a mayor.”); Chris Savage, The Scandal of Michigan’s 
Emergency Managers, THE NATION (Feb. 15, 2012), http://www.thenation.com/article/166297 
/scandal-michigans-emergency-managers [http://perma.cc/2XYX-FNKV].  
315. This suggests that some state officials may actually prefer that bankruptcy judges be given 
explicit authority to require governance change—or at the least, that judges clearly signal the 
governance changes they believe to be necessary to a feasible restructuring plan. 
316. See infra Part V.  
317. See Gillette, supra note 31, at 1414-16. Under the terms of the proposed plan for adjusting the 
debts of Detroit, the State of Michigan contributed $98.8 million to the city’s General 
Retirement System and $96 million to the city’s Police and Fire Retirement System. In re 
City of Detroit, 524 B.R. 147, 170 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2014). 
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intervene subsequent to the municipality’s exit from bankruptcy to readjust the 
local governance structure. As a result, any action taken by the bankruptcy 
court that conflicted with state preferences could be temporary.  
The state might not object for yet another reason as well. The state could 
effectively pre-empt federal bankruptcy court intervention if the state itself 
took action that addressed governance issues in fiscally distressed localities. 
Indeed, one benefit of allowing a federal bankruptcy court to restructure 
municipal governance is that the threat of judicial intervention could induce 
states to act more expeditiously in addressing local structural defects and thus 
avoid the need for a bankruptcy court to take any measures. In short, the very 
presence of the power to restructure municipal governance in bankruptcy could 
render its exercise superfluous.  
That possibility, however, raises a related question: If states have the 
capacity to alter municipal governance structures, why not leave that task to the 
state and limit the bankruptcy court to the traditional role of adjusting debts? 
It is to that question that we next turn. 
v.  why not the state?  
In this Part, we address the capacity of states, rather than bankruptcy 
courts, to restructure dysfunctional local governments. We begin by 
acknowledging that states have political and institutional advantages over 
courts for this purpose. But we contend that there will be occasions when the 
state is disabled from exploiting those advantages. Restrictions on state 
intervention result from two sources. First, legal doctrines that define the 
relationship between the state and its political subdivisions may prevent state 
interference with local governmental structures. Those doctrines typically arise 
from principles of home rule that grant municipal governments immunity 
from state interference with respect to local internal organization. Second, the 
political economy of state intervention may render it difficult for states to 
intervene in local institutional design, even when the state has the legal 
authority to do so.  
If governance restructuring is vital to municipal fiscal health, the natural 
question to ask is why the state, rather than a federal bankruptcy court, is not 
the appropriate entity to impose governance restructuring in the face of 
recalcitrant local officials. After all, standard legal doctrine provides that states 
can exercise plenary power over their political subdivisions, constrained only 
by federal or state constitutional law.318 State legislatures, which deal with local 
 
318. See BAKER, GILLETTE & SCHLEICHER, supra note 20, at 245-56.  
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governmental powers on a regular basis, appear to have a comparative 
advantage over courts, including federal bankruptcy courts, in designing 
institutions that affect the welfare of municipal residents. As Omer Kimhi has 
argued, the state is well positioned to deal with municipal fiscal distress 
because it has greater control over the socioeconomic or political causes of crisis 
and has the capacity, by conditional bailout, direct state takeovers, or the 
imposition of local governance mechanisms, to resolve it.319 Moreover, to the 
extent that local fiscal distress threatens to spill over to other jurisdictions in 
the state—either by reducing the faith of credit markets in the fiscal health of 
neighboring jurisdictions or by threatening consequences in the metropolitan 
economy—the state has the appropriate motivation to intervene.320 Finally, it is 
more consistent with principles of federalism to permit the state to dictate 
forms of governance than to invite the intervention of a federal bankruptcy 
court. 
For each of these reasons, it is preferable that the state design and dictate 
structural change for municipalities. We are concerned, however, with the very 
common case in which the state has not addressed the question of institutional 
design in the face of fiscal distress.321  If inaction is the consequence of a 
deliberate decision that state intervention would entail costs in excess of the 
benefits of enhanced fiscal stability, there may be little reason for a federal 
bankruptcy court to revisit the inquiry. If, however, the state’s inaction is 
motivated by factors unrelated to questions of institutional design, then it may 
be desirable to have a third party, such as a federal bankruptcy court, induce 
appropriate structural change. Of course, ad hoc explanations for state inaction 
in a particular case are difficult to discern and thus invite courts to engage in 
messy speculation about state political processes. To determine whether or not 
bankruptcy courts should abstain from municipal governance reform we 
 
319. See Kimhi, supra note 27, at 664-72. On bailouts, see Robert P. Inman, Transfers and 
Bailouts: Enforcing Local Fiscal Discipline with Lessons from U.S. Federalism, in FISCAL 
DECENTRALIZATION AND THE CHALLENGE OF HARD BUDGET CONSTRAINTS 35, 48-49 
(Jonathan A. Rodden et al. eds., 2003). On state takeovers, see Gillette, supra note 31. State 
constitutions and statutes permit the legislature to dictate the terms of or amend city 
charters. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN. § 117.3 (West 2012) (mandatory provisions in 
city charters); City of Ecorse v. Peoples Cmty. Hosp. Auth., 58 N.W.2d 159 (Mich. 1953). 
Some restrictions may arise when home rule authority is deemed to affect the form of 
government. See infra text accompanying notes 332-342. 
320. See Gillette, supra note 31, at 1416-19. 
321. We are not, for example, aware of any efforts by the state to restructure local governments 
in well-publicized cases of fiscal distress, such as Detroit or Vallejo. Financial control boards 
in New York City imposed budgeting requirements on New York City, but did not 
otherwise reorganize the city government. 
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therefore will need to consider what, as a general matter, explains state inaction 
rather than what occurred in a particular case. 
For two very different reasons, states may often fail to impose appropriate 
governance structures on a fiscally distressed municipality. The first, a 
relatively benign story, involves legal doctrines that dictate the relationships 
between the state and its political subdivisions.322 These doctrines limit the 
state’s authority to intervene, although the constraints are much weaker than 
might initially seem to be the case. The second, perhaps a more complicated 
and malign explanation, involves the political economy of those same 
relationships.323 The political impediments are much more significant, and 
confirm the need for bankruptcy court intervention.  
Our discussion of state intervention focuses on the capacity of state 
legislatures to restructure local government. In theory, state courts with 
authority to resolve municipal distress could make restructuring part of a state 
insolvency process and perhaps circumvent some of the political economy 
obstacles that we attribute to legislatures. Indeed, McConnell and Picker 
argued for displacement of federal municipal bankruptcy law with state 
municipal bankruptcy law. 324  We have little disagreement about the 
institutional capacity of a state bankruptcy regime to address matters of 
municipal governance. But, as McConnell and Picker recognized, current law 
restricts that option since the Bankruptcy Code limits states’ ability to enact 
laws that impose debt adjustments on unwilling creditors.325 McConnell and 
Picker concluded that elimination of that provision would permit states to 
enact their own adjustment laws.326 They rejected the obvious response that 
the Contracts Clause precludes states from impairing the obligation of 
contract.327 We are less certain. McConnell and Picker relied on the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Faitoute Iron & Steel v. City of Asbury Park, which upheld a 
state municipal insolvency statute against a Contracts Clause challenge on the 
grounds that the law created no impairment if it allowed a creditor a greater 
probability of recovery than would otherwise have been possible.328 A debt 
adjustment plan that promises a creditor of a bankrupt municipality something 
 
322. See infra Section V.A.  
323. See infra Section V.B. 
324. See McConnell & Picker, supra note 8, at 479. 
325. 11 U.S.C. § 903(1) (2012) (“[A] State law prescribing a method of composition of 
indebtedness of such municipality may not bind any creditor that does not consent to such 
composition”). 
326. McConnell & Picker, supra note 8, at 479-80. 
327. Id. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. 
328. 316 U.S. 502, 508, 511 (1942). 
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rather than the nothing that would otherwise be forthcoming will satisfy that 
standard. But subsequent Contracts Clause jurisprudence allows such 
exceptions only in the face of a “broad, generalized economic or social 
problem.”329 Certainly the Great Depression, during which Asbury Park fell 
into insolvency, qualified. Fiscal distress that imperils the solvency of a major 
city and threatens substantial national effects might similarly qualify. But it is 
less certain that distress attributed to the profligate pension arrangements of a 
city with less national importance would. 330  In any event, the ad hoc 
determination that would be required concerning the constitutionality of 
impairment in a particular situation makes a state municipal restructuring law 
too uncertain to be a basis for reliance.  
McConnell and Picker may stand on stronger ground when they contend 
that state insolvency laws in effect at the time municipal distress materializes 
would not violate the Contracts Clause because those laws become part of 
subsequently negotiated contracts. 331  But that solution requires initial 
legislative intervention of the type that, in this Part, we suggest has a low 
likelihood of materializing prior to the fiscal crisis that it is intended to redress. 
Indeed, to the extent that state legislatures have recently addressed the 
possibility of municipal insolvency, they have demonstrated more sympathy 
for creditors than municipalities by granting bondholders liens that would 
arguably withstand reduction even in federal bankruptcy proceedings.332 We 
thus concentrate on the capacity and incentives of legislators to require 
structural reform outside of municipal debt adjustment.  
 
329. Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 250 (1978). While the Court has 
allowed a broader range of impairments for private contracts, it has not done so with respect 
to public contracts. See Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton, 462 U.S. 176 (1983); Energy Reserves 
Grp., Inc. v. Kan. Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400 (1983). 
330. See In re City of Stockton, 493 B.R. 772, 779 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2013). One might contend 
that the pension crisis was exacerbated by the fiscal crisis that began in 2008, and that the 
crisis created an exogenous shock equivalent to the Great Depression for purposes of the 
Contracts Clause. But to the extent that the pension crisis has been a function of unrealistic 
assumptions concerning returns, preceded the fiscal crisis of 2008, and has had varying 
effects depending on the practices of various states and cities, it is more difficult to grant it 
the same status as the Great Depression. See The Trillion Dollar Gap: Underfunded State 
Retirement Systems and the Roads to Reform, PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, 1-2 (2010), http:// 
www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/legacy/uploadedfiles/pcs_assets/2010/trilliondollargapunderf
undedstateretirementsystemsandtheroadstoreformpdf.pdf [http://perma.cc/A75H-HKHG] 
(summarizing the gap between value of obligations to retirees and available funding as of 
2008). 
331. See McConnell & Picker, supra note 8, at 480. 
332. See, e.g., 45 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 45-12-1 (2009) (granting bondholders of general obligations 
issued by cities and towns in Rhode Island first lien on ad valorem taxes upon all the taxable 
property). 
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A. Doctrinal Constraints on State Design of Municipal Governance 
Notwithstanding the traditional view that a state can exercise plenary 
power over its political subdivisions, state constitutional doctrines place 
constraints on the state’s interference with local autonomy.333 A legislature that 
respected those constraints and thus refused to restructure municipal 
institutions of governance may simply be adhering to a settled allocation of 
responsibility between states and their political subdivisions. Violation of those 
constraints by dictating forms of governance could be seen as imposing costs 
on local autonomy in excess of the benefits of redressing even a serious fiscal 
crisis. 
The most powerful limitation on state authority gives municipalities the 
authority to exercise home rule in the design of their own governance 
structures. Home rule, however, is not a monolithic concept. In some 
jurisdictions, it provides a municipality only with initiative authority; the 
municipality can legislate in an area designated as “local concern” or 
“municipal affairs” even without prior legislative authorization.334 In other 
jurisdictions, home rule authority provides a broader level of local autonomy 
by immunizing the locality from state intervention, again with respect to 
matters denominated as involving purely “municipal affairs.”335 In the first set 
of jurisdictions, the exercise of home rule is always subject to state 
intervention; there is no area in which the locality is entitled to trump a 
conflicting state statute. In such a jurisdiction, the state could always impose a 
form of government on one of its municipalities, even if the municipality 
preferred an alternative. For example, Michigan’s Home Rule City Act requires 
a city charter to contain provisions for the election of specified officers for 
specified terms.336 A municipality that preferred a different set of local officials, 
or different terms for them, would be unable to trump the state, 
notwithstanding home rule status. State inaction in such a jurisdiction cannot 
be explained as a function of a doctrinal requirement that the state be excluded 
from designing municipal institutions.  
In the second set of jurisdictions, there is a stronger claim that home rule 
status precludes the state from intervening in matters that involve an 
insufficient degree of statewide concern. If the structure of municipal 
 
333. See BAKER, GILLETTE & SCHLEICHER, supra note 20, at 245-87 (discussing a state’s plenary 
power over municipalities and exceptions). 
334. See, e.g., N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 2(c); GA. CODE ANN. § 36-35-3 (2012). 
335. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 5(a); COLO. CONST. art. XX, § 6. 
336. See Public Act No. 7, 2012 Mich. Legis. Serv. 7 (West) (amending MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. 
§§ 117.3-117.4 (West 2015)). 
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governance falls into that category, then municipal choices trump the state’s, as 
several courts have held. The Arizona Supreme Court recently opined that, 
notwithstanding general ambiguity about the dividing line between matters of 
state concern and local concern, it “is absolutely clear that charter city 
governments enjoy autonomy with respect to structuring their own 
governments.”337 Thus, a state statute that provided for partisan ballots did not 
displace a municipal charter requirement of non-partisan elections;338 a state 
prohibition on partisan elections did not bar local partisan elections for charter 
cities;339 and a local residency requirement for political candidates trumped a 
more stringent state statute.340 Other states have similarly concluded that the 
governance structures of home rule municipalities, at least insofar as they 
involve elections, trump conflicting state laws.341 The New Mexico Supreme 
Court concluded that a state statute that dictated a set number of city 
commissioners did not bind home rule municipalities.342  
None of these decisions, however, have been rendered in the face of an 
effort to impose institutions on a municipality that faces fiscal distress. Distress 
could alter the calculus because home rule authority is limited to matters of 
local concern, and fiscal distress may entail extramural effects. At least in part 
for this reason, courts have permitted states to alter the governance structure of 
home rule municipalities by appointing receivers or financial control boards, 
although these courts have also emphasized the temporary nature of the 
intervention.343 It is somewhat unclear whether a state that otherwise grants 
localities full autonomy with respect to its local affairs would be permitted to 
dictate institutional design of a more longstanding nature for a municipality if 
the state made capital infusions or if the municipality’s fiscal distress led to 
higher borrowing costs elsewhere in the state. 
In addition to home rule limitations, constraints on special legislation may 
seem to restrict a state’s authority. Most state constitutions preclude the 
 
337. City of Tucson v. State, 273 P.3d 624, 628 (Ariz. 2012). 
338. Strode v. Sullivan, 236 P.2d 48, 54 (Ariz. 1951). 
339. City of Tucson, 273 P.3d at 628. 
340. Triano v. Massion, 513 P.2d 935, 939 (Ariz. 1973). 
341. See, e.g., Ex parte Boalt, 260 P. 1004, 1010 (Or. 1927) (concluding that the election of a 
municipal judge was of purely local concern). 
342. State ex rel. Haynes v. Bonem, 845 P.2d 150, 158 (N.M. 1992). A New Mexico appellate court 
subsequently concluded that a state statute that imposed term limits on city counselors was 
prohibited by a state constitutional clause that established qualifications for elective office. 
Cottrell v. Santillanes, 901 P.2d 785, 787 (N.M. Ct. App. 1995). To the same effect, see 
Hoerger v. Spota, 997 N.E.2d 1229, 1231 (N.Y. 2013). 
343. See, e.g., Powers v. Sec’y of Admin., 587 N.E.2d 744, 748 (Mass. 1992); Moreau v. Flanders, 
15 A.3d 565, 578 (R.I. 2011). 
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enactment of special legislation that imposes unique burdens affecting only 
some of the state’s political subdivisions.344 The aversion to imposition of 
unique burdens is implicit in those constitutions that permit special legislation 
to be enacted only if the affected locality agrees. The Michigan Constitution, 
for example, only permits special legislation if it has been approved by two-
thirds of “members elected to and serving in each house and by a majority of 
the electors voting thereon in the district affected.”345 The consent prerequisite 
in the Michigan constitutional clause, which has common analogues in other 
state constitutions,346 effectively precludes the legislature from enacting laws 
that will specially burden a particular locality. The special legislation 
prohibition seems to limit the capacity of the legislature to tailor a governance 
structure to those municipalities that suffer fiscal distress. 
Nevertheless, like home rule, the special legislation prohibition serves as a 
relatively weak constraint. Courts have systematically allowed legislatures to 
enact legislation that affects only a subset of municipalities as long as the 
classification is rationally related to a permitted state purpose.347 In this sense, 
special legislation analysis essentially follows equal protection analysis under 
the federal Constitution. Thus, legislation that imposes government structures 
on municipalities that have required state financial assistance, that have been 
placed into receivership, or that fail to maintain a balanced budget for a 
particular period of time could arguably avoid invalidation, even though they 
apply only to a class of municipalities. Moreover, both courts and state 
constitutions have occasionally allocated to the legislature itself the capacity to 
determine whether proposed legislation is “special” within the meaning of the 
prohibition.348 Thus, fear of invalidation is unlikely to restrain a legislature 
 
344. See, e.g., Justin R. Long, State Constitutional Prohibitions on Special Laws, 60 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 
719, 721 n.6 (2012) (listing state constitutional provisions); Anthony Schutz, State 
Constitutional Restrictions on Special Legislation as Structural Restraints, 40 J. LEGIS. 39, 48 
nn.38-41 (2013) (same).  
345. MICH. CONST. art. IV, § 29. 
346. See MASS. CONST. amend. art. LXXXIX, § 8; MINN. CONST. art. XII, § 2; N.Y. CONST. art. 
IX, § 2(b)(2).  
347. See John M. Winters, Classification of Municipalities, 57 NW. U. L. REV. 279, 286-87 (1962). 
348. See, e.g., N.J. State Bar Ass’n v. State, 902 A.2d 944, 954-55 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
2006); Lake Cty. Bd. of Elections & Registration v. Millender, 727 N.E.2d 483, 487 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 2000). The Illinois Constitution of 1970, on the other hand, explicitly allocates the 
determination of whether legislation is “special” to the judiciary. ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 13. 
The prior version of the state constitution had conferred on the legislature final 
constitutional authority for determining whether legislation could be general. See In re 
Belmont Fire Prot. Dist., 489 N.E.2d 1385, 1387-88 (Ill. 1986).  
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otherwise convinced of the propriety of intervention in the governance of a 
distressed municipality. 
The limited scope of the special legislation prohibition may have conflicting 
implications for a state’s ability to require governance reform in distressed 
municipalities. On the one hand, the state’s ability to circumvent the 
constitutional limitation through creative classification suggests that there is 
less need to rely on bankruptcy courts to reform dysfunctional governance 
structures. On the other hand, statutory reforms that appear directed at an 
individual locality necessarily raise questions about legislative motivation and 
are more susceptible to judicial invalidation. A recent example involves 
legislation enacted by the Michigan legislature in the wake of Detroit’s efforts 
to exit bankruptcy proceedings. One of those laws required a city with a 
population of 600,000 or more to establish the position of chief financial 
officer, to be appointed by the mayor of the city subject to the approval of the 
governing body of the city, and if applicable, any financial review commission 
that has authority over budgetary matters in the city.349 At the time that the 
legislation was enacted, Detroit’s population was just under 700,000, but had 
been falling substantially in the four years prior.350 The next largest city in 
Michigan has a population of less than 200,000.351 Thus the population figure 
appears to be a substitute for inserting into the legislation the word “Detroit,” a 
measure that would likely have run afoul of Michigan’s prohibition on special 
legislation where a general law is possible.352 Presumably, the legislature did 
 
349. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 117.4s (West 2014). 
350. See State & County QuickFacts: Detroit (City), Michigan, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Dec. 2015), 
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/26/2622000.html [http://perma.cc/7FGX-P73Y] 
(estimating 2014 population at 680,250). 
351. See 2014 Population Estimates for Michigan Cities, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
http://factfinder.census.gov/faces/nav/jsf/pages/index.xhtml (Search “2014 Population 
Estimates for Michigan Cities” under “Community Facts” and hit “Go”; select “Annual 
Population Estimates” under “2014 Population Estimates Program”; hit “Download” to view 
table) (Grand Rapids has the second largest estimated population in 2014 with 
approximately 194,000 residents). 
352. See MICH. CONST. art. 4, § 29 (“The legislature shall pass no local or special act in any case 
where a general act can be made applicable, and whether a general can be made applicable 
shall be a judicial question.”). Although one could argue that a chief financial officer is more 
essential for large distressed cities, due to the complexity of their budgets, the distinction 
seems tenuous in Michigan, where the state has deemed a number of substantial 
municipalities—including Flint (population 99,002, see State and County QuickFacts, U.S. 
CENSUS BUREAU (Dec. 2, 2015), http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/26/2629000.html 
[http://perma.cc/H5A5-4F23]), Hamtramck (population 22,099, see State and County 
QuickFacts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Dec. 2, 2015), http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/26 
/2636280.html [http://perma.cc/BN6Y-32ZC]), and Lincoln Park (population 37,231, see 
State and County QuickFacts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Dec. 2, 2015), http://quickfacts.census 
 
 
the yale law journal 125 : 1 150   20 16  
1230 
 
not believe that it was appropriate to dictate municipal officials for all cities or 
even for all large cities; perhaps more realistically, localities would have resisted 
such intrusion into local governance. While the Michigan legislature was 
willing to risk invalidation in order to enact a statute that would impose 
governance constraints on Detroit, and only Detroit, either less salient cases of 
fiscal imprudence or more aversion to circumventing constitutional constraints 
could induce legislatures to take a more conservative approach and avoid 
imposing governance reforms even on distressed localities.  
B. The Political Economy of Structural Reform 
The prior Section suggested that legal doctrine provides some, albeit 
minor, constraints on the capacity of the legislature to dictate forms of 
governance to the state’s municipalities. Where legal constraints operate, 
bankruptcy court intervention to restructure municipal governance might be 
seen as improper rebalancing of the priorities that the state had struck between 
the interests in local autonomy and the risk that a municipality or the state 
would suffer as a consequence of flaws in the design of municipal governance. 
The limited scope of constitutional restrictions on state legislatures during 
municipal fiscal crisis, however, indicates that those doctrines do not 
substantially foreclose impinging on local decisions. The explanation for 
legislative inertia must lie elsewhere. 
It is, of course, plausible that the state would have been willing to intervene 
in municipal structure in an appropriate case, but that the legislature made a 
considered determination that such drastic action was undesirable in the 
specific case of the municipality that had entered Chapter 9. The case for 
restructuring depends on balancing the costs and benefits of governance 
reform, and the legislature could have made a good faith determination that 
the costs of restructuring were excessive. In that case, judicial revisiting of the 
decision would appear inappropriate, given the legislature’s comparative (if 
imperfect) advantage in defining the limits of municipal authority and the 
proper allocation of state and local responsibilities. Thus, the area in which 
judicial intervention would appear to be appropriate would be those cases in 
which the legislature not only had failed to deploy measures that would 
enhance fiscal stability for the municipality, but had failed to do so for less 
benign reasons than a considered judgment of the value of restructuring. 
It is, of course, difficult to the point of fruitless to determine legislative 
intent in the case of legislative inaction. As William Eskridge has 
 
.gov/qfd/states/26/2647800.html [http://perma.cc/3E72-N4W5])—sufficiently distressed to 
require an emergency manager.  
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demonstrated, legislative inertia may result from different degrees of intensity 
in favor of acting as well as from insufficient support for action.353 Assume, for 
example, that state legislators responded to fiscal instability in a municipality 
in the following manner: forty percent of the legislators desired no tampering 
with the municipality’s governance structure; forty percent desired requiring 
the municipality to move to a strong mayor model; and twenty percent favored 
disincorporating the city and merging it with the county surrounding it. 
Assume further that each of these positions was resistant to compromise. 
Under that scenario, there would be a solid majority for taking action about 
municipal governance, but the result would be inaction. It would be difficult to 
argue that a bankruptcy court should intervene to correct the result, because 
the legislature had not failed to consider restructuring; it simply failed to 
achieve consensus on the form restructuring should take. Nor could the court 
assume that the existence of a majority for some form of restructuring provided 
the court with authority to select a restructuring option and impose it in the 
name of achieving majority will. Assume, for example, that the forty percent 
that favored a strong mayor also favored no action over disincorporation, and 
that the twenty percent that favored disincorporation also favored no action 
over a strong mayor. Under those circumstances, a court could not correctly 
conclude that any form of restructuring was a majoritarian preference 
compared to no restructuring. 
Uncertainty about legislative process and intent does not, however, 
necessarily leave a court helpless or mired in unfettered speculation. Legislative 
history, although sparser in the state context than in the federal one, should 
reveal whether any discussion of restructuring has occurred. Even in the 
absence of legislative history, one might conclude that the state’s failure to act 
is the result of considered judgment if inertia is inconsistent with incentives 
that the state otherwise has to intervene. Given the structure of the state 
government, the state legislature should be willing, if not anxious, it might 
seem, to impose a governance structure on municipalities that are experiencing 
fiscal distress. This is true for two reasons. First, as Roderick Hills has argued, 
the state has incentives to expand the scope of its jurisdiction and therefore to 
invade areas that might properly be allocated to localities.354 If state legislatures 
desire to expand their jurisdiction, fiscal distress provides an opportunity to act 
on “imperialist” tendencies. Second, as we have suggested above,355 fiscal 
 
353. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87 MICH. L. REV. 67, 104-13 (1988). 
354. Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Compared to What? Tiebout and the Comparative Merits of Congress and 
the States in Constitutional Federalism, in THE TIEBOUT MODEL AT FIFTY 239 (William A. 
Fischel ed., 2006).  
355. See supra text accompanying note 343.  
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distress could generate negative externalities sufficient to overcome objections 
that principles of home rule preclude a state role in municipal affairs.  
In addition, municipal fiscal distress that is sufficiently severe to attract 
legislative attention traditionally involves major cities, and the traditional story 
of state/local relationships suggests widespread suburban and rural hostility to 
urban areas.356 Thus, one can infer that the legislature will be more likely to 
exploit local fiscal distress to discipline or embarrass a municipality that was 
often the target of statewide animosity. Given these apparent incentives to 
intervene, a state’s failure to intervene could, theoretically, reflect legislative 
judgments—to which bankruptcy courts should defer—rather than inertia or a 
political impasse. 
In reality, however, inertia or impasse is more likely to be the principal 
explanation for inaction. Begin with the contention that the state legislature is 
likely to exploit opportunities to discipline or embarrass the distressed 
municipality. Recent scholarship indicates that the relationship between urban 
areas and the state legislature is more complicated than the traditional story of 
hostility. Cities that desire additional authority from the legislature often 
obtain it; indeed, empirically minded students of state processes conclude, 
“State legislatures have routinely deferred to local governments.”357 A recent 
paper by Gamm and Kousser demonstrates that the failure of large cities to 
obtain legislative authority is due less to hostility from other jurisdictions or to 
partisan politics than to disagreement within the delegation from the affected 
locality.358 Legislators are willing to defer to the preferences of local legislators 
where those preferences are clear. Where disunity within the local delegation in 
the state legislature obfuscates the signal about city preferences, other 
legislators have no one to defer to.359 If there is unified resistance to state 
intervention within the delegation from the affected municipality, by contrast, 
that may be sufficient to quash any effort to impose a government structure. 
Moreover, to the extent that partisanship explains state interference in local 
government, it may also explain state inaction. If the distressed municipality is 
dominated by the same party that dominates the state legislature, the state 
 
356. See Sheryll D. Cashin, Localism, Self-Interest and the Tyranny of the Favored Quarter: 
Addressing the Barriers to New Regionalism, 88 GEO. L.J. 1985, 2022 (2000); Gerald Gamm & 
Thad Kousser, No Strength in Numbers: The Failure of Big-City Bills in American State 
Legislatures, 1880-2000, 107 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 663, 664-65 (2013). 
357. Scott Allard et al., Representing Urban Interests: The Local Politics of State Legislatures, 12 STUD. 
IN AM. POL. DEV. 267, 294 (1998). 
358. Gamm & Kousser, supra note 356, at 666-68. 
359. Id. 
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legislature may be reluctant to chastise local political leaders by imposing an 
unwanted governance structure on them.360  
These results suggest that a locality may have sufficient influence in the 
legislature to forestall any efforts to impose structural change, even when doing 
so would enhance fiscal stability. If that is the case, then the argument for 
bankruptcy court to restructure municipal governance may be stronger because 
legislative inaction about municipal structure would result from the dominant 
position of the distressed municipality rather than from the considered 
judgment of the legislature about the propriety of imposing institutions that 
could provide fiscal stability.  
To be sure, the studies finding that legislatures defer to municipal will may 
be skewed by their focus on bills introduced by delegates from the affected 
localities. 361  Legislators from other jurisdictions may be indifferent about 
autonomous decision making by the affected city, because exercise of the 
extended authority has few external effects. But if the municipality has fallen 
into distress, and the distress could have extramural consequences, state 
legislators’ deference could quickly dissipate. In theory, this reasoning could 
explain states’ willingness to enact legislation introduced by local officials 
under ordinary circumstances, while also suggesting that a state’s failure to 
intervene when a municipality falls into distress reflects considered judgment 
rather than a political failure that warrants bankruptcy court intervention.  
Yet, even if state legislators can be expected to intervene in the event of 
fiscal distress, they have little incentive to correct dysfunctional governance 
arrangements. State intervention that reacts to concerns about the external 
effects of fiscal distress tends to target the immediate crisis. The principal 
concern is to reassure credit markets that the municipality at issue and other 
municipalities will not default. Governance reform, by contrast, is intended to 
generate long-term solutions by addressing the causes of a crisis rather than 
the imminent consequences of inadequate existing institutions. Centralized 
decision making, for example, may reduce the size of budgets by eliminating 
logrolled deals in the future. It will not, however, assure the current payment 
of debts or assist in the renegotiation of burdensome executory contracts. Nor 
is restructuring likely to be salient to those who are concerned about the 
 
360. For discussion of the ambiguous role of partisanship in state interventions into the 
governance of political subdivisions, see Gillette, supra note 31, at 1447-49.  
361. One study reported, for instance: “Excluding bills originating in the senate, 93 percent of all 
big-city bills were introduced by a representative from the city affected by the bill—indeed, 
in Massachusetts, where legislators often named the person who had petitioned for the 
introduction of the bill, the mayor of Boston was himself named frequently as the petitioner 
for Boston-related bills.” Allard, supra note 357, at 277. 
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immediate need to address budgetary deficits or to balance the conflicting 
claims of creditors, public employees, and residents to an insufficient local 
treasury. Thus, state legislative efforts to address a local fiscal crisis have 
typically focused on some form of state takeover, either through a receivership 
or through a control board.362 Each of these methods has the capacity to 
exercise substantial authority over budgetary decision making of the distressed 
municipality. But these forms of intervention are intended to be temporary, to 
dissolve at the end of the crisis period, and to manage the current crisis rather 
than to impose longstanding structural changes on the municipality. In the 
New York City fiscal crisis of the 1970s, for example, Senate Republicans 
agreed to provide assistance necessary to avoid a default, but the conditions 
focused on empowering the Municipal Assistance Corporation for the City of 
New York as a supervisory agency rather than revamping the internal 
governance of the city.363  
There is another reason to suspect that a failure by the state to intervene 
will usually reflect inertia, rather than a considered judgment. We have 
hypothesized that restructuring often would move in the direction of a more 
centralized municipal decision-making process. That means that restructuring 
will confer more authority on mayors and detract from the authority of city 
council members. Assuming that mayors would prefer more authority to less, 
one might initially imagine that the legislature would be motivated to mandate 
centralization, because the mayor of a major city is likely to have more 
influence with the state legislature than individual city council members.364 If 
that is true, then, again, one might conclude that the failure of the state 
legislature to intervene is a consequence of a substantive judgment that such a 
move is, on balance, undesirable, rather than a consequence of political 
alignments.  
But a period of fiscal distress is not a propitious time for the legislature to 
confer additional authority on the mayor of a municipality that faces fiscal 
 
362. See Gillette, supra note 31, at 1377-78. 
363. See BAILEY, supra note 119, at 26. 
364. There is some evidence that mayors have greater influence in the state legislature than city 
councils. During the 1990s, there was a movement away from independent school boards 
for large cities and toward appointed school boards. During this period, twenty-four states 
enacted legislation permitting control of school districts by local or state officials. Kenneth 
K. Wong & Francis X. Shen, When Mayors Lead Urban Schools: Assessing the Effects of 
Takeover, in BESIEGED: SCHOOL BOARDS AND THE FUTURE OF EDUCATION POLITICS 81, 83-84 
(William G. Howell ed., 2005). Where local officials have been authorized to name some or 
all members of the school board, the relevant local official has consistently been the mayor, 
rather than the city council or some combination of mayoral appointment with city council 
approval. 
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distress. The incumbent mayor is likely to have become a focal point of blame 
for the very distress that additional centralization is intended to alleviate. Even 
if the absence of centralized control is responsible for the distress, the fact that 
the crisis materialized on the incumbent’s watch makes that official less likely 
to receive sympathy from the legislature. Instead, the legislature will likely 
question the competence of the mayors whose cities face local distress, and 
those mayors are unlikely to enjoy a promising political future, at least in the 
short term.365  
Nor is the mayor, even one with influence, likely to advocate any 
governance reforms, no matter how essential, that would detract from her 
executive authority. For example, we noted above that the legislation enacted 
by the government of Michigan required Detroit to appoint a chief financial 
officer—a rare instance of legislative intervention in municipal governance in 
the face of fiscal crisis. That requirement was presumably intended to provide 
centralized decision making insofar as it created a single umbrella for what had 
been a multi-faceted budgetary process.366 It is unlikely that a mayor would 
advocate such a reform in the state legislature. Similarly, as we have indicated 
above, a requirement that a municipality elect its city council through an at-
large system rather than through district elections could facilitate fiscal stability 
because it would reduce the benefits of district-by-district logrolling. But a 
mayor may be agnostic about or oppose such a change because it would 
undermine that official’s claim to be the only representative elected by the 
electorate as a whole.  
In summary, the failure of the state to restructure municipal governance in 
the face of fiscal crisis is not likely to be a consequence of considered legislative 
 
365. There are exceptions. Marion Barry returned to office as a council member of the District of 
Columbia, notwithstanding that, as mayor, he had previously presided over a financial crisis 
and federal bailout. See David Stout, Marion Barry, Washington’s ‘Mayor for Life,’ Even After 
Prison, Dies at 78, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 23, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/24/us 
/politics/marion-s-barry-jr-former-mayor-of -washington-dies-at-78.html [http://perma.cc 
/9HSY-DZAN]. Dennis Kucinich was elected to Congress after serving as mayor of 
Cleveland during its financial crisis in the late 1970s. See Biographical Directory of the 
United States Congress, Dennis Kucinich, http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay 
.pl?index=k000336 [http://perma.cc/3NLX -LLHQ]. 
366. See DETROIT CITY CHARTER, art. VIII. Although the chief financial officer is appointed by 
and reports to the mayor, see H.B. 5567, 97th Leg., Reg. Sess., §§ 4s(1)-(2) (Mich. 2014), the 
supervisory authority granted to the new official diminishes what had previously been the 
domain of the mayor, see DETROIT CITY CHARTER, art. VIII. In similar fashion, Congress 
established a chief financial officer of the District of Columbia when it created a financial 
control board for the district. District of Columbia Financial Responsibility and 
Management Assistance Authority Act, Pub. L. No. 104-8, 109 Stat. 97 (1995) (codified as 
amended at D.C. CODE §§ 47-391.01, 47-393 (2014)). 
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judgment that should foreclose a bankruptcy court’s visitation of the subject. 
Nor is it likely to emanate from respect for legal doctrines that caution against 
interference with local autonomy. Instead, legislative inertia is likely to result 
from political considerations that are disembodied from the optimal allocation 
of authority between the state and its localities or the optimal design of fiscally 
stable institutions within the locality. Some political deviations from ideal 
institutional design must, of course, be tolerated, if for no other reason than 
the low likelihood that political actors, such as courts, will be able to improve 
on decisions made in the political market. But where fiscal crisis translates into 
the inability of the municipality to provide the basic services for which it has 
been created, the failure of the state to address root causes signals a sufficient 
gap to warrant some redress. Since bankruptcy courts have been assigned the 
responsibility of supervising the restructuring of municipal debts and thus 
addressing the symptoms of a failed system of governance, they seem relatively 
well positioned to address the causes of that system, at least where the state 
itself has demonstrated an incapacity to intervene. 
conclusion 
According to the conventional wisdom, municipal bankruptcy can only be 
used to restructure a municipality’s debt. Attempting to reform a city’s 
governance would purportedly violate state sovereignty, as well as several key 
provisions of Chapter 9 that were drafted with state sovereignty in mind. The 
Detroit bankruptcy largely reflected this conventional wisdom. Although the 
court-appointed feasibility expert warned about the potential consequences of 
failing to address Detroit’s operational problems, Detroit restructured its debt 
without addressing the dysfunctional features of its municipal governance. 
It would be unfortunate if Chapter 9 were as limited as the conventional 
wisdom suggests. When a substantial city files for bankruptcy, its excessive 
debt may only be the external manifestation of problems that run much deeper. 
Fragmentation and related governance problems are nearly always a key 
underlying cause of the city’s financial distress. If Chapter 9 cannot address 
these deeper problems, its efficacy may be quite limited.  
In this Article, we have argued that Chapter 9 can and should address these 
deeper problems. Governance reform is a common feature of corporate 
reorganization in Chapter 11, and it is even more essential for the restructuring 
of a troubled city, since a city, unlike a corporation, cannot be liquidated or 
ownership rights transferred from one group of stakeholders to another. 
Although we acknowledge that governance reform could be challenged on 
constitutional grounds or as violating one or more provisions of Chapter 9 that 
are designed to limit the scope of bankruptcy court intervention, we believe 
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that governance reform would ultimately withstand challenge. If it does, 
Chapter 9 could prove to be a more effective tool for addressing the financial 
distress of substantial cities than even its advocates have imagined.  
